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ETYMOLOGY, DEFINITIONS, TYPES

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- I. Etymology: Semantic Development of the Concept "Nation"
- II. Specificity of Nationalism
- III. Types of Nationalism

open stratification can be defined as a system based on flexible criteria such as the wealth, education, or occupation of the given individual, rather than on fixed criteria established at birth.

territorial particularism Identity focused on distinct territory regarded as one's own.

GLOSSARY

civic nationalism Nationalism in which membership in the nation is equated with citizenship and regarded as a political or legal category.

collectivist nationalism Nationalism in which the nation is defined as a collective individual with its own rights, interests, and will

ethnic nationalism Nationalism in which membership in the nation is based on ancestry and believed to be an inherent characteristic.

individualistic nationalism Nationalism which defines the nation as an association of free individuals.

modernist In this context, describing the view that nationalism is a recent phenomenon, in that it requires certain structural conditions of modern society in order to emerge.

primordialist The contrasting position to modernism; the view that contemporary nationalism is a reflection of the ancient (and even evolutionary) tendency of humans to form into distinct groupings based on an affinity of birth.

stratification The dividing of a given society into different strata, or identifiable levels. In this context,

The word "nationalism" is most commonly used as an umbrella term under which are subsumed the related phenomena of national identity (or nationality) and consciousness, as well as collectivities to which they correspond — nations. In a narrower, but still general, neutral sense, it is interchangeable with "national consciousness" and denotes the set of ideas and sentiments that form the conceptual framework of the national identity.

National identity is one among many, often coexisting and overlapping, identities — occupational, religious, tribal, linguistic, territorial, class, gender, and more. But in the modern world, national identity constitutes what may be called the "fundamental identity" — the identity which is believed to apply to more spheres of social life at once than any other identity, and to which other identities are, in consequence, considered secondary. The world community today is a community of "nations"; modern societies are "nations" by definition, and those societies that do not view themselves as nations are believed to be not (yet) modern. All contemporary "nations" are derived from

entities which previously possessed quite different identities. The first nation was England, which became one in the 16th century. The United States of America, France, and Russia defined themselves as such in the 18th century. Most others followed in the 19th and 20th centuries.

This article will consider the development of the modern concept of "nation"; the specificity of nationalism; the social and political implications of nationalism and such related phenomena as patriotism and ethnicity. It will also discuss the character, development, and some implications of the historical types of nationalism.

I. ETYMOLOGY: SEMANTIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT "NATION"

The modern concept of nation is a product of a long and complex semantic change. It begins with the Latin word *natio*, meaning "something born." In ancient Rome this word referred to the communities of foreigners who lived in Rome as aliens and did not have the privilege of Roman citizenship. Only such communities of foreigners constituted "nations," and only foreigners, therefore, had a "national identity." The term "nation" had a derogatory connotation, for being a "national" placed one below Romans in terms of status, and "national" affiliation was not desirable. This term bore certain similarities to the Greek term *ta ethne* and the Hebrew term *amamim*; these also referred to the communities of outsiders—barbarians or those not included in the Covenant—who did not belong to the defining community itself.

In its meaning of "a community of foreigners," the term "nation" was applied to communities of students in medieval universities, who were rarely born where the university was situated, since these institutions were common to all of western Christendom. The organization of medieval university life resulted in the modification of the concept "nation." Students originating in (usually geographically) related areas were defined as a nation and housed together in quarters also shared by their professors. With their professors, they participated in university disputations, and thus were identified with certain intellectual positions. This led to the understanding of "nation" not only, and not primarily, as a "community of foreigners," but, rather, as a "community of opinion." In this case, the concept "nation" no longer bore a derogatory connotation, but its application was still very limited: only students constituted "nations,"

and a student lost his "national identity" immediately upon completion of his studies.

In the late medieval period, the concept "nation" meaning a "community of foreigners," was also applied to colonies of traders in Bruges and then in Antwerp. In 1487 the Andalusian, Venetian, Navarran, Florentine, and, significantly, both Hanseatic and German "nations" among others, coexisted in Bruges. The last merchant "nation" to be constituted, i.e., granted trade privileges, was the Genoese "nation," which happened in 1395. This semantic idiosyncrasy most probably has retarded the development of nationalism in the Netherlands.

The dominant meaning of the word "nation" in the late Middle Ages was that of a "community of opinion," and it was this concept that was utilized in yet another situation: the ecclesiastical councils. Assembled at the councils were representatives of various positions in regard to the organization of the *Respublica Christiana*. These "parties," composed as they were at the same time of representatives of secular or ecclesiastical Christian potentates, were referred to as "nations." The meaning of the term "nation" thus was modified again: now it meant "representatives of (cultural and political) authority" or "a (cultural and political) elite." "National identity" became honorific, but it remained temporary and limited to a small group of exceptional individuals. It was in this new honorific sense, however, that the concept was applied. In the early 16th century, to the people of England, to be transformed yet again, and "nation" came to be understood as a synonym of the "people," acquiring its modern political meaning.

It is clear that with this redefinition the sphere of application of the concept "nation" extended enormously (now every member of the English people—at the time some 5 million people—had a national identity). But the magnitude of the conceptual revolution that this implied can be fully appreciated only if we consider the change that occurred simultaneously in the meaning of the word "people." In English, French, German, and Russian discourse, among others, before it was made the synonym of "nation," the word meant "rabble" or "plebs"; the general referent of "people" was the lower classes. The equation of the two concepts—"nation," which meant "elite," and "people," which meant "plebs"—implied reconceptualization of the entity (plebs) to which the concept "nation" was applied, at the same time as it changed the nature of the concept, and this reconceptualization symbolically elevated the lower classes to the dignity of the elite. The "people" before its "nationalization" a social category of low, undesirable status, acquired immense prestige and was redefined as an object of loyalty and the basis of political solidarity. A major transformation was

among them, to which correspond the often dramatic differences in the interpretation and institutional realization of the two principles and, as a result, in their effects on human experience, will be discussed in Section III on "types."

II. SPECIFICITY OF NATIONALISM

A. Nationalism—The Cultural Framework of Modernity

A largely unquestioned assumption in the field—at least since Hans Kohn's pioneering work, *The Idea of Nationalism*—has been that nationalism is just an expression (though the fullest expression) "of the oldest and most primitive feelings of man" (Kohn, 1961, 4) and that national identity is but another name for (a fully developed) identity as such. This is a misconception. No human group of any duration, and no individual, unless severely handicapped or (as an infant) undeveloped mentally, can live without an identity. Having an identity appears to be a psychological imperative and, therefore, a sociological constant. But there is nothing imperative in the development of any specific identity. None of the many identities human beings and groups can have and in the course of history have had (not even gender identity, as we now know) is objectively necessary: they are all a matter of social—cultural—construction. None of them—not the tribal, not the religious, and not the national identity—is determined by the immutable logic of social forces. They result from historical contingency, the unpredictable ramble of history, rather than from the orderly march of directed social evolution.

