

# **NATIONALISM, ITS EXPLANATIONS, AND NATIONAL SOCIALIZATION**

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## **ABSTRACT**

How is 'nationalism' conceptualized in the relevant literature? How is 'nationalism' operationalized in empirical studies? How is nationalism explained theoretically? Which variables have shown to explain a considerable proportion of the variance in nationalism in empirical studies? These are the basic questions that are answered in the first part of this contribution. In summary, we found a conceptual labyrinth, questionable instruments, a lack of valid empirical data, and poor explanatory power. After having discovered this, we developed a new set of terms about national attitudes along with their conceptualizations and operationalizations, a structure in which these concepts are related to each other, and a theory of nationalism development. They are presented in the second part of this contribution. Three empirical studies in the Netherlands, Slovakia, and in the Basque Autonomous Community in Spain aimed to test our nationalism research instrument and the hypotheses about nationalism explanations.

## ■ INTRODUCTION

The ultimate aim of our research project is an understanding of nationalism and its explanations. Originally we expected to find this understanding in the existing nationalism literature. We expected to find in the existing literature well developed research instruments and empirical tests of nationalism explanatory theories. The questions we asked were: How is 'nationalism' conceptualized in the relevant literature? How is 'nationalism' operationalized in empirical studies? How is nationalism explained theoretically? Which variables have shown to explain a considerable proportion of the variance in nationalism in empirical studies? We found, however, a conceptual labyrinth, questionable instruments, a lack of valid empirical data, and poor explanatory power. After having discovered this, we decided to prepare a cross-national and comparative study to explain nationalism. Thereto we developed a new set of terms about national attitudes along with their conceptualizations and operationalizations, a structure in which these concepts are related to each other, and a set of hypotheses to explain nationalism development. Theories that aspire to universality, like this one, must be tested in many, culturally diverse samples. Data were collected in a well-established state (the Netherlands), a recently established state (Slovakia), and in a region with a considerable proportion of citizens who strive to a new, independent state (the Basque Autonomous Community in Spain).

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## ■ NATIONALISM

In the relevant literature, 'nationalism', if conceptualized, is often mistaken for, or confused with, other national orientations such as 'national awareness', 'sense of nationality', 'national consciousness', 'national identification', 'national mindedness', 'sense of nationhood', 'national assertiveness', 'sense of national distinctiveness', 'national loyalty', 'national solidarity', 'national feeling', 'national attachment', 'national allegiance', 'national pride', 'national devotion', 'national patriotism', 'pseudopatriotism', 'national involvement', and 'national chauvinism'. These national orientations are conceptualized in many different and multi-interpretable ways, and the conceptualization of one author of one concept is applied for other concepts by other authors.<sup>1</sup> 'Nationalism' in the theoretical literature is not only often confused with one or more of the above named national orientations (for example, national consciousness as a synonym for nationalism), but it is also often defined in these terms (for example, nationalism as a sense of loyalty to the nation). Other, more exclusive, conceptualizations of nationalism include a variety of elements.

We identified four different though not completely unrelated categories of "nationalism" meanings in the relevant literature: nationalism as a particular political orientation of individual political leaders and citizens, as a political ideology, as a political movement, and as a process of building and maintaining "nations" and "nation"-states (to be compared with Smith, 1991, 72). In each category, nationalism is conceptualized in several different ways.

In many publications, nationalism is presented as a political 'ideology', 'doctrine', or 'principle'.<sup>2</sup> The contents of the ideology, differ, however. The first element is that the 'nation' is depicted metaphorically as an enormous system of blood relatives (Eriksen, 1991). 'Nationalism can usefully be defined as politicized ethnicity ... Above all, ethnic group members imagine a common ancestry' (Adam, 1990, 572). Nationalist doctrine also 'holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations and that nations are known by certain characteristics that can be ascertained' (Kedouri, 1961, 1). The third element is that 'the political and national unit should be congruent' (Gellner, 1983, 1) or that political unit and the cultural or religious community should be congruent (Eriksen, 1991). Each 'nation' is expected to be or become a state and each state is expected to be or become a national entity; 'nation' and state are expected to be geographically identical. The core is the right of self-determination and the right of having a state for the 'nation', claiming that even 'people of peripheral cultures and ethnic groups can gain their rightful "place under the sun" only if they are allowed to exist in a state which encompasses their nation' (El-Wafi, 1993, 32). A fourth element is 'striving to unite all people who speak a single language and who share the various cultural characteristics transmitted by that language in a single independent state and in loyalty to a single government conducted in the people's language' (Kautsky, 1965, 32). The fifth element is that there is no higher loyalty than the loyalty to the 'nation'. People are expected to feel free and to be able to develop themselves through identification with, and loyalty to, the 'nation'. A sixth element is the introduction of distinctions between people: 'Persons who do not belong to the dominant nationality ipso facto have their dignity recognized in an inferior way to those who do belong' (Fukuyama, 1992). This introduction of distinctions between people is including the formation of unfavorable stereotypes of 'strangers', both in- and outside the country. And the final element is the crucial role of history (creation). 'As the poppy is the raw material for heroin addiction history is the raw material for ethnic, nationalist and funda-

mentalist ideologies' (Hobsbawm, 1993).<sup>3</sup> If there is no useful history available, it is created. The history gives legitimation, and offers a glorious scenery to the present that may not be something to be proud of.

In the second category of conceptualizations, nationalism is presented as a political movement.<sup>4</sup> This movement calls itself a 'national movement', organizing meetings utilizing national symbols, publishing national(ist) pamphlets and striving toward the creation of a sovereign state in which the 'nation' is dominant. It also strives toward national unity, the incorporation within the frontiers of this state of all groups which are considered, by themselves, or by those who claim to speak for them, to belong to the 'nation' (Seton-Watson, 1977). Other aims mentioned are defending one's own culture against threats from outside and, if necessary, expanding that culture.

In the third category of nationalism conceptualizations, nationalism is presented as a process rather than an ideology or movement. Nationalism is then the process of building and maintaining a 'nation' and a 'nation'-state.<sup>5</sup> The 'nation' and 'nation-state' building can take place prior to, simultaneously, or after state-building. National or 'nation'-states are historically a recent phenomenon (developed from tribes, via city-states, feudal lords of multi-culture empires, kingdoms, estates, and states). In the process of nation-building, several stages are distinguished.<sup>6</sup> Political elites created states (Tilly, 1990). Both state-building or state-maintenance and nation-building are fundamental elements of political integration (Deutsch, 1969). The endurance of a state is expected to be guaranteed only if the psychological 'nation' is built, that is if the inhabitants share not only the necessary associational sentiments and deference, but also devotion (Pye, 1962). The two crucial or generic catalysts for 'nation' formation (or maintenance) are 'will, voluntary adherence and identification, loyalty, and solidarity on the one hand, and fear, coercion, compulsion on the other' (Gellner, 1983, 53). 'Nation'-building is a problem for developing states, yet it is also seen as an ongoing necessity for developed states. We can also observe the process within a part of a larger state (or outside a state or across-states). Shared economic motivations can strengthen the desire for (or reconstruction of) one's own 'nation'-state, where as 'new' elites may see this as an opportunity for more political power. Also in conceptualizations of nationalism as a process of nation-building, one or more of the above named other national orientations are meant such as 'national consciousness', 'national identification', and 'national loyalty'. For example, nation-building is 'extending down the population as a whole the belief in the existence of the nation, which, before independence was won, was held only by a minority' (Seton-Watson, 1977, 3), or it encompasses 'the processes of creating viable degrees of unity, adaptation, achievement, and a sense of national identity among the people' (Bell & Freeman, 1974, 11; in Bloom, 1993, 55), and nationalism is only 'the process whereby the inhabitants of a state's territory come to be loyal citizens of that state' (Bloom, 1993, 55). Brzezinsky maintains that in the first stage of (non-Russian) nationalism (in the former Soviet Union), 'nationalism typically tended to focus on demands for the preservation in some significant fashion of the national language, which represent an almost instinctive desire for national self-preservation from progressive Russification' (Brzezinsky, 1989, 10). If 'nationalism' also is conceptualized as the demand for linguistic preservation, then apocalyptic predictions of growing 'nationalism' resulting in a European volcano of nations may be exaggerated. One could also question just what is 'instinctive' about a desire for national self-preservation (see Eller & Coughlan, 1993).

