



HISTORY

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GLOSSARY

discourse of the nation The cluster of ideas and understandings that have come to surround the signifier "nation" in modern times.

historicism The view that anything in the past is shaped and to be understood in its historical context; human events and products are the result of particular causes that involve human volition in specific times and places.

nation A group of people who imagines itself to be a political community distinct from the rest of mankind and deserving of self-determination, which usually entails self-rule, control of its own territory, and perhaps a state of its own.

nationalism The sentiment or doctrine that expresses primary or ultimate loyalty to, and affection for, a particular nation and dedication to its promotion and advancement.

History as a discipline contributes both to how we understand what nations and nationalism are and to the

intellectual constitution of nations themselves. Historians participate in the active imagination of those political communities that we call nations as they elaborate the narratives that make up national histories. Yet as historians helped generate national consciousness and nationalism, their own discipline acquired the task of "discovering" or "recovering" the "national" past. Even as history as a discipline helped constitute the nation, the nation-form determined the categories in which history was written and the purposes it was to serve. At the same time historians sought to render an objective understanding of the past and propose a critique of what they considered to be "mythological" formulations. Though they often provided a base for the legitimization of nations and states, historians also questioned the metanarratives of nationalism and the restriction of history to national history.

I. WHAT IS HISTORY?

As an object of study, history does not exist like objects of the physical world to be checked and verified by simple empirical observation. While documents and monuments supply "facts" from which histories can be written, the act of writing an historical account is always one of human creation out of selected materials. In this sense, like a novel, a painting, or a table, history is a fabrication, and like more material things it can be made only with available ingredients and according to certain rules—in the case of history, critical

examination of the evidence, relative objectivity and neutrality, employment in the form of a narrative, etc. History can be distinguished from what actually occurred in the past. The historical past, in distinction from all past occurrences, exists in so far as it can be recreated and imagined. Indeed, in one particularly strong formulation, Anthony Kemp writes, "History is a literary structure whose literariness must always be denied; its grip on the imagination and on the whole perceived structure of the world is so great that its human origin, its createdness, cannot be acknowledged" (1991, 106). Yet, while it uses many of the methods of fiction and often aspires to be literary, the writing of history claims a particular relation to truth that is different from fiction. Its aspiration is to recreate a past as close as possible to what happened. History's own conventions differ from other forms of narrative writing precisely because of its self-limitation to available and verifiable evidence.

From the Greek word *istoria*, meaning research, investigation, and information, the word "history" evolved through European languages to come to mean (by the 17th century) a collection of data on the historical past. Though that data might be organized into a compelling story, perhaps for political instruction or aesthetic pleasure, the narrative in the hands of historians was supposed to stay as close as possible to the empirically discernible facts and not, as in the freer efforts of dramatists, painters, or historians of the ancient and medieval world, be allowed to depart far from the knowable and verifiable facts. From the time of Herodotus and Thucydides legends and myths were questioned and the accounts of eyewitnesses privileged. The line between factual history and fiction was often breached, but as historical practice became professionalized and academized in the 19th century a commitment to a more rigorous and austere prose, free of romantic conjecture and overt subjectivity, became more widespread.

The study of history in the modern period has been primarily dedicated to change in the evolution of political and social humanity with an effort to explain causality. Historians usually assumed that human experience was neither, on the one hand, purely arbitrary, chaotic, and impossible to explain, nor, on the other, subject to immutable laws that had the regularity and predictability of natural phenomena. Thus, history fell between social science and art in an ill-defined liminal space called "humanities." At one extreme history was sometimes practiced as if its principal purpose was simply the elucidation of facts, the collection of chronological or genealogical, rather than some synthetic or analytical interpretation of the past. More frequently, from antiquity to the Renaissance (and even into the present),

history was pressed into the service of politics or morality, rather than left as an "objective" search for truth, and history was seen as useful for moral understanding or political legitimization. With the reconfiguration of political communities as modern "nations" in the 18th and 19th centuries, intellectuals and statesmen used narratives about the past to provide legitimacy for these new political constructs. As a professional discipline of historical study developed, in many ways allied to the nation-state, history was defended as the practice of combining empirical data synthetically into a narrative that explained some aspect of the nature of the social world. But for the empirically minded the general or the meaningful was not to be imposed on the data artificially from philosophical conjectures. Rather, as Leopold von Ranke put it, "particulars carry generalities within them." Historical method was a process of induction from facts to generalizations and, perhaps, theories, rather than deductions from philosophical first principles.

For much of the history of modern Western professional history-writing, historians have been inspired by an ideal of objectivity. The past was real and knowable, and there was a historical truth that corresponded to that reality. Historical writing was to be factual and free of value, and this would require a sharp separation of the historian from politics or commitment to moral projects. Historical truth existed before interpretation, and the historian's task was to interpret as closely as possible to the facts. As Peter Novick summed up the objectivist position, "truth is one, not perspectival. Whatever patterns exist in history are found, not 'made'" (1988, 2). Though this ideal of a neutral, distant, and disinterested history was seldom achieved, a certain balance and fairness, and openness to anomaly and contradiction, was recognized as necessary for the professional historian. Thomas Haskell suggests, in a sympathetic critique of Novick, that objectivity should not be confused with neutrality. A historian's "ascetic detachment," "self-overcoming," fairness, honesty, and openness to differing perspectives in a search for more complete understandings are closer to the sense of objectivity with which most practicing historians work. Still the idea of "objective truth" in history seemed to many critics to be an ahistorical conceit, and a more historicist approach claimed that everything in the past and present is shaped by its historical time and place, including the historical observer. Nothing, not even so-called "facts" or "events," can exist outside of history, or, indeed, outside the interpretations or the discourses that give them meaning. In the words of Jacques Le Goff, "the historian starts from his own present in order to ask questions of the past. . . .

If in spite of everything, the past exists outside the present, it is vain to believe in a past independent of the one constituted by the historians" (1992, 107).

Despite the dedication to critical examination of evidence and objectivity, values and politics could not be excluded from most historical writing. Hayden White has written, "it is possible to view historical consciousness as a specifically Western prejudice by which the presumed superiority of modern industrial society can be retroactively substantiated" (1973, 2). For those historians, particularly in the 19th and 20th centuries, who organize their history as encompassing or partially illuminating the story of a nation, historical writing can be viewed as a specifically national prejudice by which the superiority, naturalness, and indeed unavoidability of the modern nation are retroactively substantiated. The argument of much national history is, in White's terms, "organicism"; that is, its strategy is "to see individual entities as components of processes which aggregate into wholes that are greater than, or qualitatively different from, the sum of their parts" (15). National historians "tend to structure their narratives in such a way as to depict the consolidation or crystallization, out of a set of apparently dispersed events, of some integrated entity whose importance is greater than that of any of the individual entities analyzed or described in the course of the narrative" (10).

II. WHAT IS A NATION?

Since the 16th century three major distinct and coherent forms of social organization have emerged to become dominant, first in Europe and the Americas and ultimately throughout the world: sovereign territorial states, capitalist economies, and human communities that conceive of themselves as "nations." Though in much historical, social scientific, liberal, and Marxist thought these developments have been described as "progressive" or "necessary," not all historians saw this evolution as preordained or inevitable, or leading predictably to a present "end of history." These social processes, however, did result in both the economic and the political hegemony of Europe over most of the globe until late in the 20th century and the establishment of the political and economic structures that provide the principal matrix of social life at the end of the second millennium of our era. Not surprisingly, then, the national form and a developmental model of historical progress remain principal modes of writing history, even after postmodernist critics have subverted meta-narratives of progress and national development.

Chronologically the first consolidation was of the state in the period of absolutism, which, though contested by aristocracies and ordinary people, established a set of political institutions that more or less monopolized the legal use of violence over a given territory and provided certain goods and services, including defense, and perhaps famine relief, to its subjects. Anthony Giddens suggests a useful definition for the absolutist state, which he sees as limited to the 16th through the early 18th centuries: "a political order dominated by a sovereign ruler, monarch, or prince, in whose person are vested ultimate political authority and sanctions, including control of the means of violence" (1981, 186). As "new monarchies" transformed themselves into absolutist states and theories of political sovereignty were elaborated, a system of autonomous and independent polities was established that was sanctified in the Peace of Westphalia (1648). While, as Giddens points out, territoriality has likely been present in all forms of society, in early modern Europe a more precise fixing of boundaries marked off the realm of the administration of the state. The great monarchs, like Louis XIV, were indeed "the state" in the sense that they were eliminating competing sovereignties within their realm and that rather than any more abstract sense of membership in a "national" community autonomous of the state, they represented the ultimate point of legal connection and loyalty of their subjects. Within this mosaic of bounded territorial polities in which legitimacy flowed down from God and his chosen prince, both capitalist economic relations and national communities developed.

"Nation" as a word in modern usage was derived from the Latin *natio* ("I am born," from *nascor*). The early meanings of nation were a group of people born in the same place or having common genetic ancestry, but also one's place of birth, or a society of university students from the same region or speaking the same language. The word came into English in the 14th century, and by the 16th century was loosely related to "group" or "class," as in Edmund Spenser's "nation" of birds in *The Faerie Queene*. Foreign or strange people were referred to as "nations," though in the 17th and 18th centuries nationalities like the Polish *szlachta* and the Hungarian magnates also designated themselves the nation.

Among the meanings attached to the word "nation" in early modern Europe, one was in a territorialized sense: all the people of a given state. Here nation was equated with the population of the state, and countrymen and nation become synonymous. This usage can be distinguished from two other senses of nation: the cultural meaning in which nation is equivalent to nationality or ethnicity, i.e., a group of people sharing a common

culture and (usually) language, and the political meaning in which nation is equivalent to state, as in the United Nations. In this last usage nation means "sovereign state" or a people that lives in and possesses a sovereign state. All of these meanings have come down to our times, both in ordinary language and in social science.

In this article "nation" is employed to mean a group of people who imagine itself to be a political community distinct from the rest of mankind and who deserves self-determination, which usually entails self-rule, control of its own territory (the "homeland"), and perhaps a state of its own. Though there were some precocious and disconnected usages of "nationalism" in earlier periods, the word came into wider circulation after 1830, particularly in the writings of Mazzini. How one uses nationalism, of course, depends on what one means by the nation. In most common usages nationalism is usually associated with ethnocultural nations, while loyalty to the state or to multinational communities is rendered as patriotism. In this article "nationalism" is the sentiment or doctrine that expresses primary or ultimate loyalty to, and affection for, a particular nation and dedication to its promotion and advancement.