An identity defines the position of its bearer (which may be an individual or a group) in, and serves as a map or blueprint for, a certain, more or less extensive, sphere of the social world, with the help of which this world, in fact, is constantly reconstructed. An identity, every identity, in other words, represents a means of constructing and defining the social reality of the bearer. The social importance of an identity increases with the importance and size of a group that shares it, but even more so with the extent of its applicability. For example, the "national identities" of foreign communities in Rome, of students in medieval universities or merchants in the trading centers of Flanders and Brabant, and of parties of the church councils provided guidelines for relatively narrow spheres of the actors' social lives (in addition to applying to very small groups of actors); they were at most as important as other partial—for example, gender,




FIGURE 1 The zigzag pattern of semantic change reflected in the evolution of the modern idea of the nation.

effected in the image of the social order: defined as a nation, the community, inclusive of all classes, had to be imagined as sovereign and as a community of equals.

An analysis of the continuous changes in the meaning of the word "nation," leading to the emergence of the modern concept, reveals a certain pattern of interaction between the structural and semantic elements, which may be visualized as a zigzag. At each stage of this development, the meaning of the word, which comes with a certain semantic baggage, evolves out of usage in a particular situation. The available conventional concept is applied within new circumstances, to certain aspects of which it corresponds. However, aspects of the new situation, which were absent in the situation in which the conventional concept evolved, become cognitively associated with it, resulting in a duality of meaning. The meaning of the original concept is gradually obscured, and the new one emerges as conventional. When the word is used again in a new situation, it is likely to be used in this new meaning, and so on and so forth. The process of semantic transformation is constantly redirected by structural (situational) constraints which form the new concepts (meanings of the word); at the same time, the structural constraints are conceptualized, interpreted, or defined in terms of the concepts, which thereby orient social action. (This process is depicted in Figure 1.)

To sum up, nationalism rests on two principles—the principle of popular sovereignty and the principle of fundamental equality of membership in the community—which reflect the idea of the nation as it emerged from this complex evolution. The presence of these principles allows us to define as nationalisms otherwise quite dissimilar systems of ideas and sentiments. The differences

family, local—identities of these actors, and certainly less important than their religious identities. The modern national identity, in contrast, has been the most generally applicable identity for those who have acquired it from the moment of its acquisition—and today this is so for the majority of the world's population.

Whatever its kind, a generally applicable or "fundamental" identity, which is believed to define the bearer's very essence, shapes behavior in a wide variety of contexts. It also reflects—in effect, contains in a microcosm—the image of the social order or the "social consciousness" of the given society. This makes nationalism, the framework of the "fundamental" identity in the modern world, also the framework of the modern social consciousness, and implies nothing less than that in the modern world social consciousness takes the form of national consciousness. Nationalism is the cultural framework of modernity; it is its main cultural mechanism of social integration, and therefore, construction. It is the order-creating cognitive system which invests with meaning, and as a result shapes, our social reality, or the cognitive medium—the prism through which modern society sees this reality.

The difference between nationalism and national identity, on the one hand, and other order-creating cultural systems (for instance, religion) and identities reflecting them, on the other, is at least as great as the difference between modern society, which represents the implementation of the principles of nationalism, and other types of societies. Few principles are capable of immediate and unproblematic translation into reality. Nevertheless, one can clearly see the two principles of nationalism, the principle of popular sovereignty and the principle of the fundamental equality of membership, reflected in the modern political and social structure, specifically in the institution of the state and the class system of social stratification.

All politics that define themselves as nations or polities that claim membership in the community of nations, without being defined as nations themselves (like modern empires such as the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires in the beginning of this century, and the Soviet Union at the end of it), adopt an impersonal, legal-rational or "state" form of government which, in principle, has a representative character. The state is an implication of the principle of popular sovereignty. The authority it exercises emanates neither from itself, nor from the transcendental sources beyond the nation, but from the nation. This principle applies equally to polities which are representative democracies in actual fact and to modern dictatorships which dispense with represent-

taive institutions. What allows for such differences in the implementation of the same principle are differences in the definition of the nation, which this article addresses in the section on "types." The principle itself, however, materially affects the experience of politics and life, in general, in modern societies, adding to it dignity unknown to those who, in principle, could not see themselves as represented in the power wielded over them and even theoretically speaking had no share in it. It is this, in-principle, impersonal and representative character of political authority in nations which permits openly authoritarian modern regimes to insist on their democratic character.

The principle of equality of membership and the inclusive character of national identity are responsible for the most important structural implication of nationalism: the change in the nature of social stratification. In distinction to prenational social formations, nations—or modern societies—develop the open, class system of stratification. The class system is based on achievement, rather than ascription, and has the individual, rather than the family, as the unit, and transferable properties, such as money and education, rather than birth, as the basis of status distinctions. Though achievement may be variously defined and education and wealth ascribed different relative importance, all societies defined as nations accept, in principle, social mobility as legitimate, and allow considerable, though different, rates of mobility in practice. This, in principle, open nature of stratification also, obviously, has a tremendous effect on the experience of life in modern societies. On the one hand, it makes each and every one of us the maker of one's destiny, increasing our sense of control and empowerment and adding excitement to life, which, by definition, becomes less predictable. On the other hand, by making life less predictable, it creates an inherently anomic, and thus stressful, environment, oppressing us with choices which must be made and the responsibility for our success or failure, and depriving us of the sense of security and peace of mind which come with predictability and limited possibilities.

Every modern society experiences dignity and empowerment to a degree unknown to any society before it, and every modern society to a degree heretofore unknown suffers under conditions of pervasive anomic and disorientation. This is what the experience of modernity is, and it is directly related to the structures of the state and class stratification, which in turn are directly related to the twin principles of nationalism which provide the cognitive framework of modernity—popular sovereignty and fundamental equality of membership.

B. Related Phenomena

1. Patriotism

The failure to realize the specificity of nationalism not only forces one to lose sight of its historical social context—namely, the empirical context in which it must, and apart from which it cannot, be understood—and leads to vague and futile theorizing. In addition, it diverts attention from the issues central to nationalism and focuses it on marginally related phenomena and side effects, contributing to further conceptual confusion. This confusion is most widespread in regard to the relations between nationalism and patriotism, and nationalism and ethnicity.