The fourth category of nationalism refers to individuals' particular political orientations.<sup>7</sup> Also in this category, nationalism is often identical to one or more of the

above named national orientations such as 'national consciousness', 'national identity', 'national feeling', 'national loyalty', and 'patriotism'. Nationalism is seen as national consciousness in, for example, 'Nationalism is a form of collective consciousness which both presupposes a reflexive appropriation of cultural traditions that have been filtered through historiography and which spreads only via the channels of modern mass communication' (Habermas, 1992, 3). Nationalism is national identity in, for example, '[Nationalism is] the desire to preserve or enhance a people's national or cultural identity when that identity is threatened, or the desire to transform or even create it where it is felt to be inadequate or lacking' (Plamenatz, 1976, 23-24). Nationalism is a national feeling which can be inclusive or come from excluding others (Michener, 1993). Nationalism is national loyalty in, for example, 'Nationalism is a state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due to the nation-state' (Kohn, 1965, 9); 'the cognition of the individuals that they comprise a national political community which is entitled to independent statehood, public support, and loyalty' (Seliktar, 1980, 90); 'ideas, thoughts, feelings, attitudes, or beliefs that are characterized by national or subgroup consciousness, a promotion of one group above all others, with an emphasis on loyalty to, and promotion of, the group culture' (Jacobs, 1990, 221); and 'the feelings that persons have toward [their own and other nations] and their sense of loyalty to them ... are at the heart of nationalism' (Druckman, 1994, 44). Nationalism is patriotism in, for example, 'the set of more or less uniform demands which people in a society share, which arise from their patriotism, for which justifications exist and can be readily expressed, which incline them to make personal sacrifices on behalf of their government's aims, and which may or may not lead to appropriate action' (Doob, 1964, 6).

Other dimensions (introduced in conceptualizations of nationalism as a particular political attitude of individuals) are particular beliefs about the roots of one's own country and people, the desire to establish a 'nation'-state, the call for national homogenization, the attitudes of national superiority, ethnocentrism, national dominance and xenophobia. The first dimension is a set of particular beliefs, including the belief in kinship, blood-tie, and a genetic stock common to the members of the 'nation', the belief that one's own people as a 'chosen people' has a special mission, the belief that one's country/land is a 'promised land', and the belief that 'nationality is at the root of one's being, rather than one among a series of roles that are constructed' (Breuilly, 1993, 48). The second dimension is the desire to establish or maintain a separate, distinct and independent 'nation'-state (Bar-Tal, 1993). Nationalism is then 'the pursuit - through argument or other activity - of a set of rights for the self-defined members of the nation, including, at a minimum, territorial autonomy or sovereignty' (Barrington, 1997, 714). This desire may result in 'the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle [that the political and the national unit should be congruent], or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by this fulfillment' (Gellner, 1983, 1). The third dimension is 'the struggle to keep groups as [ethnically] "pure" and homogeneous as possible' (Blommaert & Verschueren, 1992, 362) and the call for 'national homogenization by (forced) assimilation, deportation or even killing of non-nationals' (Koch, 1993). The fourth dimension is national superiority. Nationalism includes the 'monolithic interpretation of the nation inside the own nation and a confrontational one in relations to the remaining, mainly the neighbouring nations' (Zajac, 1993, 55) and ethnocentrism as an attitude which evaluates one's own group as virtuous and superior and outgroups as contemptible and inferior (Levine & Campbell, 1972). The fifth dimension is 'an orientation toward national dominance' (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989, 271). Superiority consistently implies 'downward comparisons of other

nations relative to [one's own country], thus going beyond merely a belligerent attitude regarding [one's own country's] righteousness' (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989, 271) and results in xenophobia.

There are also several different types of nationalism distinguished in the literature. The first distinction is the one between cultural and political nationalism (Loh, 1975; Plamenatz, 1976; Breuilly, 1993).<sup>8</sup> Some authors (for example, O'Brien, 1993) state that historically the growth of cultural nationalism (promoted by, among others, the writings of Herder) at the end of the eighteenth century provided a basis for political nationalism. The second distinction is the one between ethnic or linguistic nationalism and territorial nationalism (Blommaert & Verschueren, 1992). Linguistic nationalism is observed in, for example, Germany. Due to the fact that the German language was widely spread over Europe, this language could be used as a focus for unity. Territorial nationalism is observed in France. The French language was not widely spread among the population and could not be used for nation-building. Therefore French people were, as a result, defined as those who lived on French territory. The next distinction is historically and regionally bound: i.e., original or classical nationalism, nationalism in the developing countries, and a tertiary nationalism (Zajac, 1993, 55). Original or classical nationalism is related to small Western and Northern European countries. It stresses national differentiation and individuality in the competition with the big powers in the context of the European Community/Union and to the states with several different "nations", such as Spain, Belgium and Italy. The second type of nationalism is related to African and Asian countries whose boundaries were drawn without regard to traditional boundaries of 'nations', that have passed through the process of colonization/decolonization and which have not yet successfully established the ('nation'-)state. Tertiary nationalism is the new nationalism which serves as a substitute for the failed class collectivism in contemporary Eastern, Central, and Southern Europe. The fourth distinction relates to the character of nationalism: the rational and associational nationalism in Western Europe and the organic and mystical nationalism in Eastern Europe (Kohn, 1965); the Western civic-territorial nationalism and the Eastern ethnic-genealogical nationalism (Smith, 1981); and the 'Mazzini-style Risorgimento nationalism of non-competitive universal emancipation and fulfillment' and 'a more sinister "integral nationalism" insisting upon its own exclusive "destiny", the mystical right of the nation to pursue its ethnocentric *sacro egoismo* without regard for the sensibilities of others' (Pearson, 1993, 61-62). Eastern Europe's nationalism is also perceived (we may also say, "stereotyped") as tending 'to be more volatile, more emotional and more intense than [that] in the West' (Brzezinsky, 1989, 4). The next distinction is the one between 'sub-state nationalism', 'pan-nationalism', 'hyper-state' nationalism and 'positive' nationalism. In stead of criteria for this distinction, proponents only give us examples: e.g., Slovakia, 'Pan-Turkism', Serbia and the USA respectively (Griffiths, 1993). There also is the distinction between 'state nationalism', i.e. the nationalism that is instilled by the rulers of the nation-state as a means to homogenize its population, and 'nationalism in nations without a state', i.e. the nationalism of nations without a state incorporated into larger nation-states (Guibernau, 1996). A 'conscious' and an 'unconscious' nationalism are also distinguished (Bayer & Strickland, 1990, 704-705). Conscious nationalism is 'manifest when members of a given national group profess in an open and more or less vociferous way certain national values and ideals; when they strive consciously toward certain particular national goals; when they explicitly glorify the real or imaginary peculiarities of their own national group, while at the same time rejecting in a more or less aggressive way the values, ideals, symbols, and aims of other nations'.

Unconscious nationalism is 'evident when members of a national group, even though not formulating and pronouncing in any articulated way their particular national ideas and beliefs, nevertheless fundamentally are so involved in sets of nationally prejudiced concepts that, without being aware of it, they see and judge everything from their own national point of view'. Other distinctions made are between 'quotidian nationalism' and 'crisis nationalism' (Davies, 1973), 'democratic' and 'authoritarian nationalism' (Kamenka, 1976), and between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism (Greenfeld, 1993). Finally there are authors who indentify very specific nationalisms, such as an 'aggressive, integralist nationalism' (Mommson, 1993, 6), and a 'manic xenophobic nationalism' (O'Brien, 1993, 147). These distinctions, however, made no contribution to our search for conceptual clarification.

There also are different levels or intensities of nationalism: a 'normal' and an excessive nationalism. For example, militant nationalism (Katz, 1965); rabid nationalism; nationalism in pathological proportions (Seliktar, 1980); committed and uncommitted nationalists (Seliktar, 1980); nationalism and ultra-nationalism (Farnen & German, 1992); and 'sober' and 'excited' forms of nationalism (O'Brien, 1993, 148). Differences between each are not always made clear. Katz (1965), for example, says that militant nationalism is the 'type of national identification that is based not so much on the individual's attraction by the advantages of group belongingness as on his attempts to solve his own internal conflicts and insecurities'. This description says more about an assumed cause than of the phenomenon itself. Probably 'normal' nationalism is what others consider as national orientations such as 'national pride', while 'extreme nationalism', then, may be 'national superiority' and specific nationalist elements such as the desire to establish a separate, distinct, independent, and ethnically homogeneous 'nation'-state combined with comparisons of other 'inferior' nations.

Observers differ also in their normative approach. Most evaluate nationalism negatively.<sup>9</sup> Others indicate both negative and positive evaluations.<sup>10</sup> Nationalism is Janus faced: amity for the ingroup, paralleling enmity for outgroups; self-sacrifice and altruism go hand in hand with ferocious hostility.<sup>11</sup> Farnen & German (1992, 80-81) see nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe as a two-edged sword: 'On the one hand, it is necessary to have a sufficient national identity to have broken away from Soviet communist control; yet ultranationalism can lead to violence against minorities and an unwillingness to join international organizations such as the European Community or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe'. Some scholars stress nationalism's positive elements which give people an identity, motivation in, for example, sports, and for contributing to the establishment of democracy. It is argued that due to national(ist) aspirations, independent states were formed which made popular sovereignty possible. Under the nationalist banner, populations were transformed into 'nations' which formed states. The creation and existence of a state is a pré-condition for the existence of a democracy. Nationalism succeeded in reconciling 'republican' ideas with the larger dimension of modern territorial states.<sup>12</sup> In Central and Eastern European states, nationalism is one of the primary reasons for freedom from autocracy and communism. 'Historically, nationalism arises in the course of stabilising or making possible the transformation from autocratic to democratic or at least popular government' (Kamenka, 1976, 15). However, 'nationalism' as here conceptualized is again probably more meant in the sense of other national orientations such as 'national consciousness', than in the sense of a struggle to keep groups as ethnically pure and homogeous as possible or a persistent superior comparisons with other nations. Differences in evaluations of nationalism are