The very arbitrariness and multiplicity of definitions for nation and nationalism, particularly the variety of meanings for nationalism, require that another term be employed for the cluster of ideas and understandings that came to surround the signifier "nation" in modern times (roughly post-1750). It was this available universe of meanings, what I call "the discourse of the nation," that allowed for the power of nations and nationalism to constitute collective loyalties, legitimize governments, and mobilize and inspire people to fight, kill, and die for their country. This cluster of ideas includes the conviction that humanity is naturally divided into separate and distinct nationalities or nations. Members of a nation reach full freedom and fulfillment of their essence by developing their national identity and culture, and their identity with the nation is superior to all other forms of identity—class, gender, individual, familial, tribal, regional, imperial, dynastic, religious, or state patriotic. Though the nation may be divided or graduated along several axes, it is politically and civilly (under the law) made up of equals. As in the plot of a romantic novel in which the hero and heroine of different classes find harmony and happiness in a love that transcends their social distinctions, so in the ideal of nation are class and region to be effaced in a national homogenization. The discourse of the nation acknowledges that each nation is unique, with its own separate past, present, and destiny, and that all national members share common origins, historical experiences, interests, and culture, which may include language and religion. Yet at the same time it rec-

ognizes the developmental process of the nation as unevenly and at different rates.

Within the discourse of the nation, in contrast to earlier political discourses, lies the powerful (and presently hegemonic) political claim that nations, rather than military conquerors, divinely ordained monarchs, theistic leaders, or dynasties, have unique rights to sovereignty and political representation. The people organized as a nation possesses a right to self-rule, which may have been realized occasionally in the past but ought to exist fully in the present. The moral-political claim is that nations ought to constitute sovereign states if they desire, and all legitimate states ought to represent a nation.

Flowing from the discourse of the nation is a narrative of human history that claims that the nation is always present, though often concealed, to be realized fully over time in a world of states in which the highest form is a world of nation-states. The nation may be in people unconsciously and may need to be brought forth or willed into consciousness, but in this discourse the nation is never completely subjective but always has a basis in the real world. The national history is one of continuity, antiquity of origins, heroism and past greatness, martyrdom and sacrifice, victimization, and overcoming of trauma. It is a story of the empowerment of the people—the realization of the ideals of popular sovereignty. While in some cases national history is seen as development toward realization, in others it is imagined as decline and degeneration away from proper development. In either case an interpretation of history with a proper trajectory is implied.

Nations in the modern sense exist within this discourse of the nation. They are political communities that imagine themselves in a particular way that became possible only with the coincidence of the idea that cultural communities ought to become political communities and that the ordinary people within those communities ought to be able to rule themselves or at least choose those that govern them. Finally, the modern sense of nation articulates a community of people that is separate from and grants legitimacy to the state, but is not to be conflated with the state. The nation is the imagined political community, while the modern state is the set of institutions legitimized by the nation. The nation's destiny, so the discourse of the nation projects, is to form a state, or take over an existing state, and become a nation-state.

III. A SHORT HISTORY OF HISTORY

As insistent as modern Western historiography is that it emerged in a rupture with past forms of history, the

writing of national history in particular has an often unacknowledged debt to earlier forms of history, going back at last to the Bible. Historians, like epic poets, writes Donald R. Kelly, "have always been fascinated with questions of origins, with first causes, which usually meant the founding of particular national traditions" (1998, 7–8). Early histories were often about dynasties, beginning with their sacred origins in the creation of the universe. As Pierre Gilbert argues, for the collective memory of the past to become history, there must be a sense of continuity, something that already appears in the ancient institution of monarchy with Saul, David, and Solomon. Continuity is reflected in genealogy as well as in the movement from past origins through the present moment to a glorious future.

A second mode of understanding employed by historians from their earliest works has been the division of their world into realms of civilization and barbarism. The superiority of one people over another was nowhere clearer than in the Jewish idea of a people chosen by God for a special worldly mission. Whether histories were local and bounded geographically or universal, the undulation from higher to lower forms of society through time or through space was often an organizing theme. Ancient Greek culture, often taken as the originating point for historiography, acknowledged its debt to earlier historiographies, most particularly Egyptian, but here the past was valorized as a Golden Age and the present as a decadent departure. For Herodotus what distinguished the Greeks (at least some Greeks) was Athenian liberty backed by the force of the law, which gave them strength and purpose. His ethnographic method that contrasted one people from another would be employed through the ages as a guide to comparative analysis, just as Thucydides' singular human nature based on self-interest and aggression encouraged more uniform and law-like explanations. Later Tacitus lamented the fall from glory of Rome and contrasted civilized decadence with the manly warrior democracy of the Germans.

Besides continuity and distinction from the alien other, historians introduced a third theme that would mold future national histories—the progress from one civilizational form to another. With the Christianization of the Roman Empire "the Bible provided . . . the theme of the passing of empire from one nation to another" (Kelly, 1998, 77).

Building upon Hebrew antecedents, Christianity introduced a new linear notion of time into the Greco-Roman world. The Judeo-Christian line of time literally began at one moment and would end at another, and it revealed God's purposes. In the

Christian schema, the turning points of sacred history—the Creation, Jesus's life and death, and the prospect of the Last Judgment—set the framework for all historical time.

Appelby et al., 1994, 57

Medieval history looked for the finger of God in human affairs and affirmed the universal relevance of Christianity. Whether in lives of saints or tales of miracles, or even the accounts of the secular world in chronicles, divine intervention and explanation were paramount.

Central to historical visions was the conceptualization of time and its passage. The late Middle Ages distinguished the present and past in their historical aspects and as a tragic flight of time, and this duality of historical progress and the tragedy of life and death continued into the Renaissance. Only with Enlightenment optimism was the superiority of the moderns over the ancients fully affirmed. Modernity was seen as a rupture with the medieval and progress beyond the darkness of the past.

Finally, historians had to bound their stories spatially as well as temporally. Along with universal histories of mankind or the great empires of the Mediterranean world, other chroniclers and historians took units of geography, dynasties, a specific region or people, or the state as subjects for study, as in the 6th century story of the Goths by Jordanes, the 8th and 9th century histories of the Armenians and Georgians, or the 12th century chronicle histories of the Britons by Geoffrey of Monmouth. Gregoire de Tours' history of the Franks and Bede's chronicles of Northumbria and Britain were early examples of located histories that became more common in the early modern period, as testified to by 16th century studies like Niccolò Machiavelli's *Istorie Fiorentine*, Chemnitz's history of Sweden, or Samuel Pufendorf's work on Brandenburg. From these works the historiographic traditions of modern nations would be constructed, and the antique origins and continuity of nations projected back in time. Kelly has noted that the "emergence of national traditions was due in large part to the retrospective labors of scholars—the legal fictions of jurists, the ideological constructs of publicists, the sentiments of poets, and especially the mythologizing of historians, usually with the Roman model in mind" (1998, 118).

While Renaissance scholars looked back to classical models and constructed a "political science" for the instruction of princes, with the Reformation the demands of national churches and powerful new monarchs encouraged historians and chroniclers to collect documents and tales that reinforced state sovereignty and

religious independence. "In the sixteenth century, religious history became in many ways pluralized, politicized, and polemized, subverting the master narrative of Christian universal history" (Kelley, 1998, 169). Lutheran scholars found the source of liberty in Germanic traditions, and their French Protestant colleagues likewise read their own history "as the product of pristine Germano-Celtic traditions originally free . . . from the taint of Roman tyranny" (180). A new narrative of continuity replaced an older one at the very moment of momentous rupture. As sovereigns created new territorialized states, more clearly bounded and effectively administered and policed, historians contributed both to the new imaginary of political space and, by elaborating an historical pedigree, to the legitimization of the state.

The Copernican revolution in cosmology and the retreat from divine to natural explanations seemed to require a redefinition of human nature and a new concentration on human history. A major innovation in historical thinking, largely ignored in its own time, was by an obscure Neapolitan scholar, Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), who wrote of fusing the empirical and the rational into a new science. In his *Principi di una scienza nuova* (1725), Vico proclaimed that "the social world is certainly the work of men, and it follows that one can and should find its principles in the modifications of the human intelligence itself" (in Wilson, 1972, 5). Since consciousness and will made history a subject distinct from "the insensible motion of bodies," the study of human society required different methods from the study of nature. Vico's turn toward the human as cause in history, his refusal to see history as part of nature, and his emphasis on time and place and rejection of presentism stimulated 19th century historians as different as Michelet and Marx, who each in their own way adopted his implied historicism and humanism.

The writers of the Enlightenment displayed both an interest in "natural philosophy" and the development of a "science of man." Though varied in their political and philosophical preferences, the secular intelligentsia that emerged in the 18th century was relatively united in its commitment to rationalism, empiricism, science, and secularism. They adopted an idea of progress, faith in the individual, tolerance of difference, and opposition to traditional constraints imposed by power and religion, and shared a notion of human nature—a cluster of ideas and sensibilities that later would be characterized as quintessentially modern. The philosophers of 18th century Europe displayed great interest in differences between "nations" and peoples, the savage and the civilized, East and West, and the new world and the old. Patriotism had a strong competitor in loyalty to univer-

sal values. In the cosmopolitan spirit of the age, Denis Diderot (1713–1784) confidently wrote to David Hume (1711–1776), "You belong to all nations, and you will never ask an unhappy man for his birth-certificate. I flatter myself that I am, like you, a citizen of the great city of the world."

Both in England and in France the new secularism accompanied a turn toward investigation of primary sources and the borrowing of hermeneutic methods from biblical studies. Appelby, Hunt, and Jacob have noted how archival documents were read critically by writers influenced by a "heroic model of science" and dedicated to the radical excision of the divine from the human record. Though society and nature were now seen as two separate realms, the methodology of studying the latter was applied to study of the former. Eighteenth century students of society saw history as a laboratory in which moral experiments illuminated the constancy of human nature. Hume, for example, saw "wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions" as "so many collections of experiments by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the principles of his science, in the same manner as the physician or natural philosopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and other external objects" (Carrithers, 1995, 241). History was useful, in Voltaire's view, precisely because statesmen and citizens could compare foreign laws, morals, and customs with those of their own country—all against the background of a human nature common to all. Human society looked to many Enlightenment thinkers like the Newtonian physical universe. Human actions were predictable, and their causality explicable much like physical phenomena.

Dominated by a conception of rationalism derived from the (Newtonian) physical sciences, the philosophes approached the historical field as a ground of cause-effect relationships, the causes in question being generally conceived to be the forces of reason and unreason, the effects of which were generally conceived to be enlightened men on the one hand and superstitious or ignorant men on the other.