Patriotism is often seen as a reflection of underlying national consciousness, and sometimes as the positive side or expression of nationalism which can also have negative expressions—"good nationalism" so to speak. In fact, however, patriotism is not necessarily connected to nationalism; the concept denotes "love of country," *patria*—the land of one's fathers—and is a natural sentiment that is likely to exist whether or not one's community is defined as a nation. The civic sentiment of classical antiquity—attachment and dedication to the city—is the paradigmatic example of patriotism, but the image of the social order it reflected was very different from the one contained in nationalism, and the institutional, structural reality constructed on the basis of this image was different too. Different from both—the classical and the modern, national patriotism—was the idea of patriotism prevalent during the Middle Ages in Europe: Christian patriotism. The Heavenly Kingdom—*la patrie céleste*—was the true *patria* of a Christian, and it was there, rather than in any earthly domain, that his supreme loyalty was due. Patriots were those who, like the Crusaders, loved and fought for God above all.

National patriotism, in distinction to the classical attachment to the city and Christian attachment to the *patrie céleste*, is the love of the nation. Of course, it may take the form of love of a particular plot of land, as in classical patriotism. But this is not always so; more importantly, it is not such love of land which is definitive of national patriotism. National patriotism, in fact, is more akin to the Christian patriotism, for it is, too, primarily a dedication to an ideal. It is the love of principles of social organization—first and foremost, the two constitutive principles of nationalism, and also additional principles selected by a particular nation. American patriotism, perhaps, reveals this idealistic nature of modern, national patriotism most clearly. "Give the American his institutions,

and he cares little where you place him," wrote Charles Mackay in 1837. But patriotisms associated with other nationalisms, particularly of the civic variety (see Section III), share this idealistic character.

As the American example demonstrates, the identification of nationalism with territorial particularism is misleading. Possession of a particular territory was the clinching element in Stalin's classic definition of the nation, still very much in use among students of nationalism. But there is no reason to defer to Stalin's opinions in this area of study: they are as unwarranted as in linguistics, medicine, or any other academic discipline in which this "coryphaeus of scholarship" dabbled in his spare time. Most nationalisms indeed became attached to a certain territory; if not from the moment of emergence (which happens very often), then eventually. But territory does not breed nationalism. In the American case, as a matter of fact, it was nationalism that bred territory. In general, nationalism is not a particular case of territorialism; it belongs to a different class of phenomena. It is a cultural system—an order-shaping sociopolitical perspective. As such, in principle, it can be equally well applied to the entire world as to any territorial unit within it. A world polity with a sovereign populace in which all the members would be considered fundamentally equal would be a perfect nation within the framework of nationalism.

Patriotism always reflects some identity; in many cases it had reflected the development of a unique identity whose geopolitical framework and/or name were at a later point inherited by the nation that was constructed in the place of the earlier social order. However, such a unique identity, the consciousness of being French or Chinese, for example, can no more than territory serve as a proxy for national identity and an evidence of nationalism. Both uniquely French and Chinese identities existed for centuries before the development of the French and Chinese national identities. The French national identity, indeed, was the third in line of unique French identities. The first one of these, which existed between the 12th and 16th centuries, was a religious one, with France defined as a church and Frenchness as a particular kind of (Catholic) Christianity. The second was a political identity whose constitutive element was the authority of the French kings—France was the king's domain, and Frenchness was coterminous with the status of a subject. This identity existed between the 16th and the later 18th centuries. Though the name of France and, by and large, its borders remained the same, each time the nature of the French identity changed, the society that existed under this name and within these borders

transformed. France was imagined differently and thus no longer was the same France.

2. Ethnicity

The view that a unique identity, such as French, for instance, is evidence of nascent or even mature nationalism reflects an equally unwarranted notion, shared by many nationalists as well as students of nationalism, that the world is naturally, or primordially, divided into objectively different ethnic units, and that it is this objective difference between them, or their ethnicity, which underlies national divisions and gives rise to national identities. Among the recent theorists of nationalism, this view is common to the so-called modernists, who insist on the modernity of nationalism, as well as to the primordialists who consider modern nationalism an outgrowth, or recent expression, of ubiquitous ethnic divisions between human collectivities. The differences between these two positions are differences in emphasis, rather than in fundamental conception. Representatives of both regard nationalism as a modern phenomenon and assume a link between nationalism and ethnicity, which they implicitly define as identity naturally resulting from various ascriptive characteristics. The reason for such affinity is that primordialists as well as modernists work within the long dominant (sociological) structuralist paradigm. In their discussions of nationalism, they attempt to provide a structural explanation of the activation of ethnic characteristics in the conditions of modernization, and their effectiveness as a basis of political mobilization in the service, or oriented toward the establishment, of a separate state. However, theories representative of the modernist position emphasize the structural conditions of modernization as the chief determinant of the emergence and character of nationalism and nations. Theories representative of the primordialist position, in distinction, place the emphasis on what they consider as the raw matter out of which nationalism and nations are fashioned by modernization—ethnicity.

Ascriptive characteristics covered by the term "ethnicity" fall into cultural and physical categories and minimally include "language, religion, and race" (Ghai, 1994, 1), but also, more generally, physical type, as well as common territory, common history, and secular traditions. It is obvious that, in this sense, ethnicity is in fact ubiquitous. All of us inherit certain physical and cultural characteristics: unless we wear colored lenses, our eyes are a certain color we have not chosen; we have certain, genetically determined complexions; and our families, neighborhoods, and cities into which we are born often have their specific traditions, accents, and even dia-

lects. But the ubiquity of ethnicity does not translate into the ubiquity of ethnic identities and does not automatically divide people into ethnic groups. Indeed, there is nothing natural or primordial in such ethnic division; much of it results from cultural construction along national principles.

Anyone's ascriptive characteristics—ethnicity—necessarily differ from those of many others within one's society; it follows that all societies are ethnically diverse. Nevertheless, in some societies we do not notice this diversity and consider them "homogeneous," while in others such diversity is distinctly and often painfully visible. This is so not because there is less diversity among individual members of one society, insofar as their ascriptive, cultural and physical, characteristics are concerned, than of another, but because the same measure of ethnic diversity is perceived differently. This is to say that not every society attaches cultural significance to ethnicity or makes it an element of its members' general identity. Very few societies before the modern age, if any, did so. In the framework of nationalism—the defining cultural system of the modern age—ethnic characteristics are often assigned cultural significance and are incorporated in people's national identities. But this is not because ethnicity is in any way conducive to nationality. "Ethnic" characteristics form a certain category of raw material which can be organized and rendered meaningful in various ways, thus becoming elements of any number of identities. National identity, in distinction, provides an organizing principle applicable to different materials (among which ethnic material may or may not be included) to which it then grants meaning, transforming them thereby into elements of a specific identity. Moreover, when ethnicity is utilized in the process of nationalist cultural construction, it is not the actual existence of certain ethnic characteristics which determines the ethnic profile of a group. Of the available ethnic characteristics only some are selected, and not the same ones in every case, and the choice, in addition to the availability or even salience of the selected qualities, is determined by many other factors. In addition, no clear line separates selection from artificial construction. A language of a part may be imposed on an entire population and declared native to the latter (or it may be outright invented, as was the case with Russian). An "ancestral" territory may be acquired in conquest, "common" history fabricated, and traditions imagined and projected onto the past.