obviously based on different (or confused) conceptualizations.<sup>13</sup>

Opponents of nationalism often prefer international attitudes. International attitudes may, however, relate to particular regions of the world, for example, "Arab nationalism" (El-Wafi, 1993) and "Europeanism" (Commission, 1993; Dekker, 1993), rather than to the world as a whole, "internationalism" or "transnationalism", "cosmopolitanism", "international-mindedness", and a "world-minded attitude" (Sampson & Smith, 1957; Böcker, 1991). There is a debate about relationships between national and international attitudes. Some assume that nationalism and internationalism are two poles or opposite ends of a single dimension. Others assume no relationship between national and international orientations. Kosterman & Feshbach's (1989) investigation showed empirically that the internationalism factor was distinct from nationalism (with a low negative interfactor correlation of -.18). Their nationalism subscale suffered, however from conceptual confusion (see above). Finally, there is the conditional relationship hypothesis, following Piaget's (1926, 1951) theory of cognitive development and Etzioni's (1968) theory that loyalties transfer from smaller to larger entities. Plamenatz (1976) assumes that if an individual, living in Europe, has a feeling of inferiority or inadequacy in belonging to whatever "nation" is his, he/she is unlikely to be as good a European as otherwise he/she might be. Also collectivities need a developed identity in order to abandon it for a more inclusive one, hypothesizes Adam (1990). This conditional relationship also has some empirical evidence (Hewstone, 1986; Meulema, 1991; see also Guetzkow, 1955). That some of these conclusions are contradictory may be due, again, to conceptual confusion and for that the validity of these studies may be questionable.

One explanation for the confusion about nationalism may lie in the underlying concept of 'nation'. 'Nation' is defined in three different ways: as 'a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members' (Smith, 1991); as an 'imagined community' (Anderson, 1983); or as a combination of both (Kellas, 1991; Smith, 1992). In the first way, it is defined (a priori) with the help of 'objective' criteria, such as language, religion, a common history, and shared historical experiences or common cultural characteristics. In the second way, 'nation' is (a posteriori) based on subjective criteria: the nation defined as the 'consciousness' of the people belonging to that particular nation. This 'consciousness' is a political construction; i.e., 'nationalism comes before nations' (Hobsbawm, 1993, 10). 'The essence of the nation is a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious [and the non-rational, emotional] conviction of its members, from all non-members in a most vital way' (Connor, 1993, 377). At the core is a sense of kinship based upon a belief in the group's separate origin and evolution. Other important elements are the belief in the right of territorial self-determination, and the purpose to control the territory that the members of the group believe to be theirs (Barrington, 1997). Both the objective and the subjective way of defining 'nation' give, however, arbitrary results (Koch, 1992, 35 and note a). In stead of 'nation', the concept of 'ethnicity' is sometimes used. This concept suffers, however, from the same conceptualizational problems (Eller & Coughlan, 1993). Moreover, it is a simplification to see ethnicity as a synonym for 'nation' especially with respect to relationships with the state (Eriksen, 1991). Opposite to nations, ethnic groups do not aspire to have their own territory (Barrington, 1997). A 'nation' may also include more than one ethnic group (e.g., the 'American nation' in the US).

In most publications on nationalism, an empirical paragraph is missing; nationalism is just assumed to exist and/or to grow.<sup>14</sup> The main reason may be that there is indeed very



limited empirical knowledge about this phenomenon. One excuse is that there are no adequate tools of measurement. 'The view from below, i.e. the nation as seen not by governments ... but by the ordinary persons who are the objects of their action and propaganda, is exceedingly difficult to discover' (Hobsbawm, 1990, 11).

If empirical references are made, nationalism as an ideology is assumed to exist if national(ist) aspirations are found in key writings, documents, and statements of political philosophers and politicians. As a movement it is assumed to exist if political leaders express national(istic) aspirations. As a process of nation-building it is assumed to exist if national(ist) aspirations are found in political leaders' statements, policy documents, and in socialization structures and processes (e.g., public information, propaganda, political education and so forth).

Only a very few studies focus on nationalism as a particular political orientation of individuals. Again, some of the applied nationalism scale items relate to other national orientations, such as 'national consciousness', 'national identification', and 'national pride'. For example, one of the items in Watts' (1994) German nationalism scale is 'I am proud to be a German'. Others refer to a variety of elements. The first group of operationalizations relate to national symbols. For example, being fond of the national banner, emblem, and anthem (Csepeli, 1990); considering the mother tongue to be the most beautiful language in the world (Csepeli, 1990); considering one's first duty to be to honor the national history and heritage (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989); respect towards national symbols (Middendorp, 1978); and opinions that education should contribute to love of one's country, respect for the flag, and the national anthem (Middendorp, 1978; Dekker, P. & Ester, 1993). The second group includes giving priority to national interests (for example, agreeing with 'The important thing for the U.S. foreign aid program is to see to it that the U.S. gains a political advantage'; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989).

The third group refers to national superiority (for example, agreeing with the following Kosterman & Feshbach's 1989 items: 'Other countries should try to make their government as much like ours as possible', 'Generally, the more influence America has on other nations, the better off they are', and 'Foreign nations have done some fine things but it takes America to do things in a big way', agreeing with the Middendorp's 1978 and Dekker, P. & Ester's 1993 item that the Netherlands is a better country than other countries, and agreeing with Watts' 1994 item that 'The Germans were always the greatest in history'). The fourth group includes national dominance (agreeing with 'In view of America's moral and material superiority, it is only right that we should have the biggest say in deciding United Nations policy'; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). The next group refers to negative evaluation of foreign ideas and foreign groups (agreeing with 'The greatest threat to democracy in the U.S.A. comes from foreign ideas and foreign groups'; Remmers & Radler, 1957); negative stereotypes (Loh, 1975); enemy images (Loh, 1975); and favoring greatly restricting immigration (agreeing with 'The immigration of foreigners into the U.S.A. should be greatly restricted since it may mean lowering national standards'; Remmers & Radler, 1957). Other operationalizations refer to: stressing the importance of winning international (sports) competitions (agreeing with 'It is important that the U.S. win in international sporting competition like the Olympics', and not agreeing with 'It is really not important that the U.S. be number one in whatever it does'; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989, 34); resistance to major changes in one's culture (agreeing with 'We should firmly resist all attempts to change the American way of life'; Remmers & Radler's study of American 'super-patriotism', 1957); seeing a similarity with Third World liberation movements (Loh, 1975); perceiving a threat to one's rights (Loh, 1975);

perceptions about discriminatory favors or privileges (Loh, 1975); opinions that one's national identity and independence should be protected in international cooperation (Middendorp, 1978; Dekker, P. et al., 1993); and opinion that if someone does not like it in his/her own country, they should leave (Watts, 1994). Scheepers' (1992) 'favourable attitude toward the ingroup' scale includes items on both nationalism and other national orientations ('Everywhere in the world, Dutch people are beloved. We, the Dutch people, are always willing to put our shoulders to the wheel. Generally speaking, Holland is a better country than most other countries. We, the Dutch people, have reason to be proud of our history. Other countries can learn a lot of good things from our country. Every Dutchman ought to pay honour to our national symbols like the national flag and the national anthem. When striving for international co-operation, we have to take care that no typical Dutch customs get lost. I am proud to be a Dutchman'). In summary, when nationalism was empirically measured, it was done with several different indicators or indices. Again, some of these indicators relate to other national orientations (such as 'national consciousness', 'national identification' and 'national pride'), while other indicators show a great conceptual variety. Differences in items are striking and illustrate the missing congruence between these operationalizations and the conceptualizations presented previously.

There is obviously a need for clarification in the conceptualizations and operationalizations of national orientation concepts. This should point out for us how to distinguish nationalism as such from the other national orientations and how to improve our national orientations conceptual structure. Naturally, we are not the first to realize the need for clarification in the conceptualizations and operationalizations of different national orientations concepts, and for distinguishing nationalism from the other national orientations. A number of scholars have undertaken just such a clarification. Results of these efforts are, however, not completely convincing. For example, we could read that the difference between patriotism and nationalism is that patriotism 'seems to spring from love of home and the desire to preserve and protect it', while nationalism is 'inspired by opposition or aversion to persons and things which are strange or unintelligible' (Chadwick, 1945, 3). This difference relates, however, more to its different sources (or causes) than to the phenomenon itself. Nationalism and patriotism are also distinguished on the basis of the object; nationalism is assumed to relate to one's national group while patriotism is assumed to relate to one's state (Connor, 1993; Barrington, 1997). The theoretical or empirical argumentation for this distinction is missing however. Another example is Bar-Tal's distinction between patriotism and nationalism (1993). Without any convincing argumentation he states that nationalism is 'a political-sociological term', excluding the 'more general and basic sentiment' which is patriotism. Also distinguishes Bar-Tal between patriotism in its normally used or practical sense and 'negative', 'blind', or 'fervent' patriotism. More useful may his differentiations be that nationalism has as its fundamental goal a separate, distinct and independent 'nation'-state while patriots do not define themselves as a 'nation' striving to establish their own state (1993, 51). The same distinction is made by Adam (1990, 578): 'Patriotism is the unifying concept in immigrant societies ... With a variety of groups of different religions and languages, the myth of common origin obviously cannot be invoked ... the loyalty demanded from the patriots is not based on a common history but on the unique opportunities that the new "fatherland" provides'. Inclusive patriotism is the opposite of an exclusive nationalism. Another useful contribution is indicating and/or distinguishing specific dimensions for each separate orientation. Doob (1964) states that patriotism may have only one dimension, affect for

(love of) one's own country, while nationalism may have (besides affect for one's own country) the dimension of affect for (or hostility toward) (one or more) foreign countries and foreigners. Kosterman & Feshbach (1989)'s investigation of the multidimensionality of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes resulted in the conclusion that the factors were indeed distinct. The iterated principal factor analysis resulted in a low interfactor correlation of .28. A study in Japan, using the same items, however, showed a much higher correlation between patriotism and nationalism ( $r = .46$ ; Karasawa, 1994; see also Nish, 1993). We may conclude with Breuilly (1993) that the conventional distinction between nationalism and patriotism is not a very helpful one.