White, 1973, 65

Yet a tension emerged between the objective and cosmopolitan imperatives of science and the older tradition of employing history to moralize about rulers and legitimize politics. Eighteenth century historiography continued to serve the state-building projects of Europe's monarchs. Enlightened, and not-so-enlightened,

monarchs commissioned historians to chronicle their achievements and challenge the views of foreigners. In Russia, for example,

Peter the Great appealed for a national history to counteract "Polish lies"; Empress Elizabeth (1742–1761) summoned historians to refute German scholars who described the early Slavs as "barbarians, resembling beasts"; Catherine [the Great] urged denunciation of the "falsehood . . . slander . . . and insolence" of the "frivolous Frenchmen" who wrote histories of Russia.

Whitaker, 1998, 34

"Man" was at the center of Enlightenment social science. Though there was not general agreement on what human nature might be, there was a widely held assumption that some fundamental nature was shared by all humans. The category "human nature" remained largely unquestioned and provided the ahistorical language against which historical change and diversity was understood. It involved the natural essence of humans, their capabilities and capacities, their power to absorb sensations and to reason, their aptitude for moral behavior, and their sociability. Though 18th century scientists were fascinated with the diversity of the human species, their study of past civilizations and primitive peoples repeatedly returned to what was constant in humans. Human nature was given and to a certain degree fixed, but nature was distinguished from society, in which humans constituted certain aspects of their individual and social selves. The unity of humankind represented an ideal for the Enlightenment historians, and the purpose of writing history was to foster that ideal in the face of evident schisms, divisions, and differences. The past of various societies gave abundant evidence of irrationality, superstition, credulity, passion, and ignorance. But over time reason expanded until a small group of rational men was able to analyze society's ills and prescribe reasonable remedies. As White puts it, "the Enlighteners, therefore, wrote history against history itself, or at least against that segment of history which they experienced as 'past'" (1973, 64).

Western historiography "made time universal and evolutionary and arrayed all the peoples, structures, and institutions in every epoch along its line, labeling each people and era in terms of its level of development. Time became real and sequential, and historians became those who could measure development by progress toward modern, Western time . . ." (Appelby et al., 1994, 53). Through observation, classificatory schema, and con-

ceptual histories, the Enlightenment theorists attempted to explain the origins and evolution of society and civilization. The Baron de Montesquieu traced the differences among peoples to climate, contrasting the indolent people of the hot climes to the more self-reliant people of the north. Hume argued in a similar way in his "Essay of National Characters," while Rousseau reversed the valences in his *Essai sur l'origine des langues* (*Essay on the Origin of Languages*) and placed the origins of liberty in the south and despotism in the north.

Enlightenment historical theorists, like Pierre Bayle and Voltaire, distinguished among true, satirical, and fabulous histories, and observed that actual histories were most often a mixture of these elements. Reason, however, rather than imagination, was the instrument with which to discover truth. History, which was about real life, was to be discerned through the use of reason; fancy and imagination were to be relegated to the realm of art, not life or history. Yet historical knowledge continued to be used for partisan purposes, even polemics, in the service of what was understood to be truth. In his *Essai sur les moeurs* (1756) Voltaire wrote of the development of civilization as the progressive emergence of humane government, tolerant religion, respect for personal rights, equality before the law, and the protection of property against arbitrary state power. Though Voltaire referred to the late of nations, nations as units of analysis were incidental to his overall story. The nation was seen as a political creation rather than a natural phenomenon, something made by, and malleable in the hands of, a great ruler, and the ultimate objects of historical study were states and "civilizations"—a new conception, the word for which was coined in the 18th century.

IV. HISTORY MEETS THE NATION

With the explosive break of European colonies with their motherlands, beginning with the American Revolution, the idea of nations as new polities endowed with rights of self-governance entered the language of politics. Though prelaced by rhetorics of nation and popular sovereignty in England's glorious Revolution of 1688, the invocation of nation as a break with tradition and older forms of political legitimization took on a universal power with the French Revolution of 1789. At roughly the same time a notion of nation as a community of people with a common culture and similar aspirations and political endowments emerged as a central subject in historical writing, most importantly in the universal histories of Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803). For

Herder, nations were individual and possessed different cultures, expressed in law, religion, and poetry. Their national characters were natural essences created by climate and nature, and he celebrated the uniqueness of each phenomenon and the differences and distinctions among peoples. Nature (or God) created the plurality of languages and cultures, or, as Isaiah Berlin puts it, "a nation is made what it is by 'climate,' education, relations with its neighbours, and other changeable and empirical factors, and not by an impalpable inner essence or an unalterable factor such as race or colour" (1976, 163). Herder believed that what history had produced and had grown naturally was good. Providence guided history and gave it purpose and the direction of its progress. While nations differed in terms of climate, blood mixture, and folk spirit, humanity was one unit in which nations should live harmoniously. Everything was part of an indispensable whole—a benevolent process.

His *Nationalismus*, a word he apparently created, was cultural rather than political. Applying Leibniz's concept of development to peoples, Herder saw civilizations, like flowers, budding, blossoming, and fading. All human values and understandings were historical and national. Herder emphasized transformation and change through time but always with a sense of an overall order. In the flow and seeming chaos of history there were constancies, namely nations, dynamic and vital, changing but possessing a constancy of spirit. In search of the soul of the nation, Herder collected his people's folk songs, read Norse poetry and mythology, and analyzed the prose of Martin Luther. Language was for Herder intimately connected to culture and community—the medium through which humans understood and thought, and were conscious and able to express their inner selves. "Language expresses the collective experience of the group," he wrote (in Berlin, 1976, 169). Through language people understood that they share a culture and historical tradition and therefore form a *Volk*. Rather than biological or racial unity, a people for Herder was a matter of shared awareness of the social milieu into which one was born, and which provided the basis for a "collective political identity." Truth, value, and beauty are diverse and found in the national spirit, and true art and poetry were always national and historical.

Though Herder contrasted the particularity of the nation and its *Volksgeist* or *Kultur* to the universalistic rationality of the French Enlightenment, he was at the same time a creature of the Enlightenment, explaining his own philosophy of history in naturalistic and scientific terms. Often credited as the founder of what would later be called "historicism" or "the historical sense," Herder saw history not simply as the source of political

stratagems but as a way to understand human reality distinct from the application of abstract reason. The real nature of things could only be discerned in historical development. Each age contained a heritage from the past that it passed on to the next age, and a people, the *Volk*, rather than humanity as a whole, was the carrier of culture. Providence worked through particular peoples to cause humans and institutions to make change. Since every nation has its own unique values, Herder and subsequent historicists eschewed judgment or ranking of peoples. "Everything has come to bloom upon the earth which could do so, each in its own time, and in its own milieu," he wrote, "and it will bloom again, when its time comes" (in White, 1973, 7). Yet, it should be noted that Herder's "nations" are not the same cultural units that would call themselves nations in the 19th and 20th centuries. The Slavs, for example, constituted a single cultural unity (as for Edward Gibbon and Hegel as well). Herder celebrated diversity, but what to some might seem to be a dangerous relativism and an anarchy of values in his enthusiastic ethnographies is redeemed by the faith that all history, like all nature, reflects God and His divine plan. Though multiple in form, humankind for Herder is one.

Proclaiming the national as the source of value, Herder stimulated intellectuals around Europe to follow him in collecting folk poetry and to seek the sources of national spirit in the folk. At the same time Herder's love of nations did not extend to the state. He despised government and power, the great absolutist monarchs of his time, and celebrated the cleansing force of the French Revolution. But even as Herder's work appeared, the colossal political upheavals in France and the Napoleonic expansion across Europe radically shifted the thinking of his countrymen about history and the nation. The universalist faith of the Enlightenment in general principles applicable everywhere was shaken by the turn toward the Terror and imperialism.

Herder's more cosmopolitan approach to the nation, in which each nation as part of the tapestry of humankind enriched others, gave way to a more particularistic view of the superior qualities of one nation over another. In 1806 Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) proclaimed that, unlike the French, Germans had not lost touch with their original genius that flowed from their language, and in 1814 Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835) sought a harsh peace for France at the Congress of Vienna by vilifying the French national character as lacking a "striving for the divine which the French lack not only as a nation but virtually without exception also as individuals" (Iggers, 1983, 55). Increasingly, people, nation, and state were closely identified, and

both Fichte and Humboldt saw the state as the principal protector and moral teacher of the nation. Fichte argued in an essay on Machiavelli that "there is neither law nor right except the right of the stronger," and Humboldt proclaimed,

Germany must be free and strong, not only to be able to defend herself against this or that neighbor, or for that matter, against any enemy, but because only a nation which is strong toward the outside can preserve the spirit within from which all domestic blessings flow. Germany must be free and strong, even if she is never put to a test, so that she may possess the self-assurance required for her to pursue her development as a nation unhindered and that she may be able to maintain permanently the position which she occupies in the midst of the European nations, a position which is so beneficial to these nations.

Iggers, 1983, 54

It was in the midst of the emergence of this new form of nationalism and the crisis of state-building in Germany that academic history took shape in the early 19th century. University chairs of history were founded in Berlin in 1810 (with Humboldt playing a key role) and in Paris in 1812. The connection between the postrevolutionary nationalism and state politics of Germany and France and professional historians was intimate, and within a decade historical societies were created to collect and publish historical documents along national lines: the society for the *Monumenta Germaniae* in 1819 and the *École des Chartes* in 1821. Governments soon supported these efforts, while professional historians founded their disciplinary journals, usually with a distinct national focus, for example, the *Archiv für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde* (1820), the *Danish Historisk tidsskrift* (1840), *Archivio storico italiano* (1842), *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte* (1848), the *Historische Zeitschrift* (1859), the *Revue historique* (1876), the *Rivista storica italiana* (1884), the *English Historical Review* (1886), the *Swedish Historisk tidsskrift* (1889), and the *American Historical Review* (1895). Graduate programs in history, based on the German model, spread eastward to Russia and westward to the Americas at the end of the century, and history-writing became a distinct, professional, academized intellectual practice. But as Hayden White has pointed out,

the theoretical basis of its disciplinization remained unclear. The transformation of historical thinking from an amateur activity into a profes-

sional one was not attended by the sort of conceptual revolution that has accompanied such transformations of other fields, such as physics, chemistry, and biology. Instruction in the "historical method" consisted essentially of an injunction to use the most refined philological techniques for the criticism of historical documents, combined with a set of statements about what the historian ought not to attempt on the basis of the documents thus criticized.

1973, 136

History was conceived neither as a science in the Newtonian sense nor as a "free art" in the romantics' sense of imaginative creativity. Most historians of the 19th century conceived of the "historical method" as

a willingness to go to the archives without any preconceptions whatsoever, to study the documents found there, and then to write a story about the events attested by the documents in such a way as to make the story itself the explanation of "what had happened" in the past. The idea was to let the explanation emerge naturally from the documents themselves, and then to figure its meaning in story form. The notion that the historian himself emplotted the events found in the documents was only vaguely glimpsed by thinkers sensitive to the poetic element in every effort at narrative description—by a historian like J. G. Droysen, for example, and by philosophers like Hegel and Nietzsche, but by few others. To have suggested that the historian emplotted his stories would have offended most nineteenth-century historians.