Similarly, cultural significance attached to ethnic differences between populations is rarely proportionate to their "objective" magnitude. Very often these differences

are minimal or virtually nonexistent, but, when perceived as culturally significant, they are magnified—often to the point of being turned into a cultural rift that cannot be bridged. The vast majority of cases of ethnic violence are rooted in such nationalist constructions of ethnicity. The former Yugoslavia, and in particular Bosnia, can serve as an example of minimal differences magnified and turned murderous by cultural significance attached to them in the context of nationalism. The differences between Serbs, Croats, and the so-called "Bosnian Muslims" are mostly in the imagination. These three groups of southern Slavs belong to the same race and look the same; they speak Serbo-Croatian; their religion, which has been made so much of recently, cannot, in practice, be used to distinguish between them, because overwhelming majorities in each of them are (or were until the eruption of the recent conflict) nonbelievers. These facts are overlooked because the identities of Serbs and Croats have been traditionally defined as ethnic identities (and since these identities reflect the way these groups envision the world, they necessarily define as ethnic the identities of members of the third group, the descendants of Slavic Muslims in Bosnia). The definition of a "fundamental" identity as ethnic presupposes a belief that a person's inclinations, attitudes, and behaviors are determined ascriptively, by the group to which one is born, which, in effect, means genetically—that these attributes are given, so to speak, in the blood, and though they can be hidden or suppressed, cannot, in any circumstances, really be changed. In other words, one is a Serb, a Croat, or a Bosnian Muslim every moment of one's life and in everything one does, whether one is aware of this or not. Such attitudes may create a conflict situation where none existed before and render any conflict irresolvable. These attitudes are quite independent of the ethnic realities that obtain in any particular case, and, instead, represent cultural perceptions of ethnicity which give rise to a new reality.

C. Conceptual Problems

It is futile to look for the sources, and understanding, of nationalism in any of the "objective" characteristics of nations. Nationalism is a kind of imagination and it reflects the autonomy of its parent faculty. The focus on "objective" characteristics, the assumption that nationalism, like any cultural system, must be an emanation of tangible, material realities, is the main source of the conceptual problems that have plagued the field of study of nationalism. It is a reflection of these problems that most recent theories leave nations and na-

tionism essentially undefined. Aware of the persistent failure of the earlier scholarship to come up with an adequate definition, many students of nationalism today approach it as undefinable in principle. Some authors openly declare that since before them "nobody has been able to provide precise definitions" of the phenomena in question, one "must settle for composites of characterization" or, in other words, limit one's aspirations to description (Nielsson, 1985, 27). The lack of a definition, however, severely encumbers the possibilities of analysis. It prevents effective operationalization of hypothetical relationships and makes it impossible with any degree of precision to locate the origins of nationalism in time. As a result, while the argument of many recent theories hinges on the assumption that nationalism was antedated by other modern developments, there is no possibility to test and therefore either substantiate or refute this assumption. Unable to muster the evidence required by the logic of their propositions, these theories have to rely on the conclusions of older historical scholarship, which has been persistently called into question.

1. A Nation Is a Nation

Sometimes, definitions are attempted, but end in circular statements or are abandoned midway. An example of the former problem is Ernst Gellner's influential 1983 contribution, *Nations and Nationalism*. The book, appropriately, opens with a definition of nationalism, postulating that it is "a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent." Defining "nationalism" by reference to an undefined "national unit" is obviously circular, but occurring as the definition does in the opening paragraph of the text, this does not, as such, present a problem. Several lines later the statement is reiterated in a slightly modified form. The reader is told that "nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones." The conclusion one must draw from the juxtaposition of the two statements is that "national unit" means an "ethnically bounded unit," or that nationality equals ethnicity. Since ethnic boundaries are treated as unproblematic, which presupposes the ubiquity of ethnic identity (thus the equation of ethnic identity with generalized identity as such), one is further led to conclude that what Gellner means by "nationalism" is the accentuation of ethnic identity—that is, any identity namely, in the final analysis, politicization of an identity.

Perhaps unwilling to draw such conclusions, Gellner insists that his definition of nationalism was "parasitic"

on the "as yet undefined" term "nation" and proceeds to explicitly define, or rather "pinpoint," "this elusive concept" with the help of "two very makeshift, temporary definitions" (7). The first one suggests that "two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating" (7). The second definition proposes that "two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation" (7). Gellner goes on to explain that

a mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory, or speakers of a given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership in it. It is their recognition of each other as fellows of this kind which turns them into a nation, and not the other shared attributes, whatever they might be, which separate that category from non-members.

The implications of the first definition are empirically untenable. According to it, two people sharing the same culture, for instance, two dedicated professors of Russian literature, one in St. Petersburg and another at Yale, would necessarily be of the same nation. On the other hand, two Russians, for instance, the St. Petersburg professor of literature and an illiterate peasant from a Siberian village, who obviously do not share the same culture in the sense it was defined by Gellner, would not be fellow-nationals. Such implications make this definition quite unhelpful.

The second definition represents a reformulation of Renan's classical statement, "une nation est un plébiscite de tous les jours" [a nation is an everyday plebiscite]. Whether one interprets it in the strongly subjectivist sense and regards a nation as a community willed into being by its members, which was, probably, Renan's intention, or moderates this subjectivism by transforming a will into a recognition, as does Gellner, its meaning remains essentially the same. It means that a nation is a community which is regarded as a nation, whether because its members so decide or because, as sentient beings, they recognize it as such. Either way, being a circular definition *par excellence*, it begs the question of why people decide to see, or recognize, their community as a nation, rather than as a class, as a church, as a dynastic realm, or what not. In other words, it is the question

with which we began: what is a nation? That is, that would be the question, unless a nation is simply politicized identity, as the opening definitions of the book suggest. In that case, the issue is no longer that of the nature, and specificity, of the nation. It is, rather, what makes an identity politicized. It should be pointed out that this interpretation turns Gellner's definition into a reiteration of Kohn's 1944 statement that "the growth of nationalism is the process of integration of the masses of the people into a common political form" (Kohn, 1961, 4), which suggests a prior existence of, and focuses attention on, a modern, bureaucratic, and centralized government over a large territory.