In summary, in the relevant literature, "nationalism" is often not very well distinguished from other national orientations, for example, national loyalty. "Nationalism" also has several different meanings, relating to different levels of analysis: an individual's orientation, an ideology, a movement, and the process of "nation" building. In each category, "nationalism" receives different conceptualizations. These conceptualizations often include terms of other national orientations (for example, nationalism defined as a sense of loyalty to the nation). Other conceptualizations of nationalism include a great variety of different elements. Moreover, there are several different types and intensities of nationalism distinguished. The underlying concept of "nation" also receives different interpretations. The very few empirical studies suffer from conceptual confusion as well, using several different indicators or indices. The differences in definitions result in differences in evaluations of nationalism. Naturally, we are not the first to criticize the conceptual confusion and to realize the need for distinguishing nationalism from other national orientations. A number of scholars have undertaken just such a clarification especially with respect to the concepts of patriotism and nationalism. Results of these efforts are, however, not completely convincing. A more clear conceptualization and operationalization of 'nationalism' is needed in order to prevent a continuation of the 'inflation' of the value of the concept, and to improve the studying of its actual occurrence and possible growth or decline in a more valid and reliable way.

## ■ NATIONALISM EXPLANATIONS

In the relevant literature, nationalism as a particular orientation of individuals, is explained by systemic, individual's, and socialization variables.

Systemic variables that are expected to explain nationalism in the past include the standardization of schools and mass education; the increase of multiclass literacy in a common language; the establishing of centralized, systematic, professional bureaucracies; compulsory military service; national infrastructural works such as railways, harbours, and canals; the growth of industrial capitalism; the growth of the middle classes; the increasing importance of trade; and the development of armies, the compulsory military service, and the fighting of wars (Deutsch, 1966; Smith, 1981; Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Pearson, 1993; Michener, 1993). Elites (monarchs) are believed not to be interested in the mass as citizens till the end of the 18th century. The aristocracy identified itself with the monarch rather than with a particular country or state. Increasing competition between the monarchs forced them to unify their 'nationals'. Therefor they initiated and supported infrastructural works and social and cultural integration on a national scale. As a result the mass broadened their local horizon, became acquainted with national structures and became nationally aware (Van Benthem van den Berg, 1994). Many authors see the start of nationalism in Europe during the French Revolution. Its emphasis on citizenship, popular sovereignty and national self-determination is assumed to have invited or required establishing a national community. (Kamenka, 1976; Habermas, 1992; Greenfeld, 1993). Other scholars locate the beginning of nationalism development at the end of the Roman Empire. Again others see nationalism as a phenomenon of all times. Pfaff (1993) refers to movements in Arabia promoting Arabia for the Arabians during the period prior to Mohammed's birth (see O'Brien, 1993). [Current literature about the coming "post-modern" period has a highly apocalyptic flavor. Continuing internationalization of the economic, political, and military systems is expected to lead either to a strengthening of the national or "nation"-state and more international conflict, or to a strengthening of international regions, divided on the basis of a particular "civilization", while also leading to international conflict, but on a larger scale (Huntington, 1993)].

We subcategorized the systemic variables that are expected to explain nationalism nowadays, in international and national political, economic, social, and communication systemic variables.

Regarding international politics, (growth of) nationalism is related to the national or "nation" basis of international law and political organizations, and to the goals of foreign policies. The more international law and international political organizations are based on (and designed to promote) the national state or "nation"-state and the right of self-determination of peoples or "nations", the more the individual is expected to develop the impression that the national state or even the "nation"-state is "normal", "natural" and desirable (Moynihan, 1993). Furthermore, the more the international political system highlights competition and conflict between national states for national geographical, economic, cultural objectives and for national status, influence, and power in international affairs, the more the individual is expected to perceive international politics in terms of national interest and to develop a preference for or believed superiority in one's own national state and people (Druckman, 1994). A foreign policy, which stresses competition (or creates a serious conflict, or starts a war) can also be expected to strengthen national attitudes (and to distract attention away from domestic crisis). Starting a war (and ending it after a short period with the claim of having reached the goal) is seen as one of the

most effective tools for political leaders who aim to strengthen national consciousness, loyalty, superiority, and nationalism (by setting aside domestic cleavages and thereby acquiring more personal popularity; Smith, 1981; Pearson, 1993). McCarthyism in the U.S.A. during the Korean War and the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas conflict between Argentina and the U.K. (at least if seen from a British point of view) may be seen as illustrations that the origins and causes of national attitudes, including nationalism, do not lie primarily in international circumstances but in domestic conditions, both historic and actual. Nationalism, even in the context of the international political system, may be presented as essentially a function of domestic politics (Gerrits, 1992).

With respect to the national political system, (growth of) nationalism is related to state performance. State performance is interpreted in two opposite ways. In the first way, nationalism is a result of a successful state (Eriksen, 1991). More authors see increasing nationalism the more a national political system is (perceived as being) in disorder (Loh, 1975). Then the individual is expected to feel a discrepancy between his/her sense of community and actual political arrangements, to become disappointed about cleavages between political groups, to become confused, to fear the future, and, as a result, he/she is expected to become more attracted to the idea of "one nation, one state", or "one state, one nation".

Regarding economics, (growth of) nationalism is related to economic deterioration and economic inequality. It is expected that the more the economic situation deteriorates into a "crisis" the more the "victimized" individual will feel disappointment, frustration and a lower self-esteem. It is also expected that great differences in economic activity and prosperity between regions in an existing state form a motive for regionalism, and, in cases where such a region coincides with a "nation", a motive for nationalism.

With respect to the social system, (growth of) nationalism is related to the position of minorities. The presence of a large minority group may become the political leaders' target and the mass may see soon this group as threatening. This may be expected to be the case especially in times when economic deterioration leads to disappointment and frustration. Frustration may lead to looking for a guilty party and may evoke aggression. Aggression is usually directed toward the source of the frustration. If this can not be done, because of its absence, its overwhelming protection, and/or effective counter propaganda, the aggression is directed toward some other easily identifiable group, e.g., a minority or foreign nationality group. Minority groups may even be presented and/or perceived as internal enemies. This may have a positive influence on the development of positive national attitudes including nationalism. In response to stereotyping and discriminatory behavior, leaders and members of minority groups may, in their turn, strengthen their own "ethnic" orientations.

With respect to the communications, the more sophisticated the communication system is, the more it facilitates the sharing of the same culture (language, symbols) while revealing more differences with other cultures, so that the individual may develop more national consciousness, pride, or preference (Richmond, 1984).

We have not found any empirical multivariate cross-national study into nationalism on an individual level that have included these system's explanatory variables. There is, however, a comparative study in national pride (Rose, 1985). In all the involved countries a majority of the population had national pride though the level of pride was variable across national boundaries (the highest in the U.S.A., 96%, and the lowest in Germany, 59%). Economic development did not show to be an important explanatory variable because both low and highly developed countries were at the top and the bottom of

the list. Two political factors appeared to account for differences in the level of national pride: colonial history and war history. National pride tended to be highest in former colonies, reflecting a legacy of conscious "nation"-building in a post-independence society, and the lowest in countries that suffered military occupation (the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark) or were defeated (Germany, Japan) in the Second World War.

In our view, system variables (macro-level) can not completely explain national attitudes on an individual level (micro-level). They can not explain why nationalism does not accompany the same system transformation in different countries. Other variables must link system factors to the individual. These variables must include the individuals' perceptions of the system and its change.

We subcategorized the explanatory individual's variables named in the literature in social-demographic characteristics, psychological needs, non-political but politically relevant orientations, and political orientations other than the one under study.

National attitudes are related to the following social-demographic variables: age (Weinstein, 1957; Jahoda, 1963, 1964; Lawson, 1963; Lambert & Klineberg, 1967; Rosandic, 1967; Jaspars, 1972; Pantic, 1993); gender (Kelly & Ronan, 1987; Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1989); level of education (Rose, 1985); income level or social-economic status (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989); country of birth and nationality (Kostermann, et al., 1989); and one's actual residence, "at home" or abroad (Okamura, 1981). Social-demographic variables can not in themselves explain much of the differences in national orientations. The important element is the other variables which are so often linked to them. For example, age is linked with variables such as personal characteristics (e.g., cognitive development), social position and social and political experiences. These other variables must link social-demographic variables to the dependent variable.