1973, 141–142

Central to the practice of professional history in the 19th century, first in Germany and later throughout Europe and the Americas, was the historicist approach or what Georg G. Iggers calls "the German conception of history." "The core of the historicist outlook," writes Iggers,

lies in the assumption that there is a fundamental difference between the phenomena of nature and those of history, which requires an approach in the social and cultural sciences fundamentally different from those of the natural sciences. Nature, it is held, is the scene of the eternally recurring, of phenomena themselves devoid of conscious

purpose; history comprises unique and unduplicable human acts, filled with volition and intent. The world of man is in a state of incessant flux, although within it there are centers of stability (personalities, institutions, nations, epochs), each possessing an inner structure, a character, and each in constant metamorphosis in accord with its own internal principles of development. History thus becomes the only guide to an understanding of things human. There is no constant human nature; rather the character of each man reveals itself only in its development.

1983, 5

Without a doubt the exemplar, and greatest European influence, of 19th century historiography was Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886). As a young man he had read and was greatly influenced by Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation*, but as a Saxon, not a Prussian, he was less enthusiastic than many of his intellectual contemporaries about emerging German nationalism and its project of political unification. His historicism led him to defend the local and provincial particularities of the various German states. Every people, Ranke believed, had its own genius and its own politics, and therefore, there was no need to import foreign political forms. Like the poet Goethe he remained a cultural nationalist and felt no overriding obligation to Prussia as a fatherland, even after he became a teacher in the kingdom of Prussia. Even after he became a defender of the Prussian state in the 1830s, his support of Bismarck was much delayed.

Following the ideas of Humboldt's important essay, "On the Task of the Historian" (1821), Ranke saw history as a particular way to comprehend reality, distinct from deductive philosophy. Critical study of the sources the historian, using his intuition, to discern elements of the divine plan. Both Humboldt and Ranke thought that history was an art form that could represent reality as it actually appeared in time and space. Both believed that the great varieties in history were part of a harmonious whole that automatically restored the rightful order if was disturbed. Ranke's Christian God and His meaning were always present in history, to be discovered by examining the facts, which were the concrete manifestations of metaphysical forces. The way to discover the order and divine process in human affairs was to read critically the sources and stick close to the empirical facts. He opposed the "principles of representation" found in Sir Walter Scott's works, the philosophizing ap-

proach of Hegel, religious dogmatism, and the mechanistic and positivist analyses of physical science and the prevailing social theory of his time. Ranke also stood against the enemies of the church (materialism, rationalism), threats to the state (capitalism, imperialism, racism, liberalism), and opponents of the nation (socialism, communism, ecumenical religion). But, as Iggers points out, "inherent in this type of historicism which Ranke espouses is always the threat that, if Christian faith is shaken, history will lose its meaning and present man with the anarchy of values" (1983, 69). Closely behind historicism stalked relativism.

In his first major work, *History of the Latin and Teutonic Nations, 1494–1535* (1824), Ranke sought not to judge the past, but to "show what actually happened." In this work Ranke saw the interaction of Latins and Teutons as the creative foundation of a civilization that could be distinguished from Europe and Christendom as a whole. Though he acknowledged that contributions of various nationalities (and marginalized others like the Slavs), Ranke emphasized the overall integration of cultures into a single amalgamated civilization. Ultimately he wrote 12 volumes of Prussian history, 5 on the French monarchy, and 6 on 17th century England, but he conceived of his work as part of general European and world history. He considered history to be universal. History, unlike politics, need not, indeed should not, be concerned with a given state. Churches and states were institutions created by God to bring order to disorderly humanity. They were the institutions through which a people constituted itself as a nation. In the Middle Ages, he wrote, the "peaceful progress" of peoples into nations was hindered, but eventually reformers emerged in the Renaissance and Reformation who attacked the idea of the universal church and the universal state (while maintaining the essential unity of European culture and Christianity) and introduced the "national" idea. This constitution of nations led to a new phase of European civilization and historical development. New rules for governing the relations of people, church, and state within the nation developed along with rules among the various nations, namely, the balance of power. Ranke, like Michelet, saw the French Revolution as the moment when nations came into the final stage of self-consciousness and the great powers found a common purpose in maintaining each by all the others. By the mid-17th century history had ended, and the shape of future development had been fixed.

Though Ranke would be attacked by fervently nationalistic historians in the second half of the 19th century for his tepid patriotism, his history was firmly founded in the story of the emergence of nations and contributed

to the conviction that this process was a universal, natural, or divinely ordained, inevitable process. For Ranke the nation was the sole possible principle of organizing humans for "peaceful progress." The principle of nationality was the only safeguard against humanity falling back into barbarism and had to be treasured as an eternal, immutable idea of God, though only knowable when actually realized in an historical form, when peoples actually become nations. "In short," White concludes, "Ranke made of the reality of his own time the ideal for all time. He admitted the possibility of genuine transformation, revolution, convulsion, only for ages prior to his own; but the future for him was merely an indefinite extension of his own present" (1973, 173).

Like Hegel and unlike Herder, Ranke saw the state as a positive good. The state in his historical work was conceived in the image of the absolutist states of early modern Europe and operated in their own interests, largely unencumbered by internal divisions and politics. Whereas a British historian in the Whig tradition might trace the evolution of parliamentary institutions, or a French historian, like Jules Michelet (1798–1874), might laud the moment of national effervescence in 1789, a German historian of the 19th century was likely to emphasize the distance between government and those governed. While in his *Englische Geschichte* Ranke identified the history of the English nation with that of parliament, in his French and German histories the identity was with the monarchs. The state was guided by its own principles and interests, which in Ranke's view were the achievement of the greatest independence and strength in the competitive constellation of states. His history, thus, was largely political and diplomatic, and its agents great statesmen, warriors, or thinkers. The social setting or the role of ordinary people was hardly sketched in. German historians in this tradition

tended to believe that the Hohenzollern monarchy, with its aristocratic and authoritarian aspects and its unique bureaucratic ethos, guaranteed a better bulwark for the defense of individual liberties and juridical security than a democracy in which policy would be more responsive to the whims of public opinion than to considerations of reason of state.

Iggers, 1983, 15

This idealization of political power as it had been constituted in 19th century Prussia and Germany was part of the legacy Ranke passed on to his more secular successors.

"Ranke's influence," a later historian noted, "can scarcely be overestimated." When in the second half of the century German historiography became politicized and historians took up the cause of unification, "he remained the conscience of German historical science even during periods when it entered with nationalistic political vehemence into the struggle over Germany's transformation" (Goetz, 1937, 377). Ranke was responsible for making historicism respectable. The view that all human institutions and values originate within history and that the nature of things can only be comprehended within historical processes extended into the early 20th century with the social thinkers Wilhelm Dilthey, Wilhelm Windelband, and Heinrich Rickert in Germany. Its most notable practicing historians, like Friedrich Meinecke and Ernst Troeltsch, believed historicism to have "liberated modern thought from the two-thousand-year domination of the theory of natural law," and to have replaced "the conception of the universe in terms of timeless, absolutely valid truths which correspond to the rational order dominant throughout the universe" . . . with an understanding of the fullness and diversity of man's historical experience" (Iggers, 1983, 5). But German historicism was not simply a method, as it declared itself, but also had normative and political content. As Iggers points out, it "viewed the state as the product of historical forces" and abandoned the cultural-centered historiography of Voltaire and Gibbon for a nation-centered narrative that tended to idealize certain political forms. In writing such a history the historicists proposed a certain understanding of the proper nation and its relationship to its past and to the state authorities. Even German moderate liberals of the mid-19th century adopted what Leonard Krieger calls "the German idea of Freedom" and, like Hegel and Ranke, saw the state as ethical, a natural product of historical forces, rather than as a foe, the political ally of liberty. As Bismarck transformed the kingdom of Prussia into the German empire, German historians emerged as vocal spokesmen for the imperial project. Johann Gustav Droysen (1808–1884), the founder of the "Prussian School" of historians, legitimized the House of Hohenzollern's role in history as part of a "divine order" in which Prussia, more than any other state, moved in the line of historical development. When constitutionalism failed to bring about German unification in 1848, he and many of his fellow historians backed Prussia as the means to the national end. As state officials, university professors were expected to show patriotic loyalty and champion the efforts at state-building. Deviants or critics, like the social historian Karl Lamprecht, were severely attacked or had their careers terminated.

The tension between a narrative of an emerging nation, with themes of resurrection and past glories and heroes, and the disciplined empiricism preached by Ranke was resolved in several national historiographies in favor of a more romantic representation of the past. Even historians less directly engaged in nationalist or state-building projects were deeply affected by the emerging discourse of the nation that assumed without serious questioning the natural division of humanity into separate and distinct nations, the generally progressive evolution of peoples into nations, and the claim that nations had a unique right to sovereignty and political representation. Though their method was ostensibly objective and "realist," that is, dedicated to apprehending the world "as it actually is," their observations most often confirmed both the shape and the value of the world as it had evolved by the time of their own writing. "As it actually is" slipped imperceptibly into "as it ought to be."

British historiography of the 19th century was marked by what Herbert Butterfield later called the "Whig Interpretation of History," and nowhere was this more classically exemplified than in the most widely read history of England of the period (selling an incredible 140,000 five-volume sets!)—that of Thomas Babington Macaulay (1800–1859). Here the great English political achievement, stretching back to the Magna Carta and coming to fruition in the Glorious Revolution, was the creation of a parliamentary political system that out of revolution and reform made the former unnecessary. The origins of the nation were pushed back into the Middle Ages and a continuous lineage of constitutional development was represented as the center of the national formation. The great constitutional historian William Stubbs (1829–1901) held up the Magna Carta as the moment when the nation achieved a unity between the Saxon and the Norman elements in its constitution. The political lesson to be learned was that progressive, timely reform and the establishment of liberty were the bases for national stability. England's political evolution was held up as an example to the world of the proper destiny of humankind.