2. An Imagined Community

Benedict Anderson, the author of perhaps the most famous book on the subject in recent decades, attempted in it a novel definition, already intimated in the title: his book of "reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism" was called *Imagined Communities*. Anderson proposed to define the nation as "an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (1991, 6). This definition did point to the nature of nationalism. Unfortunately, it stopped short of in fact defining it, namely, of distinguishing it from other, similar phenomena. The reason for that, paradoxically, is still the belief in the essential materialism of social reality and the epiphenomenal, not really real, character of everything that is not material, such as imagination.

To start with, even if we leave aside the question of the inherent limitation of the nation (which, as was indicated above, is an occasional, rather than necessary, element), the nation is not the only entity to which Anderson's definition applies. For example, a class such as the proletariat, in the Marxian scheme of things, would also be an imagined, political, limited, and sovereign community. It would be some other things too, but, of course, Anderson does not imply that the nation is nothing but the complex of features included in the definition. A church, certainly for the periods in which the political sphere was subsumed under, or confounded with, the religious, would also be such a community, if we assume that anyone under God could be sovereign (which, as it happens, was the assumption behind discussions of sovereignty in the Middle Ages). If we place an emphasis where, presumably, Anderson places it, given the title—namely on "imagined"—the definition opens up completely. Every large-scale human community—a city, a neighborhood, a university, a professional association—is imagined for the same reason that Anderson mentions: "because the members . . . will never know

most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (6).

Moreover, defining the nation as imagined, Anderson clearly stresses the act of imagining in the sense of mental representation, rather than the content of imagination or the nature of the image. This leads to the focus on the conditions of this act (what makes this imagining possible) and thus on the limits of the community (it is easier to visualize a limited community than a limitless one). In fact, taking up Gellner's proposition that nations are "invented," and therefore artificial, communities, Anderson says, "Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined" (6). But he does not develop this idea, and instead of the style of imagination, namely, characteristics that make a society imagined as a nation different from a society imagined as a dynastic realm, a class, or a church, he focuses on the conditions—such as print capitalism—which make it possible to visualize a certain large, but nevertheless delimited, territory as a community, or, rather, as a category of belonging and a source of one's identity.

III. TYPES OF NATIONALISM

Though by and large nationalism is treated as a uniform phenomenon, most scholars recognize the existence of two types of nationalism. This typology is conceptualized in different sources as "political vs. cultural" nationalisms, "Western vs. Eastern" nationalisms, and more recently, "civic vs. ethnic" nationalisms. Like many other elements in the scholarship on nationalism, this conventional dichotomy is also derived from the seminal work of Hans Kohn; it reflects, and is originally intended to capture, certain conspicuous differences in the historical record of the nations whose development Kohn described.

The three pairs of categories focus attention on the same dividing line, but with a slightly different emphasis. While it is generally agreed that all nationalisms are in some sense cultural and political, the dichotomy "political vs. cultural" stresses the relative salience and historical priority of principles of political organization vs. preoccupations with language, literature, history, and folklore in various nationalisms. The Western-Eastern dichotomy reflects the fact that while the archetypal example of "political" nationalism in Kohn's and other historical scholarship was France—a "Western" nation par excellence—most examples of "cultural" national-

ism were drawn from Eastern Europe, specifically Slavic countries. Of course, the archetypal case of "cultural" nationalism, Germany, could not be easily placed in either the "East" or the "West"—geographically, it belongs in Central Europe—and some other examples of "cultural" nationalism, such as Italy, simply do not fit the dichotomy at all. Using it would incongruously define Germany and Italy as Eastern nations.

But, in fact, "East" and "West," in this context, and as categories in social sciences generally, are cultural, rather than geographical markers. A "Western" nation is implicitly defined as a "civic" nation, and an "Eastern" nation as an "ethnic" one; therefore, these concepts contribute little to the use of that latter dichotomy. The categories "civic" and "ethnic" closely correspond to the "political" and "cultural" types, with a greater emphasis, perhaps, in the case of "civic" on the concept and institution of citizenship, and an implicit understanding, in the case of "ethnic," that preoccupations with language, history, and folklore reflect a belief in deeper, "natural," that is, in effect, biological, forces behind them, such as race or "blood and soil," which form the ultimate reality underneath nationhood and national identity. The concepts "civic" and "ethnic" are useful, but they do not capture all of the significant differences (i.e., differences which are translated into differences in political and social institutions and behavioral patterns) between historical nationalisms. Moreover, when taken as descriptive categories, intended to briefly characterize these nationalisms—which is indeed the inspiration behind them—they cannot explain any of these differences and thus lack explanatory value.

A. Historical Types of Nationalism

Empirically, one can distinguish three types of nationalism, each one of which has distinctive implications for the ways of thinking and behavior within societies they help define. These types can be identified as an "individualistic-civic" type, a "collectivistic-civic" type, and a "collectivistic-ethnic" type of nationalism. This typology is analytical, rather than descriptive. At its basis lie not the differences which the three types of nationalism produce, but the differences in the initial conceptions of the nation which produce them.

The initial conception of the nation—the new, nationalist image of society—must include two elements: the nature of the nation as a whole, and the nature of the human parts that compose the nation. The nation as a whole can be seen either as a composite entity, a collectivity formed by the association of individuals, or in unitary terms, as a collective individual. The former

conception results in the individualistic nationalism—the individualistic vision of the new social order—and the latter in a collectivistic vision, collectivistic nationalism. (It is important to keep in mind that both categories, individualistic and collectivistic, are markers of social consciousness and of collective, namely, shared, representations. To borrow Durkheim's phrasing, both concepts refer to the ways in which society—the nation—is represented to its members, i.e., as a composite or a unitary entity, not to the motivations of the members or the firmness of their commitment. Historically, individualistic nations have commanded national patriotism as intense as, and more widespread than, that of collectivistic nations. The rates of both desertion in times of war and of emigration in times of peace have been lower in individualistic nations than in others.)

The definition of the nation as a composite entity, as was the case with the original nationalism in England, and the other societies that adopted the English model, assumes the moral, political, and logical primacy of the human individual, who is seen not simply as a physical unit of society, but as its constitutive element, in the sense that all the qualities of the latter have their source in the nature of the former. In the framework of this composite definition the nation—which, in the framework of nationalism in general, is seen as a sovereign (fully independent and self-governing) community of fundamentally equal members—derives its freedom from the essential liberty of the individuals who compose it, while its dignity, and the dignity of national identity, reflects the natural dignity of each human being. Such dignity and liberty (which are, of course, inherently linked) make the members of the nation equal, and this equality is realized in the social and political arrangements that set individualistic nations apart from others. The principles at the foundation of individualistic nationalisms are none other than the principles of liberal democracy, which individualistic national consciousness fosters and sustains.