National attitudes have also been related to several individual psychological needs and social-psychological processes that accompany efforts to fulfill these needs (Bloom, 1993; Druckman, 1994; Guibernau, 1996). The individual psychological needs which are seen as universal although their intensity may vary, are: the psychological security need, the need for a secure sense of identity, and the need to have a positive identity. The relevant social-psychological phenomena relate to group influences on beliefs about, and attitudes toward the members of the in- and outgroups. Psychological security is seen as one of the fundamental human needs. This need follows only physiological and bodily safety needs, and precedes love, self-esteem, and self-actualization needs (Maslow, 1954). Psychological security is a sine qua non of personality stability and emotional well-being and a minimum condition for self-protection and social survival. Its basis is a biological one; the nervous system tends to reduce, or at least to keep constant, the amount of excitation present in it (Bloom, 1993). In order to achieve psychological security and self-protection people actively seek to develop a sense of identity. To make adaptive identifications and to protect, to enhance, to bolster and to defend identifications already made is a dynamic human imperative (Bloom, 1993). Individuals who share the same identification will tend to act in concert in order to protect or enhance their shared identity. This identity should help to capture cognitively one's complex social and political environment. Personal identity is a social phenomenon and is tied to other individuals and to groups (Erikson, 1968). It is a mediated identity: it is related to the image of oneself which others offer. An identity is the result of identifications with other individuals and groups (and their symbols). The individual identifies him/herself therefore with the behavior, the values, the attitudes, the opinions, and the beliefs of significant other individuals and groups or social categories in his/her surroundings, and with the behavioral expectations that fit best with

the group or category to which he/she wants to belong or belongs. Fulfilling others' expectations is rewarded in the form of positive images of oneself offered by the others and acceptance of membership. Groups are attractive to identify with because they also fulfill the need for belonging, the need for motivation, and the need for having a say or power. Part of identity is social and political identity. This is that part of identity or self-concept which the individual derives from membership in a particular social or political group. This particular group may be related to age, gender, social class, religion, occupation, and sports, but also to "ethnicity" or culture, territory, and political ideology. We may also see combinations of these, for example, the combination of "nation" or "ethnicity", territory, and political ideology, which may result in a nationalist identity (Smith, 1991; Weinreich, 1991). Each unit of identification may offer the individual a cognitively accessible interpretation of the complex social and political reality, so that he/she knows how to relate him/herself to this environment and to solve his/her own internal conflicts and insecurities (Allport, 1954; Tajfel, 1981; Markus, et al., 1985). This cognitively accessible interpretation may be a myth (Frindte & Pätzolt, 1994), an ideology, or an identity-securing interpretative system (Habermas, 1994). One of these identity-securing interpretative systems may be the country or "nation". The "nation" is a powerful rallying point and the widest possible mobilization that is available within a state (Bloom, 1993). One's own country, fellow-nationals or "nation" may become most important if other groups fail to fulfill the fundamental psychological needs (Duckitt, 1989). People strive not to an identity, as such, but rather to have a positive identity and high self-esteem (Bloom, 1993). Because of this need for a positive identity and prestige people tend to positively evaluate the group to which they belong, probably more positive than other groups. A new group is only attractive so far this group is positively evaluated, and perceived as important, by themselves and relevant others (Terhune, 1964; and Tajfel's 1982 social identity theory). The identity is strengthened by clearly distinguishing one's own group from others. If a group fulfills these needs the individual will develop a (very) positive attitude toward this group. In case of (the perception of) conflicting interests between groups, negative perceptions of others will be developed which also justify one's own group position. This involves the mechanisms of displacement and projection (Bloom, 1993). Individuals tend to observe more similarities among fellow-group members than with others (Turner's 1987 self-categorization theory; also see Billig, 1985, 1993). The mere classification of people into social categories or groups has shown to evoke biases in favor of one's own group even in the absence of dependence on, or competition with, the other group(s) (Tajfel, 1982; Hewstone, 1983; Messick & Mackie, 1989). The development of positive emotions and beliefs and, through them, of positive attitudes toward one's own people and country will be accompanied and followed by the development of negative emotions, beliefs, and attitudes toward other nationalities living in the country and toward foreign peoples and countries (Hagendoorn, 1991, 1993, 1994; Scheepers, et al., 1992). Individuals with higher identity need levels are more motivated than others to develop such negative emotions, beliefs and attitudes toward minorities and foreign peoples and countries (Duckitt, 1989). Once the negative (emotions, beliefs and) attitudes toward other nationalities living in the country and foreign countries and peoples have developed, the individual will tend to be less open to, and consider as less significant any inconsistent information about the foreign country/people and foreign minority within the country, and will be tended to distort, reject, ignore, or forget this kind of information. Consistent information is not just more likely to be accepted, stored, and remembered, but it is also more likely to be received and to be exchanged with peers, friends, and

colleagues and thus to be reinforced (Hirschberg, 1993). This may result in ingroup amity and outgroup hostility. Competitiveness and hostility will be greater the more (perceived) consensus among one's own group (Druckman, 1994). An identity crisis is expected to be the result of conflicting subsequent identifications and a failure of the "old" identity and the corresponding ideology. Subsequent identifications (with, for example, parents, teachers, religious leaders, pop stars, political leaders) may be in conflict. Also external sources may contribute to a crisis (for example, one's own self-belief is challenged by relevant others). The same is true for a clear failure of the "old" ideology, including vanishing of former values and absence of new ones. An identity crisis may lead to defensiveness, subservience, aggressiveness (Weinreich, 1991) or a shift in identification. The new identification may include the "extension" of the weak self when a "stronger" group or leader shows the way out. This may be a strong national(istic) group or leader. One's own country, people and/or "nation" may become a most important unit of identification. This may be the more attractive the more the individual also perceives a common threat from "outside", perceives a national political disorder, experiences an economic crisis, perceives his/her society/community is running in crisis, and the more the individual expects to gain psychological and/or material benefits thereby (Hogg, 1992). Any threat from the outside, a rise of political disorder, and an economic crisis may, in the view of the individual, require unification of the population through neutralizing any gender, class, religion, or political ideology divisions or inequalities. National(istic) ideology may function as a surrogate for a lost "faith". Although these psychological theories offer more understanding of the developmental processes related to national attitudes, they do not explain completely why and in which particular situations an individual chooses to intertwine his/her identity with the country and people or "nation" and not with, for example, an international political entity.

National attitudes, including attitudes such as national loyalty and patriotism, have also been related to orientations which are not in themselves political, but may have important political implications, and to political orientations other than the one under study. Relevant non-political orientations include religion (Smith, 1974; Rose, 1985; Ramet, 1989). Some religions are assumed to reinforce national attitudes such as national pride (e.g., in Israel), whereas others are expected to reduce national orientations in favor of international attitudes (which may, however, relate to a particular region in the world, e.g., Islam in Arab countries; Smith, 1992; El-Wafi, 1993). Other politically relevant orientations are dissatisfaction with social relations at home (Rose, 1985); feelings of meaninglessness, normlessness, social isolation (all components of anomie); feelings of moral desorientation; status anxiety or status inconsistency (indicating a difference between achieved and ascribed status; Loh, 1975); and negative perceptions of the economic system and its changes, for example, generalized economic retrogression and socio-economic frustration (Scheepers, et al., 1992). Authoritarianism is an explanatory variable including both politically relevant and political orientations (Adorno, et al., 1950; Meehan, 1991; Farnen, 1994). Strictly political orientations that are related to national orientations include, among others, ethnocentrism (Forbes, 1985), right wing party preference and political self-scaling, lack of political interest, political distrust, feelings of political powerlessness, lack of support for democracy, and support for a strong leader (Rose, 1985; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Empirical evidence of relationships between these variables and national attitudes does not imply causality, and does not specify in what direction influence was exerted. Moreover, the question may be asked which of these variables are determinants exclusively for nationalism (as just one of the various national



attitudes).

A third group of nationalism explanations refer to parents', teachers', mass media, and elites' influences on, and manipulation of, individual's and mass' national attitudes (e.g., Hess & Torney, 1967; Easton & Dennis, 1969; Mosse, 1975; Csepeli, 1982; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Breuilly, 1993; Desai, 1993; Pečjak, 1994; Beissinger, 1996; Guibernau, 1996). Parents and primary and secondary schools are ascribed a mayor influence in establishing national orientations (Gellner, 1993; Maddens, 1989). Education is expected to unite a given population into a single civic culture, employing a single civic language, and to preach allegiance to national symbols and national historical myths (Smith, 1992). History, and social studies or civic teaching in particular are expected to promote the development of positive national attitudes (Katz, 1965; Gumbert, 1987). Special attention is given to (the potential influence of) history textbooks (Citron, 1988; Lorentzen, 1990). Elite's (potential) influences were studied, among others, through an analysis of their national(istic) rhetoric (Connor, 1993). The more amorphous the political orientation, the earlier in life it is assumed to be acquired. Primary agencies of socialization have more influence on national affections, while secondary agencies have more influence on national cognitions (Seliktar, 1980).