In this Whig historiography British history was largely written as English history and demonstrated the genius of a particular Protestant people, to the detriment of the Scots, who were constructed as culturally backward, and the Irish, who to their misfortune remained Catholic. Though William E. H. Lecky (1838–1903) would alone treat the Irish question sympathetically as a part of British history, his nemesis, James Anthony Froude (1818–1894), saw the Irish as unfit for self-government and as ungrateful beneficiaries of the British Empire. John Robert Seeley (1834–1895) developed this

theme of empire as a replacement for Macaulay's liberty. His history, like those of Macaulay and Froude, was extraordinarily popular, reshaping the national identity of Britain in an imperial direction. Empire was the proof positive of the rightness of the national mission and the superior qualities of the English. A third approach to national history, that of Frederick William Maitland (1850–1906), traced the story of liberty back to the Norman Conquest, but arguing that the medieval parliament was more a royal court of law than a representative assembly opened the way for a counternarrative of the state, marrying the story of liberty to the monarchy. However, the national narrative was not consistently about a rise to glory, power, and liberty. In the hands of Thomas Carlyle, a biographical approach and an emphasis on great men were organized around a trope of national decline fostered by the spread of democracy and industrialism. Carlyle's pessimism and Macaulay's triumphal arch of liberty may be said to have come together in the "last Whig historian," George Macaulay Trevelyan (1876–1962), who was dismayed that English values such as common sense and tolerance were threatened by the mass society of the interwar world.

In France it was during the post-Napoleonic Restoration that historians like François Guizot (1787–1874) and Augustin Thierry (1795–1856) elaborated a national story that both legitimized the nation-state and defended off challenges from Catholic reaction and popular radicalism. The national liberals emphasized compromise and unity, enterprise, and the struggle against unearned privilege and arbitrary power. As a historian of French historians writes,

Their aim was to demonstrate that individualism was compatible with cohesive models of human association. They argued that parliamentary forms of government were admirable because they gave space to individual freedom but nonetheless preserved social cohesion. . . . History was called upon to fulfill an integrative function, demonstrating to individuals that they belonged to a community which somehow remained the same despite being embroiled within the dynamic process of historical change over the centuries. History validated society or, more accurately, history confirmed the bourgeois nation as the site of the promised reconciliation between individual will and collective purpose.

Crossley, 1999, 53

Instead of accepting the conservative theocratic view that only through submission to divinely sanctioned

rulers can society and the state be maintained, historians provided a story of the creation and emergence of community through time. Michelet, who admired and translated Vico, saw a universal striving for unity in history that historians must capture and reflect. For him the first year of the French Revolution was the moment at which the divisions of the *ancien régime* were overcome and the unity of the native land was achieved. His *Précis d'histoire moderne* (1827) became standard reading in French schools in the next two decades. A myth of "geographic predestination of the French nation" and an "idea of a virtual France existing before the historical France" can already be found in Michelet and was popularized by the writers of schoolbooks.

Yet even as they contributed to the constitution of the nation, national or nationalist historians were never simply or completely servants of the nation-state but often presented critical perspectives that made politicians and patriots uncomfortable. Governments of ostensibly national states, often supportive of the efforts of national historians, were occasionally intolerant of the independence of professional historians and dismissed and punished those whose views conflicted with official policy or popular views. Guizot—historian, statesman, holder of the first chair in modern history at the University of Paris, and the editor of a 31-volume collection of French memoirs—lost his post at the Sorbonne for teaching "ideas" rather than "facts." Radicals like Ludwig Feuerbach and D. F. Strauss were barred from the academy in Germany. The romantic nationalist Michelet, the most influential historian of France of the period of the July Monarchy (1830–1848), was fired when the revolutionary and democratic ideals he espoused were rejected by the Second Empire (1852–1870). Governments of empires, like Russia and Austria, were even less hospitable to nationalist and liberal ideas. In the reign of Nicholas I (1825–1855) of Russia even a conservative patriot like Mikhail Pogodin, a historian who passionately loved autocracy and empire and held the first chair in Russian history at Moscow University, was periodically reprimanded by state officials.

Two different kinds of historical writing developed in nonnational imperial states like Russia—a state patriotic historiography and a nationalist literature of the subject peoples. With the emergence of an autonomous intelligentsia in the second third of the 19th century, an intense discussion developed on the nature of Russia and its relation with the West and with Asia, as well as with its internal "others," the nonethnic Russians within the empire. As with other peoples and states of Europe in the postrevolutionary period, East European intellectuals, particularly historians, were in a sense

thinking nations into existence or at least elaborating and propagating the characteristics, symbols, and signs that would make the contours of the nation familiar to a broader public. From Nikolai Karamzin's *Istoriia gosudarstva rossiskogo* (*History of the Russian State*) to the great synthetic works of Sergei Solov'ev and Vasilii Kliuchevskii, historians treated Russia as something like a nation-state, in many ways reflected in the West European models but uniquely multiethnic in its composition. Karamzin's contribution was particularly significant, for his work, extremely popular among educated readers, provided a colorful, patriotic narrative of Russia's past up to the Time of Troubles of the early 17th century. But his history was also a defense of a particular form of government. As he emphasized in his secret memorandum to Alexander I, *Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia* (1811), Karamzin believed that autocracy and a powerful state were responsible for Russia's greatness.

Nationalist histories were foundational to the conviction that nonruling nationalities were distinct nations with historical continuity even though they did not possess states of their own. *Geschichte von Böhmen* (1844–1867) by the Czech patriot František Palacký and the efforts of the Ukrainian historian Mykola Kostomarov provided their people with a claim to nationhood precisely because they possessed a history. Building on long textual traditions and earlier histories, Jews and Armenians developed national historiographies both in the principal cities of the empires in which they lived (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Tbilisi [Tiflis], Istanbul) and far from their lands of settlement (in the case of the Armenians, in Venice). Even as Marx and Engels condemned "historyless peoples" to evolutionary oblivion or called one of their spokesmen, Palacký, "a learned German run mad," nationalist historians shored up their future with elaborated pasts.

Though Herder spoke of cultures as "peoples" or "nations," in the 18th and early 19th centuries the idea of a political nation was far from synonymous with an ethnolinguistic community. In both the American and the French revolutions "nation" was understood as a community that came together historically and subscribed to shared principles. The nation was proud of its newness and cosmopolitan quality—its universal appeal—rather than desperately searching for ancient roots or a homogeneous ethnic culture, as would become the common practice half a century later. But if "nations only exist because of the will of their citizens to accept themselves as a unified body," the principal problem for Americans at the time of independence was how "to create the sentiments of nationhood which

other countries took for granted. There was no uniform ethnic stock, no binding rituals from an established church, no common fund of stories, only a shared act of rebellion" (Appelby *et al.*, 1994, 91). Americans had to invent what they thought Europeans had inherited.

The fighting of the War for Independence had not turned Americans into a united people. Rather it had created the . . . imperative to form a more perfect union once the practical tasks of fighting a common enemy and securing a peace treaty no longer exerted centripetal pressure. . . . Those commonalities that did exist among them—those of language, law, and institutional history—all pointed in the wrong direction, backward to the past, toward an association with England, whose utility as a contemptible oppressor could not easily be done without.

95

A distinctly American national identity began to be forged in the 1790s, when the French Revolution validated an interpretation that 1776 had been "the initial act in a historic drama of liberation, now sweeping Europe" (97). A new history claimed that the Declaration of Independence was the end of a long development in colonial times and that American values and behaviors were distinct from those of Europe. God was present in this history. America's national destiny and God's plan neatly coincided in the work of the first important American historian, George Bancroft, a student of Ranke. Not only was the United States unique, and not only was it a model for other nations, but its destiny included the conquest of much of a continent.

The early professional American historians have been characterized ideologically as "conservative evolutionists." They viewed American history as the story of freedom gained through national solidarity and were concerned about the need for national unity and reconciliation, particularly after the Civil War and in the face of massive immigration.

As Ranke's faith in history as the unfolding of God's grand design protected him from doubts about the objectivity of his labors, so the secular faith of the American professionals . . . guaranteed that their message, for all the austerity of its prose, was a profoundly moral one. There was no tension between disinterested scholarship on the one hand, and patriotic duty or moral engagement on

the other: the former, through the self-evident ethical and political truths it revealed, satisfied the latter.

Novick, 1988, 85

Like the national historians of ruling European nations, American historians worked to legitimize the particular form of polity and national community in which they lived.

German historical norms conquered North American historians in the last decades of the century, but when the Americans borrowed Ranke's realism and the notion of *wissenschaftliche Objektivität* (scholarly objectivity), they left out his search for the divine or "essential" and interpreted his work as the purest empiricism—facts without generalization or interpretation. In America Ranke was the prophet of secularism, unphilosophical empiricism, and a turn away from speculation and philosophy. "German *Wissenschaft*," writes Novick, "became Anglo-American 'science'" (31). Starting with the "blank slate" epistemology of John Locke, American historians added their idea of the inductivism of Francis Bacon's scientific method—observation without preconceptions—and a faith in scholarly neutrality.

This, then, was the model of scientific method which, in principle, the historians embraced. Science must be rigidly factual and empirical, shunning hypothesis; the scientific venture was scrupulously neutral on larger questions of end and meaning; and, if systematically pursued, it might ultimately produce a comprehensive, "definitive" history. It is in the light of this conception of *wissenschaftliche Objektivität* that they regarded themselves as loyal followers of Ranke.

37

In the last decades of the 19th century and the first of the 20th, historicism was attacked by the new social sciences, not only for its naive inductivism, but also "for its presupposition that the nation was the sole possible unit of social organization (and the sole desirable one) and its conviction that, *therefore*, national groups constituted the sole viable units of historical imagination" (White, 1973, 175). Social science turned toward more generic human problems of a transnational character and articulated other units of analysis, like society and culture. The French sociologist Emile Durkheim denied history the status of science, for it dealt too insistently with the particular and not with the general or

lawlike. In Germany Max Weber criticized historians for being too descriptive, but in his search for causal explanations he scrupulously historicized his sociological treatments of the state and religion. In Germany they spoke of a "crisis of historicism," while in America an important group of historians worried about their loss of religion, the impossibility of objectivity, and the consequent descent into relativism. "New Historians" in the United States, like Frederick Jackson Turner, Charles Beard, Carl Becker, Perry Miller, and Vernon Parrington, reserved an optimistic faith in American democracy, but as self-styled "Progressive Historians" they presented provocative and critical revisions of older historiographical assumptions. More radical and pessimistic critiques of standard histories were presented by the Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt and the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche rejected the notion that historical objectivity was a possibility. Much of the scientific optimism and sense of progress that had made narrative history an appropriate form for presenting the nation eroded at the turn of the century, only to fall away even more quickly with the devastation of World War I.

Science had offered prewar historians not just a method—well or ill understood—but above all a vision of a comprehensible world: a model of certitude, or unambiguous truth; knowledge that was definite, and independent of the values or intentions of the investigator. None of these characteristics were to survive the first third of the [20th] century.

Novick, 1988, 134–135

What did survive, and even intensify in the first half of the new century, was the essential historicism of professional history and its focus on and location in the nation, which remained a powerful frame for the practice of writing history in the new century.