The definition of the nation in unitary terms, by contrast, promotes collectivist forms of social and political organization, which are conceptualized as "communism," "socialism" of one kind or another, or "socialist" and/or "popular" democracy. Collectivistic nations share in common a predilection for authoritarian politics and, as a result, pronounced inequality in social life, at least in the relationship between the rulers and the ruled. This authoritarianism is a logical implication of perceiving the community as an individual in its own right—and one morally superior to human individuals—with a will, interests, and purpose of its own which have priority over, and are independent of, wishes and aspirations of its human members. The will, interests,

and purpose of the nation are not directly known to the members and have to be deciphered and interpreted for their benefit by a specially qualified elite. This all-important service gives new meaning to the concept of representation: the elite, in such cases, represents the nation to the people, rather than representing the people. This service also establishes those who provide it in a position of vast superiority to the rest. The equality of membership that is implied in nationalism is contradicted by this superiority and is, therefore, reinterpreted and limited, becoming in the political sphere a matter of make-believe.

The other implication of nationalism, popular sovereignty, is also reinterpreted, becoming the attribute of the nation as separate from the people who compose it, and, as such, lying not in political arrangements that ensure individual liberties, but in collective freedom from foreign domination. Finally, the dignity of the nation, and of national identity, is in the framework of collectivistic nationalisms, no longer a reflection of the dignity of individuals, but is instead inherent in the nation as such and is only communicated to individuals by virtue of their membership in the nation.

The second element of the definition of the nation—the nature of the human parts that compose it—is in fact the definition of the criteria of membership in the nation, or nationality. It is here that one can usefully utilize the conventional distinction between civic and ethnic nationalisms. Indeed, membership in the nation can be conceived of either in civic or in ethnic terms. In the former case, nationality is equated with citizenship and is seen as an essentially political and even legal category, implying a commitment to certain rights and duties, which is, in principle, embraced voluntarily. Being, at least theoretically, a matter of choice, nationality can be acquired and lost. Though it is presumed that every person at any point in time has a nationality, and that one's choice is limited to selecting among various national identities, it is conceivable, in the framework of civic nationalism, that one could be without a nationality altogether.

When nationality is defined in ethnic terms, by contrast, it is no longer conceived of as a matter of choice, but, instead, as an ineluctable, biological necessity. It is believed that one cannot be without a nationality as one cannot be without an essential bodily organ; one is born with a particular nationality and can never lose it. At best (or at worst), one's national identity can be concealed. In some mystical, but essentially biological, natural process, completely independent of human volition, nationality, in this framework, is thought to be transmitted by blood, as an inherent, genetic characteristic. It is also thought to determine one's interests and sentiments

and is expected to project itself naturally and unreflectively in one's sense of attachment and commitment to the nation. It should be noted that ethnic homogeneity of a population (whether linguistic, racial, or other), even when seen as a characteristic of a nation, does not necessarily result in ethnic nationalism. France, perceived as ethnically homogeneous, for instance, is a civic nation.

The two dimensions of the definition of the nation result in three types of nationalism mentioned above, because the composite definition of the nation as a whole, with its emphasis on the logical and moral priority of the individual, implies a civic concept of nationality. Consequently, individualistic nationalism is necessarily civic. The definition of the nation in unitary terms, however, is commensurate with both civic and ethnic criteria of membership, allowing for the existence of civic and ethnic varieties of collectivistic nationalism. The components of individualistic-civic nationalism, on the one hand, and of collectivistic-ethnic nationalism, on the other, mutually reinforce each other, and bolster the liberal tendencies of the former and the authoritarian proclivities of the latter. But the combination of a collectivistic definition of the nation as a whole with civic criteria of nationality unites these contradictory propensities and creates an ambivalent and inherently problematic type. The first historical nationalism, which appeared in 16th century England, belonged to the individualistic-civic type. The second type to emerge—with France as its first case—was collectivistic-civic. The third type was that of collectivistic-ethnic nationalism. It first developed in Russia, but its paradigmatic case became German nationalism. This third type of nationalism was destined to become the most widespread; most nationalisms developing in the late 19th and the 20th centuries belong to it. (Table I presents the three types in order of appearance with the original and paradigmatic cases of each type.)

These categories should be regarded as models which can be approximated, but are unlikely to be realized

TABLE I
Historical Types of Nationalism

Type	Individualistic*			Collectivistic*		
	Civic*	Ethnic*	None	Civic*	Ethnic*	
1st case	I	England	—	II	France	III
Paradigmatic case	USA	England, USA	—	France	Germany	Russia

*Definition of the nation as a whole.

*Membership criteria.

B. The Process of Emergence of the Historical Types

To understand how any particular nationalism acquired its specific form, and why it belongs to one type and not another, one has to analyze how it emerged. The processes of formation of the three types are different, because of the different significance and impact of various factors in them, even though the very same factors can be distinguished in the emergence of every nationalism. These factors fall, basically, into three categories, structural, cultural, and psychological, but the specific nature of each is a variable. Some of the differences between the types are attributable to the differences in the order in which structural and symbolic factors influence each other in the process of the transformation of identity.

The adoption of the idea of the nation always implied symbolic elevation of the populace, and therefore the creation of a new social order—a new structural reality. But in the case of the original nationalism, the first type, the idea was inspired by the structural context which preceded its formation, i.e., by the fact that the "people" were acting in some way as a political elite and actually exercised sovereignty, as well as experiencing some degree of social mobility or fundamental equality. That this should have been so in the first case of nationalism is clear from the consideration of the "zigzag pattern of semantic change" (see Figure 1). The word "nation" in its dominant conciliar meaning of an "elite" could only be applied to the people of England, if this meaning corresponded to some aspects of this people's situation. This constraint, however, was absent in the later cases. Applied to the population of England, the concept "nation as an elite" became cognitively linked to the existing connotations (political, territorial, and ethnic) of a population and a country. Societies importing the English idea of the nation could apply the new concept, "nation as a sovereign people and a community of equals," to themselves not because the people in them, like in England, had certain experiences of an elite, but because all of them had some political, territorial, and/or ethnic qualities to distinguish them. The emphasis in the concept "nation" moved from principles of international organization (exercise of popular sovereignty and

equality of membership) to the uniqueness of the population. The importation of these nationalist principles, as part and parcel of the modified idea of the nation, initiated the transformation in the social and political structure, instead of reflecting it.

The original—English—idea of the nation was individualistic: it was because individuals (of the people) actually exercised sovereignty and were socially mobile that they composed a "nation." In contrast, when sovereignty and equality were "theoretical," rather than actual, because a nation was a sovereign community of equals by definition, the concept of the nation was collectivistic: the uniqueness of a people, the reason why they could be called a nation, was a reflection of a collective being.