In summary, the development in individuals of national attitudes in general, and nationalism in particular, has been related to systemic variables, individual's variables, and socialization variables. Systemic variables and social-demographic variables are, however, not more than background variables. Socialization variables seem to have a crucial influence on the acquisition of national attitudes. Additional variables are needed to link systemic, individual's and national socialization variables with national attitude (the dependent variable). We have not found any cross-national empirical multivariate study into nationalism.

## ■ NATIONALISM: STATE OF THE ART

Nationalism is high on the political science agenda. This is so probably thanks to the perception of a revival of nationalism at present.

Although a clear, consistent, broadly accepted terminology is one of the essential starting points of any branch of science, in political science literature, the term of nationalism is often 'misused, used loosely, or used inconsistently', concluded Barrington (1997, 712). This could have been the conclusion of our first chapter. We found that in the relevant literature 'nationalism' is often not very well distinguished from other national orientations, for example, national loyalty, and that 'nationalism' receives many different conceptualizations. Efforts to explain nationalism have resulted in a long list of different variables. The number of empirical studies is, however, remarkably low, probably due to the conceptual confusion. The very few empirical studies suffer from conceptual confusion as well, using many different indicators or indices. The face validity of many of these indicators is questionable. We have not found any empirical cross-national multivariate explanatory study.

Positive elements in the nationalism research' state of the art are the following. A clear distinction can be made between nationalism as a particular set of political orientations of individuals (belonging to the political and intellectual elites or to the mass), nationalism as a political ideology described in publications from political philosophers and political leaders, nationalism at the level of a political movement, group, or party, and nationalism as a process of building and maintaining a 'nation' and a 'nation'-state. The first category can be considered most important because the other three categories are ultimately also based on attitudes of individuals in their roles as either political philosophers (developing a nationalist ideology), political leaders (leading a nationalistic movement, or initiating, promoting and supporting 'nation' and 'nation'-state building and maintaining) or followers (being participant in a nationalistic movement). There seems to be a growing convergence of the crucial elements of nationalism as an individual's set of political orientations. First, the belief in the existence of 'nations' in general and of one's own 'nation' in particular, and the belief in the superiority of one's own 'nation'. Second, the opinion that nations have a right to territorial self-determination (a homeland) and the right to control the territory that the nation believes to be its territory through a separate, independent 'nation'-state. Third, the attitude of having very positive feelings towards one's own 'nation' and (future) 'nation'-state. Fourth, the wish that the 'nation' is reproduced in the future thanks to a sufficient birth rate, the wish to keep keep the 'nation' as pure as possible, the wish to establish or maintain a separate and independent state just for one's own 'nation', including, if necessary, incorporating all regions from neighboring states where people who are considered as belonging to that 'nation' live, and forcing members of other 'nations' living within the country to leave. There also seems to be a growing convergence of some of the explanatory variables. Crucial seems to be the universal need of a positive identity (identity theory), the elites' interests that are served (interest theory), and the elites' direct and indirect influence on nationalism of the mass (socialization theory).

## ■ NATIONALISM RECONSIDERED

In this and the following chapter, we present a new set of terms about national attitudes along with their conceptualizations and operationalizations, a structure in which these concepts are related to each other, and a set of hypotheses to explain nationalism development.

We characterize an individual's nationalism as an attitude rather than a belief, opinion, or behavior. The difference between an attitude and a belief or opinion is its affective character. Nationalism is more a feeling than a cognition. The difference with a behavior is that the latter can be literally observed. Attitudes may be translated in observable actions but opportunities thereto are not always present. Moreover, actions that fit in a nationalist scheme, e.g. voluntary serving in the army and violently attacking representatives of outgroups, may also fit in another way of political reasoning. An attitude can be described as an amount of affect for an object, i.e. '... simply a person's general feeling of favorableness or unfavorableness' (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980, 54). A national attitude is an amount of affect for one's own people and country. National attitudes differ in kind of affect: positive and negative national attitudes. They also differ in amount or strength of affect: modestly strong, very strong, and extremely strong positive national attitudes. Positive national attitudes can be distinguished on the basis of this difference in strength. Positive national attitudes give a positive national identity and satisfy the need of a sense of positive self-identity.

We hypothesize that one neutral and five positive different national attitudes can be distinguished empirically. The basic neutral national affection, *national feeling*, is the feeling of being part of one's own people and country. Assuming that one's national attitude can be inferred from the (completely) agree or (completely) disagree responses to particular statements about one's own country and people, this attitude can be represented in a survey, e.g., in the Netherlands, by the following statements: "I feel I am Dutch" and "I feel that the Netherlands is my country". The first positive national attitude is *national liking* which is the attitude of liking one's own people and country. The items are: "I enjoy being Dutch", "In general, I like the Dutch", "I like the Netherlands" and "I like the Dutch language". The following positive national attitude is *national pride*: the attitude of being proud of one's own people and country. Items: "I am proud to be Dutch", "I am proud of what the Dutch people have done" and "The Netherlands can be proud of what it represents". The third positive national attitude is *national preference* which means preferring one's own people and country. Items: "In general, I prefer to have Dutch people for my personal contacts moreso than people from other countries", "I prefer being a Dutch citizen more than any other citizenship in the world", "I prefer to live in the Netherlands moreso than in any other country", and "In general, I like Dutch people moreso than people from other countries". The fourth positive national attitude is *national superiority* which is the feeling that one's own people and country are superior. Items: "In general, Dutch people are better than other nationalities", "In general, Dutch people are the best people to have for my personal contacts", "The Netherlands is the best country in which to live", and "The Dutch nationality is the best nationality to have". Finally, *nationalism* is the combination of the feeling a sense of belonging for a "nation" with a common origin, kinship, and blood-tie, wanting to keep this "nation" as pure as possible, and wanting a territory to establish or maintain a separate and independent state just for that particular "nation", including, if necessary, incorporating within the borders of that

state all people who are considered as belonging to that nation, changing borders incorporating all regions where people who are considered as belonging to that "nation" live, forcing other nationalities or "ethnic" groups living within the country to leave, and rejecting or wanting to stop international cooperation. Items are: "I feel I share a common origin with other Dutch people", "I feel I am member of one Dutch family", "I feel I have Dutch blood", "The Dutch should not mix with other nationalities", "All the Dutch should live in the Netherlands", "Flanders, that part of Belgium where people speak Dutch, should unite with the Netherlands", "The non-Dutch living in the Netherlands should leave the Netherlands", and "International cooperation with other countries overburdens the Netherlands and, therefore, should be stopped". Thanks to the attitude of national feeling do individuals have a national identity, thanks to national liking and pride a positive national identity, thanks to national preference and superiority a very positive identity, and thanks to nationalism an extremely positive national identity.

We also hypothesize a hierarchy of the above named national attitudes in individuals. Each individual is expected to reach one of the following stages of national attitudinal development: national feeling -> national liking -> national pride -> national preference -> national superiority -> nationalism. Each stage requires its fulfillment before the next can be developed while incorporating the previous one and then prepares for the next. The stages are cumulative: one stage is expected to be embedded in the following one.

We also hypothesize different alternative trajectories or 'escapes' for the individual out of the above presented hierarchy of positive national attitudes. The first alternative trajectory includes negative national attitudes. In the presence of national feeling but also in the absence of national liking, an individual may develop the attitude of *national alienation*. This attitude is the combination of not feeling comfortable being among one's own people in general and not feeling at home in one's own country ("In general, I do not feel comfortable being among Dutch people" and "I do not feel at home in the Netherlands"). A nationally alienated individual has a negative national identity (and probably an unsatisfactory sense of positive identity in general). National alienation may be followed by the acquisition of *national shame*, the combination of being ashamed of one's own people and being ashamed of one's own country ("I am ashamed to be Dutch", "I am ashamed of what the Dutch people have done", and "The Netherlands should be ashamed of what it represents"). The next negative national attitude is *national disgust*, the combination of being disgusted with one's own people and being disgusted with one's own country ("In general, I am disgusted with the Dutch" and "I am disgusted with the Netherlands"). One may even develop *national hate*, the combination of hating one's own people and one's own country ("In general, I hate the Dutch" and "I hate the Netherlands"), contributing to an extremely negative national identity. The next trajectories for the individual out of the above presented hierarchy of positive national attitudes are trajectories with positive regional national and international attitudes. The hierarchies of these positive attitudes are expected to be the same as the one for the positive national attitudes. An individual may have a (extremely or very) positive or a (extremely or very) negative attitude toward one's own region and its people: *regional national feeling, liking, pride, preference, superiority* and *regional nationalism* (Melich, 1986; Rovati, 1992). For example, the attitudes of Basques towards the Basque Autonomous Community in Spain. Another trajectory out of the positive national attitudes hierarchy is the development of international attitudes. International attitudes may relate to particular regions of the world and its people, for example, the European Union and its citizens (*EU feeling, liking, pride,*

*preference, superiority, and European Unionalism*), Europe and Europeans (*European feeling, liking, pride, preference, superiority, and Europeanism*), and/or to the world as a whole (the "international community"; Wittkopf, 1990) and mankind (*international feeling*, the feeling of being a citizen of the world, and *internationalism*, the combination of feeling a sense of belonging to all other people in the world, feeling a member of one world family, liking people from other countries and parts of the world as much as one's own fellow-nationals, feeling comfortable being among people from other countries and parts of the world, feeling at home in almost all countries of the world, and supportive of international cooperation even if this means that one's own country has to give up part of its independence).