V. HISTORIANS AND NATIONALISM

In the years between World War I and World War II professional academic history was challenged on the left by an invigorated Marxist worldview from Soviet historians, like Mikhail Pokrovskii and Nikolai Bukharin, and from the right by chauvinist and racist retellings of German, Italian, and French history by fascist and Nazi historians. An influential school of historians in France, led by Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch, broke

out of the nation-form and explored the social history and mentalities of periods, like the Middle Ages, or regions, like la Franche-Comté. The *Annales* school, named after the journal founded in 1929, abandoned the concept of linear time and the related grand narratives of historical or national development. At the same time a number of historians, primarily in the United States and Britain, rejected both the hypernationalism of the right and the class analysis of the left, and attempted to develop an historical and conceptual literature on nationalism itself. While important writers on nationalism, like E. H. Carr and Alfred Cobban, primarily focused on the international state system and problems of self-determination, the most influential historians writing on nationalism in the interwar period and into the postwar years, Carleton J. H. Hayes and Hans Kohn, operated largely in the tradition of intellectual history, concentrating on the major nationalist thinkers beginning with Herder and Fichte.

As a young historian at Columbia University, Hayes (1882–1964) opened his first major study on nationalism with the confident claim that "the most significant emotional factor in public life today is nationalism" (1926, 1). For Hayes both nationality—a "group of people who speak either the same language or closely related dialects, who cherish common historical traditions, and who constitute or think they constitute a distinct cultural society" and nation—"a nationality that acquires political unity and sovereign independence"—were objective, real communities: the first cultural, and the second political (5). Exploring historically the origins of nationality, Hayes rejected racial, geographic, or human nature explanations, as well as any notion of the "soul of the people," "national character," or inherent mental or spiritual differences between human groups. Instead he accepted the existence of a "national mind," a psychological force which impels the members of a nationality-group toward some community of thought and action" (9). Nationalism was a "condition of mind," an emotion, and the fusion of love of country or native land (patriotism) with nationality.

His object of study was the ways in which nationalities acquired historically generated coherences and differences. Nationality came into being when a group acquired a common language, which then became the transmitter of historical memory, but it was embedded in fundamental aspects of human nature: the use of language, an innate human sense of history, a natural gregariousness, a need for something internal, a propensity for faith in some power outside oneself, proneness to celebrate heroism, and collective fighting prowess. Once cultural distinctions appeared, they in turn

gave rise to beliefs that the members of one nationality were different from all others, indeed that they were the "tabernacle of a unique civilization." Thus, nationalities, though mutable, have existed from the "dawn of history" and are the natural way human society divides itself. Historical development, Hayes argued, led to the dissolving of multinational communities and states into single nationalities and ethnonational states, just as Austria-Hungary was dissolved after World War I.

While nationalities for Hayes were ancient, nationalism was the modern fusion of patriotism (love of one's natal land, which was natural for all settled peoples) with nationality. This modern phenomenon preached a unique twofold doctrine:

That each nationality should constitute a united independent sovereign state, and . . . that every state should expect and require of its citizens not only unquestioning obedience and supreme loyalty, not only an exclusive patriotism, but also unshakable faith in its surpassing excellence over all other nationalities and lofty pride in its peculiarities and its destiny.

26

Nationalism built on natural feelings of humans but also required historical interventions, like the Humanists' purification of Latin which distanced the universal literary language from vernaculars, which in turn became the important literary languages of the 15th and 16th centuries; and the invention of printing, which "served to stereotype the common spoken languages, to fix for each a norm of literary usage, and to render possible the dissemination of national literature among the masses" (33). Literary differentiation led to political differentiation and the erection of sovereign national states. These new states promoted national consciousness, created national units of economic life, and fragmented the universal church into national churches. By the 17th century Western Europe already contained a number of national states, among them Sweden, Denmark, Holland, France, Spain, Portugal, and England. But it was the French and industrial revolutions that contributed to national consciousness by adding the "dogma of national democracy" and further strengthening national economies. Finally, the Age of Romanticism provided nationalism with "a purposeful doctrine" that exalted emotion and an idealized past, and promoted revival of folk traditions and appeals to history, soil, language, and the people.

the Hebrews came "the idea of the chosen people, the emphasis on a common stock of memory of the past and hopes for the future, and finally national messianism" (11). Though centuries of universalism intervened from the time of ancient Israel and the Greek polis, linguistic and religious pluralism reemerged in early modern times. "Against the universalism of the past, the new nationalism glorified the peculiar and the parochial, national differences and national individualities" (15). Kohn dates modern nationalism from the late 18th century with its emergence in northwestern Europe and North America. From then on nationalism became inextricably linked with ideas of popular sovereignty. Unthinkable before the emergence of the modern state in the 16th to 18th centuries, eventually nationalism demanded the nation-state and each strengthened the other.

Hayes' and Kohn's grand narratives of the evolution of nationalism coincided quite closely, but Kohn more dramatically contrasted a rational Western nationalism with the romantic nationalism of Germany and the East. German nationalism, beginning with Herder and the romantic, replaced citizenship (*Staatsbürgerschaft*) with the vaguer concept of "folk" (*volk*), "which lent itself more easily to the embroideries of imagination and the excursions of emotion" (Kohn, 1965, 30). After the effervescence of the "spring of the peoples" in 1848, nationalism entered the age of *Machtpolitik* (power politics) and *Realpolitik*, a policy based on power and self-interest and not on humanitarian declarations. Biologized and racialized in the later 19th century, nationalism was allied with anti-Semitism and proto-totalitarian movements that eventually culminated in the chauvinism, imperialism, and exterminationism of fascism and the Third Reich. "The new nationalism 'justified' its merciless struggle with its passionate hatreds and cold-blooded liquidations by appealing to the necessities of history, to 'God-ordained' nationalist mission or to the evocation of a distant past" (80).

Typologizing nationalisms into Western and Eastern, the one rational and emancipatory, and the other emotional and authoritarian, Kohn traced their historical evolution from their Western Europe origins to their spread eastward in a wave-like motion, leaving older, more religious and traditional ideologies in their wake. The thrust of the argument is that nationalism, once formulated, spread and diffused by imitation and importation. But as it moved to the east, and as it moved through time, nationalism lost its original rational and civic qualities and became ever more irrational and organic. Though he may not have been the first to distinguish Western and Eastern forms of nationalism, Kohn

was certainly responsible for their normativization and this Manichaean dichotomy's widespread entry into the subsequent literature. His prolific output in the postwar years established him, along with Hayes, as the preeminent authority on the subject of nationalism. Most historians and historical sociologists following Hayes and Kohn either elaborated their ideas or simply accepted the presence and reality of nationalism in the modern world while supplying their own narratives or typologies.

The military defeat of the most vicious nationalisms in 1945 opened an international debate on possible new forms of international relations. As in the interwar literature on nationalism, so among the international relations theorists there was a marked suspicion of nationalism. E. H. Carr noted that the "democratization" of the nation in the 19th century had already "imparted to it a new and disturbing emotional fervor" (1945, 8). But after a long period of stability, economic growth, and international peace up to 1870, a "socialization" of the nation shifted much power from the middle to the lower classes and led to an alliance between economic nationalism and the nation. As the number of national states in Europe proliferated, the economic and political rivalries of "socialized" nations led to two devastating wars in the first half of the 20th century. He condemned the perverse logic of ethnonationalism: "Perhaps the apex of nationalism is reached when it comes to be regarded as an enlightened policy to remove men, women and children forcibly from their homes and transfer them from place to place in order to create homogeneous national units" (33). Looking back to the destructive period that the world had just passed through, Carr noted, "In peace, as in war, the international law of the age of sovereigns is incompatible with the socialized nation. The failure to create an international community of nations on the basis of international treaties and international law marks the final bankruptcy of nationalism in the west" (31). As he looked ahead to the postwar world, he "challenged and rejected . . . the claim of nationalism to make the nation the sole rightful sovereign repository of political power and the ultimate constituent unit of world organization" (39). Rejecting "a single comprehensive world unit" as fervently as he did the supremacy of the national unit, Carr ended by advocating greater international cooperation, economic planning, and strategic interaction.

Further theorization of nations and nationalism was delayed for several decades. But with the decolonization and emergence of new states in Africa and Asia, interest in nationalism intensified, and social scientists, most notably Karl Deutsch and Ernest Gellner, developed theories of nation formation based on the spread of social

communication in the transition from agrarian to industrial societies.

The move from the articulation of a preexisting "national" community by intellectuals and the media to a process of invention of the community itself can be dated roughly to the early 1960s. The opening shot in the modernist attack on the nation came from a professor of government at the University of London, Elie Kedourie, who worried that the modern phenomenon of ideological politics, which he dated back to Immanuel Kant's pamphlet of 1794, *Perpetual Peace*, was not only not likely to bring about peace among humans but was a mere preface to the two great ideologies in power in Kedourie's time, socialism and nationalism. The idea of self-determination, which he saw as central to Kant's ethical theory, was transformed in the moral and political discourse of his successors, notably Fichte, into "national self-determination" (1993). Bitter experience, Kedourie argued, demonstrated that the dream of national self-determination advocated by thinkers from Mazzini to Woodrow Wilson was a principle of disorder, not of order, in international life.

Kedourie boldly began his major statement on nationalism by declaring,

Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government of its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right organisation of a society of states. Briefly, the doctrine holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics, which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government.

1

While love for the "fatherland" was common in 18th century discourse, Kedourie argues that the French Revolution introduced the new possibility of people to change their government if they so chose and transform "the ends for which rulers might legitimately work" (4). The newly established revolutionary doctrine that "sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation" (so expressed in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen) was the "one prerequisite without which a doctrine such as nationalism is not conceivable" (4-5). Suddenly all governments that did not derive their sovereignty from the nation, which at the time were most of them, were "usurpers with whom no agreement need be binding, and to whom subjects owed no allegiance" (8). At the

same time disciples of Kant, like Fichte, praised the state as the source of liberation of the individual and the nation. "This exaltation of the state," wrote Kedourie, "also exalts the philosopher, the academic. He ceases to be the reflective man in whom understanding necessarily precludes action; . . . he now claims to be the true legislator of the human race" (42). With these powerful new ideologies intellectuals became formidable forces in politics.

To these original doctrines Herder and Fichte added an appreciation of human diversity and the belief that language was the most visible and important criterion which distinguished and justified a nation's existence. Once language became the basis for statehood, and statehood became a necessary guarantee that a state as a nation would not lose its language and its identity, the map of Europe had to be redrawn to match language communities with states. As Fichte put it in 1807, "the separation of Prussians from the rest of the Germans is purely artificial. . . . The separation of the Germans from the other European nations is based on Nature" (in Kedourie, 63). In Kedourie's view it was only a small step from the linguistic nationalism of early 19th century German romanticism to the later racist nationalism of the Nazis. "Originally the doctrine emphasized language as the test of nationality, because language was an outward sign of a group's peculiar identity and a significant means of ensuring its continuity. But a nation's language was peculiar to that nation only because such a nation constituted a racial stock distinct from that of other nations" (66). Nationalism was a new, modern, artificial ideology that had to be distinguished from more ubiquitous patriotism and xenophobia.