The adoption of national identity in every case (whether as a result of creation, as in England, or of importation, as in other cases) was a response to a fundamentally similar structural situation. It occurred because an influential group (or groups) was dissatisfied with its traditional identity as a result of a profound inconsistency between the definition of social order expressed in it and the experience of the involved actors. This inconsistency could result from upward or downward mobility of whole strata, from conflation of social roles (which might imply contradictory expectations from the same individuals), or from the appearance of new roles which did not fit existing categories. Whatever the cause of the identity crisis, its structural manifestation was in every case the same: *anomie*. This might be, but was not necessarily the condition of the society at large; it did, however, directly affect the relevant agents. Since the agents were different in different cases, the *anomie* was expressed and experienced differently. Most often, however, it took the form of status inconsistency which, depending on its nature, could be accompanied by a profound sense of insecurity and anxiety. The specificity of the change and its effects on the agents in each case deeply influenced the character of nationalism in it. The underlying ideas of nationality were shaped and modified in accordance with the situational constraints of the actors and the aspirations, frustrations, and interests which these constraints generated.

This often involved reinterpreting these ideas in terms of indigenous traditions which might have existed alongside the dominant cultural system in which the now rejected traditional identity was embedded, as well as elements of the dominant system itself, which were not rejected. Such reinterpretation implied incorporation of prenational modes of thought within the nascent national consciousness.

The effects of these structural and cultural influences

frequently combined with that of a certain psychological factor which both necessitated a reinterpretation of the imported ideas and determined the direction of such reinterpretation: *ressentiment*. A term coined by Nietzsche and later defined and developed by Max Scheler, *ressentiment* refers to a psychological state resulting from feelings of envy and hatred (existential envy) suppressed due to the impossibility of acting them out, which in many cases leads to the "transvaluation of values." The structural conditions that are necessary for the development of *ressentiment*—are two. The first condition (the structural basis of envy as such) is the fundamental comparability between the subject and the object of envy, or rather the belief on the part of the subject in the fundamental equality between them, which makes the subject and the object, in principle, interchangeable. The second condition is the actual inequality (perceived as not fundamental) of such dimensions that it rules out the practical achievement of the theoretically existing equality. The presence of these conditions renders a situation *ressentiment-prone*, irrespective of the psychological makeup of the individuals who compose the relevant population. *Ressentiment* could be inspired by a situation within the community that was to be defined as a nation, or by the perceived position of this community relative to other communities. As a rule the two were confounded. The unsatisfactory internal situation was interpreted as a result of foreign influence, and an outside community became the chief object of *ressentiment*. *Ressentiment*, felt by the groups that imported the idea of the nation and articulated the national consciousness of their respective societies, usually resulted in the selection of elements out of their own, indigenous traditions that were hostile to the original national principle, and in the deliberate cultivation of these elements. In certain cases, notably in Russia, where indigenous cultural resources at the time (the 18th century) were clearly insufficient, *ressentiment* was the single most important factor in determining the specific terms in which national identity was defined.

Analytically, the three classes of variables (structural, cultural, and psychological) may also be seen as stages in the formation of nationalisms, the structural being the basic stage to which the cultural and psychological stages are added in certain circumstances. The character of the first, individualistic-civic, type of nationalism, and of the first nationalism in history (English nationalism), was essentially determined by structural factors, while cultural factors (elements of indigenous traditions) influenced it but little, and the psychological factor of *ressentiment* had virtually no impact. The second

historical type (collectivistic-civic, exemplified clearly in French nationalism) bears the imprint of structural and cultural variables in approximately equal measure. And only in the collectivistic-ethnic nationalism, historically the last type to appear, does *ressentiment* play a crucial formative role.

C. Implications of the Three Types

1. Differential Propensity for Aggressive Behavior

While nationalism in general represents the ordering of particular modern societies reflects the type to which their respective particular nationalisms belong. The three types create the conditions for, and directly encourage the formation of, different cultural patterns and institutions, and the choice between them is of the utmost consequence for the social, political, and even economic character of the nation. Some of the consequences of this choice have already been mentioned. Individualistic nationalisms provide the framework for liberal democratic regimes, with representative political institutions and open, egalitarian social organization. Collectivistic nationalisms—especially ethnic ones, whose collectivism is consistent—by contrast, are conducive to the formation of various kinds of "socialism" which tend to be authoritarian in politics and to preserve relatively rigid status distinctions between social groups. In collectivistic-ethnic nations (none of which are perfectly homogeneous), status distinctions tend to become attached to ethnic differences and to reinforce the cultural significance of the latter.

Among other differences which can be attributed to the type of nationalism are the differential propensities of different nations to engage in aggressive warfare, and the likelihood of brutality in the treatment of adversary populations (in particular, noncombatants) while engaging in war. These propensities can be outlined in two sets of propositions.

First, collectivistic nationalisms are more likely to engage in aggressive warfare than individualistic nationalisms for several reasons. Individualistic nationalisms are not, in principle, particularistic, for they are based on the universalistic principle of the moral primacy of the individual. This applies to any individual, whether or not he or she belongs to the national community, and, as a result, the borderline between "us" and "them" is frequently blurred. One's nation is not perceived as an animate being which can be offended and nurture grievances, and neither are other nations regarded as collective individuals harboring malicious intentions and ca-

pable of inflicting insults. The culprits and the victims in every conflict are specified, and sympathies and antipathies change with the issues and points of view. Moreover, individualistic nationalisms are by definition pluralistic, which implies that at any point in time there exists a plurality of opinions in regard to what constitutes the good of the nation. For this reason, it is relatively difficult, in individualistic nations, to achieve a consensus necessary for mobilization of the population for war; it is especially difficult in the case of aggressive war, when no direct threat from the prospective enemy is perceived by the national population.

Collectivistic nationalisms, by contrast, are forms of particularism, whether perceived in geopolitical, cultural (in the sense of acquired culture), or presumably inherent, ethnic terms. The borderline between "us" and "them" is relatively clear, and the nation is essentially consensual, rather than conflictual, pluralistic society. Both these qualities facilitate mobilization, and both are related to a characteristic of the process of emergence of collectivistic nationalisms.