Moreover, we hypothesize that people combine moderate positive national attitudes with moderate positive regional national and/or international attitudes, while they do not combine very or extremely positive national attitudes with positive regional national and/or international attitudes. We expect that regional feeling, liking, and pride can be combined with national feeling, liking and pride. Regional preference, regional superiority and regionalism, however, will not be combined with national preference, national superiority and nationalism, because of the downward comparisons included in national preference and superiority and nationalism. National feeling, liking, and pride may also be accompanied by international attitudes. National preference, superiority, and nationalism may, however, not be accompanied by positive international attitudes. (This only applies to the comparison of national to European attitudes, and not to the comparison of attitudes toward Europe to attitudes toward other regions of the world). It is likely that individuals with strong positive attitudes towards their own country and people do not have positive attitudes towards European integration and the EU. European integration can be expected to result in a breaking down of the national identity which is highly evaluated. Finally, national attitudes may also be accompanied by certain attitudes with respect to the mankind and the world as a whole. Only individuals who do not have national, regional national or international regional preference (and as a consequence do not have national, regional national, or international regional superiority, and nationalism, regional nationalism, or international regionalism), may develop the attitude of internationalism or cosmopolitanism.

## ■ NATIONALISM EXPLANATIONS RECONSIDERED

Research in the field of political attitudes in general has included several different explanatory variables. We divided them into three categories, corresponding with three processes of attitude development (Morse & Allport, 1952; Hewstone, 1986; Mackie & Hamilton, 1993). The first is the process by which knowledge, beliefs, opinions, emotions, values, and behavioral intentions that were acquired earlier, together with earlier performed behaviors are linked to each other and by which a particular feeling is derived from that unique combination. The attitude, i.e. the general feeling of favorableness or unfavorableness towards one's own country and people, is in this process of internal inference derived from what the individual knows (knowledge and insights) and/or believes (auto-clichés and -stereotypes), thinks (opinions), feels emotionally (emotions), wants to do (behavioral intentions) and has done (behaviours) with respect to one's own country. The second process is the processing of one's own affective observations and experiences. The third process of attitude development is the processing of affective messages from others. This national socialization usually starts at an early age. It catches the child with experiences of positive emotions during national rituals - in reality or via TV. Positive emotions are linked to the national symbols. The individual then receives informative messages regarding their own country and people in conversations in the family and through watching television programmes. Later the school, church, other mass media, peers, people at the workplace, and social movements also become sources of emotions and information about one's own country and people (Seliktar, 1980; Csepeli, 1982; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Smith, 1992; Dekker & Meyenberg, 1992; Gellner, 1993; Breuilly, 1993; Desai, 1993; Pečjak, 1994; Wasburn, 1994). Political elites influence the individual's national socialization directly and, through the other socialization agencies, indirectly. In all political systems there is an intended attempt to transfer particular national political knowledge, beliefs, opinions, attitudes, values, emotions and behavioral intentions and behavioral patterns from the elites to the masses. From time to time the elites emphasize in their speeches their own country and people and their positive characteristics, and initiate and support here other socializers that do the same (Gumbert, 1987; Connor, 1993; Dekker, 1991; Farnen, et al., 1993, 1994, 1996).

In the relevant literature about attitude development through inference processes, different weights are attached to the various components (Stephan, et al., 1993; Eagly, et al., 1993, 1994). Three approaches to explain a particular political attitude can be identified: a cognitive, an affective, and a conative approach. In the cognitive approach, objective knowledge and especially a set of salient beliefs about the object are supposed to have a causal effect on the attitude toward that object (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Hamilton & Trolier, 1981, 1986; Grant, 1990). The more knowledge and the more positive opinions, clichés and stereotypes an individual has, the more positive the attitude is expected to be. Negative attitudes are explained from low levels of knowledge and negative clichés and stereotypes. The affective approach gives priority to emotions, values, and attitudes other than the one under study in the explanation of differences in a particular attitude (Zajonc, 1980). The causal relationship is with emotions, values, and specific other attitudes. In the conative approach, the attitude is expected to be preceded and influenced by behavior or the intention thereto; a particular attitude may be developed following (the intention to carry out) a particular behavior for reasons, of, for example, justification of that behavior (Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Bem, 1970; Milgram, 1974). There is no theoretical or empirical reason to exclude, a priori, one of the three approaches (Eagly, et al., 1994). In general,

the most promising explanation of a general attitude seems to be a combination of the three approaches, including previously acquired cognitions (i.e., knowledge and beliefs), affections (i.e., emotions, values, and specific attitudes, other than the one under study, and opinions), behavioral intentions, and previous behavior. This does not mean that all variables are equally important. Opinions relate usually to specific issues and not to more abstract categories such as country and people. Moreover, if cognitions, affections, intentions and behaviors influence each other, and if what is acquired first influences what is learned later, then is it relevant to know what people develop first. Longitudinal studies in this field have not been carried out, as far we know. Only some 'momentary snapshots' have been made (e.g., Piaget & Weil, 1951, 1976; Jahoda, 1962). These studies demonstrate, amongst other things, that children develop positive beliefs about their own country and people at a very early age. Based on these rudimentary clichés and stereotypes one's own country is labelled 'good' and one's own people 'friendly'. The children acquired these rudimentary clichés and stereotypes between the age four and eight. At this age, the clichés and stereotypes are not the results from inference processes or from their own observations and experiences but from socialization. These messages are presented to children mainly by parents, relatives, and television programmes in the context of their national socialization. It is plausible that at the time children acquire the first clichés and stereotypes about one's own country and people, they also develop distinct emotions.

The first determinant of national attitudes is a set of cognitions and salient national beliefs in particular. A national belief is a characteristic that an individual links to one's own people and country and/or their history and symbols. Salient beliefs are the most important beliefs and are named first, for example, answering free-response format questions. Which national beliefs are salient for a particular individual is expected to be influenced, among others, by the salience of beliefs about one's own economic, political and social position, what is salient in the communication, information and education the individual is confronted with, and by one's hierarchy of values. [This hierarchy of values also is instrumental to the evaluation of national beliefs. A value is something of worth or importance, that an individual prefers constantly and consistently, and that serves as an important goal or motive. With respect to an object, for example a country, the values may relate to the satisfaction of needs such as food, healthcare, education, income (job), room, safety, mobility, comfort, and esthetics, and to ideal ultimate situations such as national security, order, prosperity, freedom, and equality. With respect to people, the values may relate to ideal ways of behavior such as honesty, tolerance, and peaceful]. It may be expected that most of the salient national beliefs relate to the country's domestic political (dis)order, its democracy quality, its economic growth or deterioration, its social-cultural situation, the level of criminality, and the presence or absence of large minority groups, and to the country's international political position, including its (in)security and (lack of) influence and prestige. Also important are beliefs about the causes for one's own country's progress or deterioration. They may relate to foreign influences, the presence of large minority groups, and to democracy dissatisfaction and rejection. With respect to the latter one may wish a unification of the population through neutralizing the many class, religion or political divisions, aiming at restoring the (former) national order.

The second determinant of national attitudes are previously performed national behaviors. Examples of these behaviors with different intensities are orally defending one's own people and/or country against criticism from abroad, serving in the army on a compulsory or voluntary basis, and fighting in a war. Previously performed national behaviors are expected to influence one's attitude directly and, through their influence on

national beliefs, also indirectly. The beliefs and attitude, developed after the behavior performance may contribute to a rationalization for that behavior.

The third determinant of national attitudes are previously experienced national emotions and previously developed relevant other affections, the attitude towards outgroups, the feeling about one's own future, and the sense of positive identity in particular.

A national emotion is a strong feeling relating to one's own people and country, which is accompanied by a change in the readiness for action and by physical arousal. Examples of national emotions are being moved, and having tears in eyes, while listening the national anthem; being impressed while seeing the national flag being hoisted after a fellow-national's victory in a sports competition, which also gives the observant the shudders; and national home-sickness, while staying abroad. National emotions differ in quality and intensity. National emotions are expected to influence national attitudes not only directly but also indirectly through their influence on national beliefs. In general, national emotions are often developed early in life (coupled to rudimentary beliefs) and their development precedes the acquisition of national cognitions such as knowledge and more specific national beliefs. Information that comes later is attached to, and filtered through, these emotions. The beliefs that result from these processes may be distorted. Emotions are usually more resistant to change than cognitions such as beliefs. Emotions are acquired through emotional events, such as national rituals, e.g., in commemoration of the death from former wars and national liberation days (Neumann, 1967; Frijda, 1986; Kos, 1995). Emotions form potentially an important variable in explaining attitudes because they last a long time. Once an emotion is linked to an object, it will manifest itself in every contact with that object. This also happens when one just reads about the object and even when the object just comes to mind (Bem, 1972).