Patriotism, affection for one's country, or one's group, loyalty to its institutions, and zeal for its defence, is a sentiment known among all kinds of men; so is xenophobia, which is dislike of the stranger, the outsider, and reluctance to admit him into one's own group. Neither sentiment depends on a particular anthropology and neither asserts a particular doctrine of the state or of the individual's relation to it. Nationalism does both; it is a comprehensive doctrine which leads to a distinctive style of politics. But far from being a universal phenomenon, it is a product of European thought in the last 150 years.

66

In the same way religion, which had been the powerful motivation of people in the past, was reconceived by nationalists as an earlier form of nationalism.

In Zionism, Judaism ceases to be the *raison d'être* of the Jew, and becomes, instead, a product of Jewish national consciousness. In the doctrine of Pakistan, Islam is transformed into a political ideology and used in order to mobilize Muslims against Hindus. . . . There is little doubt that the appeal of modern Egyptian, or Panarab, or Armenian, or Greek nationalism derives the greater part of its strength from the existence of ancient communal and religious ties which have nothing to do with nationalist theory, and which may even be opposed to it.

71

Kedourie was convinced that the principle of national self-determination was radically subversive of the system of international relations and of the stability of existing governments. He believed that the Allies at Paris in 1919 made a grave error when they inscribed that principle in the Versailles Peace.

The Englishmen and Americans were saying, People who are self-governing are likely to be governed well, therefore we are in favour of self-determination; whereas their interlocutors were saying, People who live in their own national states are the only free people, therefore we claim self-determination. The distinction is a fine one, but its implications are far-reaching.

128-129

Quoting Lord Acton, he concluded pessimistically, like Hayes, that "nationality does not aim either at liberty or prosperity, both of which it sacrifices to the imperative necessity of making the nation the mould and measure of the State" (134).

The response to Kedourie was twofold. Some writers pushed the story of nations back into earlier ages and denied the modernity of nationality or nationalism that Kedourie affirmed. Others, like Gellner, sought to re-theorize the origins of modern nations by locating them in socioeconomic processes linked to modernization. Though Gellner also rejected the naturalness of the nation, he went beyond Kedourie's idealist argument that the nation was the product of bad ideas and proposed that nations were the functional responses to the need of industrial societies for larger groups of people to communicate easily with one another. Both Deutsch and Gellner offered a material base for the nation, though there was a key difference between their social commu-

nications theories. While Deutsch emphasized the transmission of the idea of nationalism by the media, Gellner insisted that the media itself depended on a communality of "centralized, standardised, one-to-many communication, which automatically engenders the core idea of nationalism, quite irrespective of what . . . is being put into the specific messages transmitted" (1983, 127). Even as he noted the importance of intellectuals in the new national arena, Gellner's focus on broad social forces and the grand transition from structure to culture largely ignored particular agents and actors who constructed the national ideology and movement. It would be left, first, to social historians, and later to cultural studies to provide a more specified analysis of particular individuals and groups and their reimagination of politics. Following Kedourie and Gellner, most subsequent theorists became suspicious of earlier theorizing which had emphasized the *longue durée* (lengthy history) of nations but the modernity only of nationalism, and proposed the modernity of nations themselves. They then located that development in social processes and deconstructed the synthetic, unproblematic narratives of nationalism.

A conservative liberal inimical to Marxism, Gellner had caricatured the Marxist view as the "wrong address theory."

Just as extreme Shi'ite Muslims hold that Archangel Gabriel made a mistake, delivering the Message to Mohammed when it was intended for Ali, so Marxists basically like to think that the spirit of history or human consciousness made a terrible boob. The awakening message was intended for classes, but by some terrible postal error was delivered to nations.

129

Marxists indeed had, since the young Marx, been engaged in thinking about nations and nationalism but had usually emphasized their historicity and contingency, their connection to the rise (and eventual fall) of bourgeois society, and the inherent antagonism between class allegiances and national loyalties. Like other theories of modernization, Marxism centered its attention on what it considered the fundamental processes of social change, which were "in the last instance" economic and material, and either neglected the epiphenomenon of the nation or saw it as reflective of the other more primary processes like the formation of wider markets or class struggle. But the evident reductionism of orthodox Marxist theories of nationalism was seriously questioned by a number of influential

Western Marxists, among them Tom Nairn, Eric J. Hobsbawm, and Benedict Anderson.

"The theory of nationalism represents Marxism's great historical failure," Tom Nairn wrote provocatively (1975, 3). Himself something of a Scottish nationalist, Nairn boldly challenged the almost universally negative assessment of nationalism by his fellow Marxists, and from within the fold, he claimed that nationalism was not only required by modern industrial society but also met certain psychological needs of individuals, namely, their quest for identity. Nairn followed Gellner's lead in linking nationalism to uneven development.

The subjective point of nationalist ideology is, of course, always the suggestion that one nationality is as good as another. But the real point has always lain in the objective fact that, manifestly, one nationality has never been even remotely as good as, or equal to, the others which figure in its worldview. Indeed the purpose of the subjectivity (nationalist myths) can never be anything but protest against the brutal fact: it is mobilization against the unpalatable, humanly unacceptable, truth of grossly uneven development.

1974, 60

The agent of nationalism is the intelligentsia, which responds to uneven development with a particular political ideology.

Real, uneven development has invariably generated an imperialism of the centre over the periphery; one after another, these peripheral areas have been forced into a profoundly ambivalent reaction against this dominance, seeking at once to resist it and to somehow take over its vital forces for their own use. This could only be done by a kind of highly 'idealist' political and ideological mobilization, by a painful forced march based on their own resources: this is, employing their 'nationality' as a basis.

1975, 12

Capitalism in its rapid, uneven spread produced the fragmentation of society into competing nationalisms, all of which were in some way populist but not necessarily democratic. Nationalism affects the peripheries and the metropolises differently. Here is the "modern Janus." "While the mainspring of nationalism is progressive, these abusive versions of it [that are found among dominant ruling peoples in strong, established states] are re-

gressive, and tend toward the encouragement of social and psychological atavism, the exploitation of senseless fears and prejudices, and so towards violence" (17).

Nairn's sweeping critique of the Marxist legacy found its loyal opposition in Eric Hobsbawm, a longtime member of the British Communist party and one of the principal pioneers of social history. Hobsbawm repeated Lenin's advice to Zinoviev, "Do not paint nationalism red." In articles and his series of world histories, beginning with *The Age of Revolution*, he gave one of the most compelling historical accounts of the evolution of nationalism, while scrupulously avoiding economic reductionism. In the major summation of his work he began with a working definition of the nation as "any sufficiently large body of people whose members regard themselves as members of a 'nation'" (1990, 8). Accepting Gellner's definition of nationalism as "primarily the principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent," Hobsbawm positioned himself firmly in the modernist camp, asserted that the nation is an invented idea, and stated, "Nationalism comes before nations. Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round" (10). His narrative established that in the first national revolutions, those in America and France, the nation was equated with a body of citizens whose collective sovereignty made them a state and provided them with a claim to a specific territory.

The original, revolutionary-popular idea of patriotism was state-based rather than nationalist, since it was related to the sovereign people itself, i.e., to the state exercising power in its name. Ethnicity or other elements of historic continuity were irrelevant to "the nation" in this sense, and language relevant only or chiefly on pragmatic grounds. "Patriots" in the original sense of the word were the opposite of those who believed in "my country, right or wrong." . . . More seriously, the French Revolution, which appears to have used the term in the manner pioneered by Americans and more especially the Dutch revolution of 1783, thought of patriots as those who showed the love of their country by wishing to renew it by reform or revolution.

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This concept of the nation as civic and nonethnic continued through the age of liberal nationalism in the early and mid-19th century. The "principle of nationality" operative at that time argued that national

self-determination was appropriate only for nations that met a minimum size. This "threshold principle" for the existence of a nation looked positively on unification and expansion of "national" states and opposed the *Klitzstateri* (small statism) associated with Balkanization. Multiethnicity was acceptable in larger states, and assimilation was seen not only as a positive good, but as an inevitable process. Though states based on ethnicity emerged in this period (e.g., Greece, Serbia, Germany, Italy, Romania, and Bulgaria), most states remained multiethnic, and the idea of the nation continued to be linked to the great liberal slogans of liberty, equality, and fraternity.

Hobsbawm suggested that the modern nation is a new variant of collective belonging that substituted for earlier forms like the family, tribe, and polis. Before nationalism, proto-nationalism, based in religion, ethnicity, language, and the consciousness of belonging or having belonged to a lasting political entity, provided a supralocal form of popular identification that was available for mobilization by states and national movements. As modern states became the supreme "national" agency of rule over a territory, they reached down into the population in new and more frequent efforts to record, recruit, educate, and police their people. The democratization of politics and the imperatives of modern warfare required a heightened loyalty to the state and greater mobilized participation of ordinary citizens. The traditional forms of legitimation—dynastic, divine ordination, religious cohesion, historic right, and continuity of rule—were replaced by the new civic religion of nationalism, rather than simple state patriotism. The nationalism of the late 19th century departed from the "principle of nationality" of the earlier period. No longer was the "threshold principle" observed; now every people, determined by ethnicity and language, could become a nation worthy of self-determination and even statehood.

The apogee of nationalism was reached after the two world wars when the principle of national self-determination was enshrined in the creation of new states and the redrawing of maps. But Hobsbawm believed that "the utter impracticability of the Wilsonian principle to make state frontiers coincide with the frontiers of nationality and language" led to radical attempts to homogenize nations through ethnic cleansings, forced deportations, and genocide (133). "Mass expulsion or extermination of minorities . . . was and is the murderous *reductio ad absurdum* of nationalism in its territorial version" (133). Nationalism had moved from left to right—from a liberating doctrine to a "mere reflex of despair, . . . something that filled the void left by failure, impotence, and the apparent inability of other ideologies, political

projects and programmes to realize men's hopes" (144). In a controversial conclusion to his book, rewritten for its second edition, Hobsbawm both acknowledged the evident prominence of nationalism at the end of the 20th century and made the less obvious point that as a global political program, nationalism, indeed nation-states, no longer met the needs of people in the age of globalized economies. "The owl of Minerva which brings wisdom," said Hegel, flies out at dusk. It is a good sign that it is now circling round nations and nationalism" (183; 192, 2nd ed.).