In distinction to individualistic nationalisms which are articulated by upwardly mobile, successful, and confident groups (as happened in England and later in the United States), often with a broad social base, collectivistic nationalisms are articulated by small elite groups. These either seek to protect their threatened status (as did the nobilities in France and Russia in the 18th century, the lesser nobility in Romania in the 19th century, or the Sunni Arab elite in Iraq in the 1920s) or are frustrated in their efforts to improve it (as was the small educated middle class in late 18th century Germany). Such status-anxious elites define their community—the sphere of their potential influence and membership/leadership, which may be political, linguistic, religious, racial, or what not—as a nation, and tend to present their grievances as the grievances of the nation, and themselves as the representatives of the nation. To achieve the solidarity of this larger population, made of diverse strands, they tend (though not invariably) to blame their misfortunes not on agencies within the nation, whom they would as a result alienate, but on those outside it. If they do blame internal elements, they define these as agents acting on behalf of or in collusion with hostile foreigners. Thus, from their perspective, the nation is from the start united in common hatred.

The second set of propositions addresses conduct while in conflict. During war, ethnic nationalism is more conducive to brutality in relation to the enemy population than civic nationalism. This is so because civic nationalism, even when particularistic, still treats humanity as one, fundamentally homogeneous entity.

Foreigners are not fellow nationals, but they are still fellow men, and with some effort on their part, it is assumed they may even become fellow nationals. In ethnic nationalism, by contrast, the borderline between "us" and "them" is in principle impermeable. Nationality is defined as an inherent trait, and nations are seen in effect as separate species. Foreigners are no longer fellow men in the same sense, and there is no moral imperative to treat them as one would one's fellow nationals (in the same way as there are no imperatives to treat other animal species as fellow men). The very definitions of ethnic nations presuppose a double standard of moral (human, decent, etc.) conduct. The tendency to "demonize" the enemy population, which appears to underlie "crimes against humanity," is a built-in part of ethnic nationalism, for within the framework of such nationalism enemy populations are not necessarily defined as humanity to begin with.

This tendency of "demonization" is related to the prominence of resentment in the formation of ethnic nationalisms; the latter often inspires and always reinforces the former. The object of resentment, at the outset invariably perceived as superior (were it not, there would be no reason to insist on equality with it), and therefore seen as a model, comes to be defined as the antithesis of the self. The degree of the actual inequality between it and the given ethnic nation is realized. In the minds of the spokesmen and architects of that nation, this object then becomes the incarnation of evil, which is incorrigible because it also is defined in terms of inherent traits, and therefore represents an eternal enemy. According to the characteristic psychology of ethnic nationalisms, the evil other (whoever that may be) is always harboring malicious intentions, ready to strike against the innocent nation at an opportune moment. For this reason, resentment-based nations tend to feel threatened and to become aggressive—both to preempt perceived threats of aggression against them and because the evil nature of the adversary justifies aggression (even if no immediate threats are perceived) at the same time as it justifies brutality in relation to the enemy population.

These preceding propositions, it should be stressed, are statements of probabilities. Whether or not nations which are likely to become aggressive or brutal actually become so depends on international circumstances and opportunities.

2. Economic Implications

The relationship between nationalism and economic development has never been considered systematically or based on empirical research—and this despite the fact that much of the theory of nationalism has been

couched in economic terms. This theory (represented among others, by the works of Anderson, Gellner, and Hobsbawm) has treated nationalism as an element of superstructure, determined by the progression of economic modernization, i.e., development of capitalism or industrialization. The axiomatic notion of the fundamental nature, and thus theoretical priority, of economic processes has obscured the historical priority of nationalism and precluded its consideration as a factor in the development of modern (capitalist, industrial) economies. Some preliminary work nevertheless indicates that certain types of nationalism might have played a most important role in this development.

To begin with, nationalism as such was probably a major factor in defining the place of the economic sphere in modern society, or in the emergence of the "economic civilization," and by implication, in the industrial revolution. Being inherently egalitarian, nationalism, as was mentioned above, has as one of its central structural consequences an open—or class—system of stratification, which allows for social mobility, makes labor free (that is, able to shift between sectors), and dramatically expands the sphere of operation of the market forces. Since it redefines the nature of social hierarchy, it may elevate the prestige of traditionally disparaged economic occupations, specifically ones oriented to the pursuit of profit, and make them a magnet for talent. Also, because of the members' investment in the dignity of the nation—that is, prestige—which is necessarily assessed in relation to the status of other nations, nationalism implies international competition. This makes competitiveness a measure of success in every sphere, and commits societies which define themselves as nations to a race with a relative, and therefore forever receding, finish line; when the economy is included among the spheres of competition, this presupposes a commitment to constant economic growth.

Different types of nationalism correspond to different attitudes toward economic activity and to different ways of organizing it, which impact a nation's economic propensities and success. Every particular nationalism represents (or is reflected in) a specific economic ethic, prescribing attitudes toward all dimensions of economic activity—toward money and moneymaking; various occupations; practices of business organizations in regard to their employees and customers; relations between business and government; and governmental involvement in economic affairs, whether domestic or foreign, in general—thereby determining the nature, and strengths and weaknesses, of particular economies. Economic success is influenced by such attitudes and, above all, by the status accorded to eco-

nomic activity within the framework of any given nationalism. As a rule, individualistic-civic nationalism, which defines nations as associations of individuals who are treated with respect, will be respectful of economic activity simply because it is the activity of many individuals. In the framework of collectivistic nationalisms (either civic or ethnic) recognition is bestowed on different categories of members in accordance with their contributions to what is defined as the interest of the nation. When this interest is defined as primarily noneconomic (as, for instance, in Russia), contributions to culture or to political and military capacity, rather than to economic prosperity, will be rewarded. In ethnic nationalisms where economic activity is not particularly valued, it is often the minorities who become prominent economic actors, and this may stigmatize both the minorities and the economic activity. (One finds clear evidence of this tendency in post-Communist Russia, and the Turkish experience offers some examples as well.) For that reason, it is likely that economic activity, in ethnic nations, will be more valued in ethnically homogeneous societies (such as Germany or Japan).

An important distinction between individualistic and collectivistic nationalisms, that can also have a significant impact on economic success, has to do with their relative mobilizing powers. Since the needs of individualistic nations are defined as the needs of the individuals who compose them, it may be difficult to mobilize such nations for collective economic action when the needs of the population are satisfied; such nations are less likely to be inspired by the prospect of competitive advantage or international prestige per se. In collectivistic nations, in distinction, the needs of the nation are independent of, and take precedence over, the needs of its individual members, who, as a result, can be mobilized to serve these (collective) needs—however defined—with relative ease. (These differences may help to account for

some of the recent shifts in the relative economic standing of the United States and Japan, for instance.)

See Also the Following Articles

CULTURAL STUDIES • ECONOMIC HISTORY OF NATIONALISM • EVOLUTIONARY THEORY • HOMELAND AND NATIONALISM • THE IDEOLOGY • NATIONAL SYMBOLS • WESTERN EUROPE

Further Reading

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