A significant contribution to the historicization of nationalism was made by the Czech Marxist historian Miloslav Hroch, who in a series of close studies of a number of stateless nationalities in Europe developed a periodization of national movements. Hroch postulated three stages in the evolution of nationalism: Stage A, in which small groups of intellectuals, often clerics, write grammars and histories, collect folk tales and songs, and often in the isolation of their study begin the elaboration of what will constitute the nation; Stage B, when larger numbers of patriots—journalists, teachers and political activists—spread the message of nationalism through the press, schools, and political circles; and Stage C, the moment when effective popular mobilization occurs. Carefully reconstructing the social backgrounds of the patriots who joined clubs and societies, subscribed to the first newspapers, and gave money to the cause, Hroch provided the first empirical sociology for nationalist movements.

Modifying the clichéd view of a "bourgeois nationalism," he showed that most early nationalists among stateless peoples were intellectuals (priests, teachers, writers, petty officials), most often living in towns, while the merchants and industrialists were less frequently found as major participants. In Stage C the message reached beyond the towns to the peasantry. Hroch's schema was a further refinement of Deutsch, Gellner, and Hobsbawm. Whatever the effects of industrialization (and they were not to be denied), they affected the emergence of nationalism only as they were mediated through the growth of social communication and as particular readings of the "great transformation" were articulated by intellectual agents.

The modernist writers, Marxist and non-Marxist alike, established a social history of nationalism by the early 1980s that increasingly insisted on bringing politics and agency back into the story. From the more essentialist view of the nation as a real thing—objective, natural, and perhaps primordial in origins—a significant body of scholarship now argued that nations were humanly engineered political communities, relatively

modern in their origins, and the products of hard intellectual and political work by activists and intellectuals, politicians, and statesmen. Rather than simply the modern manifestation of communities of descent or blood, as many ethnonationalists would have it, modern nationalities and nations were seen—in Benedict Anderson's widely employed phrase—as "imagined communities" based on subjectively experienced allegiances and identities. Anderson's important intervention may be said to have completed the paradigm shift in thinking about the nation. In some ways the intellectual history tradition of Hayes and Kohn was married to the social historical reconstruction of the rise of modern nations of Deutsch, Gellner, and the Marxists in a new synthesis that saw nations as far more provisional, far more contingent, and much more unstable than they were thought to be by nationalists and earlier historians of nationalism. Instead of recovering what was thought to be an actual, immanent—though often hidden—historical community, historians now placed emphasis on those historical agents who "invented" the traditions and the narratives that made up the story that the nation tells about itself. This new literature investigated the ways in which intellectuals, activists, and state leaders worked constantly to shore up the boundaries of the nation, making clear its difference from other communities both above, below, and outside of it, while at the same time homogenizing, even erasing whenever possible, the cleavages of class and region within it.

Anderson's *Imagined Communities*, along with Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism*, was probably the most influential interpretation of nationalism of the last decades of the 20th century. In his forthrightly culturalist approach Anderson turned the discussion from more structural and materialist analyses to a new stress on the meanings attached to the nation. "My point of departure," he writes, "is that nationalism, or as one might prefer to put it in view of that world's multiple significations, nation-ness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artifacts of a particular type" (1991, 4). These artifacts, once generated at the end of the 18th century, "became 'modular,' capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of self-consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations" (4). What looks modern to the historian and ancient to the nationalist, i.e., the nation, is best conceived of as "an imagined political community" that is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign and as "a deep, horizontal comradeship." This particular style of imagining a community became dominant after two other relevant cultural systems, the religious community and the dynastic

realm, began to weaken. As people developed a new idea of time, which Anderson calls (following Walter Benjamin) "homogeneous empty time," in which a variety of things quite distant from one another can be understood to be happening at the same time (as in a novel with various interwoven plot lines or the daily newspaper with its reports from around the globe), the idea of the nation as "a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history" took hold. Key to this whole process was the invention of the printing press at about the time that market capitalism began to transform the European economy. With print-capitalism the privileged script languages of the ancient and medieval world gave way to publishing in a selected or constructed vernacular that "made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways" (36). "What, in a positive sense, made the new communities imaginable was a half-for-tuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity" (42–43).

Once this model community arose, first in South and North America, it spread around the globe until it became (in its own eyes) the only possible form of legitimate political community. In the earliest nationalisms, as well as in colonial nationalisms, colonial functionaries who could rise to the top of the peripheral hierarchy but seldom were able to cross over to the metropole (called by Anderson "creole pilgrims") were among the first people to develop conceptions of nation-ness.

[N]either economic interest, Liberalism, nor Enlightenment could, or did, create in *themselves* the kind, or shape, of imagined community to be defended from [colonial] regimes' depredations; to put it another way, none provided the framework of a new consciousness. . . . In accomplishing this specific task, pilgrim creole functionaries and provincial creole printmen played the decisive historic role.

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Anderson's narrative, like those of Deutsch and Gellner, is also one of increased and easier social communication. Print languages made possible "unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars," gave language a "new fixity, which in the long run helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation," and

"created languages-of-power" that were closer to some dialects and farther from others (44–45).

Through the Cold War and to the end of the 20th century the nation-form continued to be a principal frame for history writing. Traditional narrative histories, like Winston Churchill's *Second World War*, for which he received the Nobel Prize in Literature (1953), and his *History of the English-Speaking Peoples*, retained great popularity. Like biographies of great personages or temporary celebrities, national histories—in a sense, biographies of peoples or states—continued to provide narratives for reconstructing national identities that had been fractured by the experiences of fascism, war, and, in several cases, defeat. The German historical profession, a generation of which served the Nazi state, was confronted by the enormity of Hitler and the Holocaust. Beginning with Fritz Fischer's *Griff nach der Weltmacht* (translated anodyne as *Germany's Aims in the First World War*), which laid the blame for World War I squarely on the Germans and connected Hitler's foreign policy aims back to those of the Wilhelmine Reich, and later in the *Historikerstreit* (historians' conflict), a bitterly divisive national debate in which conservative historians attempted to divest Germans of responsibility for the horrors of the Nazi years, German historians rummaged through archives and repressed memories to reconstruct a usable past. French and Italian historians looked toward the Resistance as a mythic source of national integrity, continuity, and renewal, though irrepressible facts of collaboration with fascism deeply damaged national pride. At the moment of the bicentenary of the French Revolution, François Furet announced that the revolution was over and its pernicious legacy should be sought in the Enlightenment and Jacobin connections to Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism, and the gulag. In a Europe where a new pan-European consciousness competed with atavistic localisms and stereotyped nationalisms, many historians explored how national traditions had been constructed deliberately, how memories had been selected, and how symbolic representations had been given particular meanings.

The theoretical breakthroughs of the 1980s wrenched open the study of nation formation and nationalism, once again historicizing categories like ethnicity, nationality, and nation that had been naturalized by the practices of nationalists, historians, anthropologists, and others. Historians, who in former incarnations had helped construct, stabilize, and naturalize the nation, now broke through its facade of unity and dissolved, in the words of Pierre Nora, "the national myth which linked future tightly to past." In a move in the opposite direction the great annalist Fernand Braudel, who had

extended his school's refusal to be confined to a national frame in such masterworks as *The Mediterranean and the World in the Age of Philip II* (1949), turned in his last work, *The Identity of France* (1986–1990), back to a mystical, Michelet-like search for the essential France. Critics of his holistic view of a constant France of regions and peasant culture noted that he had left out the insistent multiculturalism that marked present-day France, which had become a country of immigrants in which the limits of tolerance were confronted in a debate over head scarves on Muslim women. As in the United States, where the canonical narrative of the rise of freedom met counternarratives of slavery and discrimination, the genocide of Native Americans, and the rich mix of immigration, so in Britain and Europe new, more inclusive histories replaced older ideas of identity as a consistent core with an alternative perception of multiple identities, overlapping and undermining each other.

As historians contextualized the study of nationalism and social scientists became more sensitive to historical contextualization, scholars from various disciplines explored the constitution of membership in the new national community—the ways in which membership was gendered; how "nationality" was reconstructed; new definitions of citizenship; and the state's role in forging a more homogeneous nation from the center, as well as the opposing process of creating boundaries at the margins. The intimacy that history and the nation had for each other was directly confronted. Cultural studies approaches problematized not only nation and ethnicity but race, gender, class, and other transhistorical categories. And in the role of alternative imaginaries, dissonant discourses outside of Europe in the colonized world were called upon to confront the Eurocentric assumptions of much of the historiography and theorization of the nation. In the postcolonial, post-Soviet age, when attention had turned to supranational formations and global processes of integration and change, their subversive effects on the sovereign powers and stability of nation-states began to crack the walls of the prisons of perception that so effectively and for so long had disciplined the historian.

The nation continued into the post-Cold War world to be a field of discussion, and history and historians remained engaged in defining the content and cultural and psychic boundaries of the nation. In the absence of the security of an essential nation or a canonical tradition or consensus about identity or authenticity of membership, historians at the end of the 20th century were once again engaged in the same kind of search for objectivity and verifiability; narrativization of elusive, eclectic, and resistant material; relevance, and moral purpose that had

been their occupation since the first historians of ancient Greece had decided to tell a story of their people that moved beyond myth.

See Also the Following Articles

ANTHROPOLOGY • ECONOMICS AND NATIONALISM •
POLITICAL SCIENCE • POLITICAL THEORY • SOCIOLOGY

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THE HOMELAND AND NATIONALISM

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- ethnicity Group identity characterized by common culture and a belief in a common past at a specific place. ethnocentrism A regime under which: (a) ethnic affiliation, and not state citizenship, principally determines the distribution of public resources, and (b) a dominant ethnic group appropriates the state apparatus to facilitate its expansion. ethnonationalism Political mobilization aimed at achieving, consolidating, or protecting ethnic territorial sovereignty. group territoriality Mobilization for defense or expansion of group territorial control. national myth A constituting story pertaining to critical events and places in the nation's past which shaped its contemporary identity and goals. national self-determination The ability of a nation to determine its preferred form of government.

GLOSSARY

diaspora An organized ethnic community of long-term residence away from the historical ethnic homeland. **ethnic homeland** The residential territory, region, or country of an ethnic group, perceived as the group's "possession" and the birthplace of its culture and identity. **ethnic minority** An ethnic group situated in a culturally and numerically inferior position within its state.

The homeland is a territory believed to be the historical region inhabited by the group in question and often the birthplace of its identity. Ethnic attachment to the homeland frequently translates into feelings of exclusive ownership of this territory. Homeland ethnicity is a collective identity based on residence in the homeland. It forms the basis for ethnic nationalism (or ethnonationalism), which develops when a homeland ethnic group aspires to state power. The group's attachment to the territory constitutes a central element in the construction of its national identity, which