Another affective determinant of national attitudes, especially of extremely positive national attitudes such as national superiority and nationalism, is the attitude towards foreign national or "ethnic" minorities living within the country and toward foreign peoples and countries abroad. An individual is expected to develop the attitude of nationalism the more one has developed extremely negative attitudes toward these "outgroups" (see Kleinpenning & Hagendoorn, 1993).

The presence or absence of worrying on one's own (family's) future is also expected to be a determinant of national attitudes. We expect that an individual will tend to have a more positive national attitude, the more one is optimistic about, and does not worry on one's own (family's) future. This only applies to national liking, pride, preference and superiority. We expect that an individual will tend to nationalism the more one does worry on one's own (family's) future. One may worry on one's own economic future, for example one's future career and income opportunities, and on one's social and cultural future, for example, one's healthcare security, one's safety, and one's education opportunities.

The next affective determinant is the individual's sense of positive identity. A low sense of positive identity is expected to influence extremely positive national attitudes directly and, through its influence on national beliefs, the attitude toward minorities and foreign countries and peoples, and the worrying on one's own (family's) future, also indirectly (Maslow, 1954; Smith, 1991; Weinreich, 1991; Bloom, 1993; Druckman, 1994).

In summary, we hypothesize that an individual has a positive national attitude, such as national liking and national pride, thanks to previously experienced national emotions, previously performed national behaviors such as compulsory serving in the army,



previously acquired and positively evaluated salient national beliefs. Very positive national attitudes, such as national preference and national superiority, are expected to be developed thanks to previously experienced strong national emotions, previously performed intense national behaviors such as serving in the army on a voluntary basis, very positive national beliefs, (very) negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities living within the country and foreign peoples and countries abroad, and a low sense of positive identity. The extremely positive national attitude of nationalism is expected to be developed thanks to previously experienced extremely intense national emotions, previously performed intense national behaviors, such as fighting a war, extremely positive national history beliefs, negative beliefs about the country's actual international and domestic position and developments, extremely negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities living within the country and foreign countries and peoples abroad, a strong worrying on one's own (family's) economic and social-cultural future, and a very low sense of positive identity.

The next question is: How to explain variance in these explanatory variables?

National beliefs are expected to be developed through one's own direct observations and through selectively received mediated observations from others (such as parents, teachers, friends, journalists, and politicians). Beliefs about one's people's characteristics are acquired both through direct observations and selectively received mediated observations. Beliefs about one's country's characteristics are acquired mainly through mediated observations (from, e.g., teachers, journalists, and political information officers). Direct observations are usually limited to one's own positions and the ones of the surroundings, but they may be nationally generalized. What is observed from more or less "objective" characteristics of these individual's positions is influenced by particular characteristics of the observant, including his/her previously acquired national emotions. Mediated observations are taken for "true" the more they are consistent with one's own observations, one's previously developed national emotions, one's previously performed national behaviors, and with the beliefs that were previously developed and expressed in conversations with relevant others. The values with which beliefs are evaluated are acquired mainly through information and education from others such as parents, priests, and teachers.

In general, people take part in national behaviors later in life. Usually people acquire national emotions and beliefs before becoming active in this field. Exceptions may be (compulsory) serving in the army and fighting in a war at an early age. In these cases, national beliefs may be developed afterwards and may serve as a rationalization for the behaviors, and may, as a result, be distorted.

National emotions are developed by the individual mainly through experiencing national rituals. National rituals are, among others, (televised) ceremonies of remembrance for the national dead, ceremonies in commemoration of national historical events, and rituals around the national flag. Individuals who intensely experience national rituals are tended to connect strong feelings to obvious and hidden national objects, such as the national flag, emblem, anthem, coinage, head of state, palace and guards, capital, war memorials, military code, passport, frontier and customs, and museums of folklore and national history. These objects may become "self-objects" (Rothstein, 1994).

The attitudes toward minorities and foreign peoples and countries are to be explained by the previously performed behaviors, and previously developed emotions and previously acquired beliefs with respect to these minorities and foreign peoples and countries, which in turn are the results of direct observations and especially mediated observations offered

by relevant others, and by the level of sense of positive identity.

The worrying on one's own (family's) future is expected to be explained by one's beliefs with respect to the actual national economic, political, social and cultural system and one's own position in that system compared to the beliefs of the country's and one's own past of recent date.

The level of sense of positive identity is to be explained by, among others, the presence or absence of conflict in subsequent identifications, a clear failure of one's "old" ideology, and a deterioration of one's physical condition and one's economic, social, cultural position.

National beliefs, national behaviors, national emotions, the attitudes toward ethnic minorities and foreign peoples and countries and the worrying on one's future are to be explained for an important part by the individual's political socialization. National emotions are acquired by the individual only when they are evoked, people participate in national activities only when they are stimulated or forced to do so, and most beliefs about one's own country and people and about ethnic minorities and foreign peoples and countries are acquired only when they are offered by others. This calls thus for examination of the contents of the socializers' messages about one's own and other peoples and countries. Political socialization takes place in and through family, church, school, mass media, peer groups, workplace, social movements and the polity itself. Falling under these different agencies of socialization are various socializers, that is, persons, groups or categories, institutions, organizations, objects, and events (Dekker, 1991). We expect in general that the most influential are the socializers that are the first to exert influence on the individual (e.g., parents, priests, television, rituals), and/or exert influence for a longer period of time (e.g., parents, best friend, symbols), receive the highest credibility (e.g., parents, television journalists, teachers), have most legitimate power over the individual (e.g., parents, teachers, partner, employers, army officers), have the most skills, resources or qualities to influence and manipulate the individual (e.g., film-makers, advertisement and public relations experts, army officers, rituals), and have most power over preventing opposite influences and encouraging supportive influences from other socializers (e.g., parents, army officers). The socialization through these agencies, and the socializers within them, is in turn influenced by the information, persuasion, or manipulation goals and activities of political elites. The individual agencies and socializers possess a relative autonomy. The level of autonomy is limited in autocracies and in countries with a high level of communication centralization compared to democracies with truly free mass communications.

Political leaders who act as national(ism) 'entrepreneurs' (Kasinitz, 1992) are expected to be the most important national(istic) socializers. These leaders may support and strengthen the perspective of "one nation, one state" and may use the "nation" issue to acquire, maintain or extend political power. Political elites have an interest in creating and maintaining their own power basis. The influence of these political leaders may be expected to be stronger the more these political leaders have/receive charisma and the more they are in the position to influence the individual not only directly through statements and speeches but also indirectly through other socialization agencies, e.g. parents, school, church, mass media, and the military (Post, 1991). Nationalistic rhetoric is one of their tools emphasizing a common ancestry and consanguinity, for example saying that "our" community is conditioned by the fact of a blood-relationship, that "we" have the same ancestors, "we" are of the same family, "we" are all brothers and sisters, that the same mother that gave birth to "us", and that "we are part of the nation, flesh of its flesh

and blood of its blood" (Connor, 1993). Other tools are utilizing religious notions of "chosen people" and "promised land"; promoting nationalistic songs (such as "Today, Germany belongs to us. Tomorrow, the whole world" and a Dutch song that says 'Wien Neêrlandsch bloed door d'ad'ren vloeit, van vreemde smetten vrij'); initiating and strengthening of conspiracy rumors; blaming (economic) misfortunes on domestic or foreign "enemies" (minorities living within the country, foreign countries and peoples, and international organizations); stressing a priority for national interests; putting a prestigious international political position, economic prosperity, national domestic order, and great restriction of immigration in prospect; and suggesting that a national consensus exists on the country's goals and priorities. Under the influence of charismatic, nationalistic oriented political leaders a considerable part of the population may be influenced to strengthen their positive national attitude and to move upward in the hierarchy, resulting in larger groups of people with nationalism (Zimmermann, 1996).

We expect that the individual first acquires a *national feeling* thanks to national emotions from national rituals and initial motivation signals from parents. Because individuals need to have a sense of positive identity, the individual with a national feeling will be motivated to perceive predominantly favorable characteristics about one's own country and fellow-nationals (since she/he has little real choice of country and people, and has few realistic options to leave). This motivates the individual to develop positive beliefs about one's own country and people and to develop through these beliefs a *national liking*.

Because individuals continue to strive to a sense of positive identity, the individual with a national liking will be motivated to continue participation in national rituals and through that to strengthen one's own national emotions. He/she also will be motivated to receive positive information about one's own country and people and their history and symbols, for example by reading literature that honors the deeds of heroic nationals. In school, one may be educated in only one, national history and culture in contradistinction to out-groups which display different histories and cultures. The emotions and new beliefs may result in *national pride*.

Because the individual continues to strive to a positive self-identity and tends to observe more similarities among fellow-nationals than with non-nationals, he/she will be motivated to develop not only more positive (emotions, predominantly positive beliefs, and) attitudes toward one's own people and country but also to develop less positive or even negative (emotions, predominantly unfavorable beliefs, and) attitudes toward other nationalities living in the country and foreign peoples and countries. The positive attitudes toward one's own country and people may also be supported by very positive information about one's own country and people and negative information about others one receives from parents or other relatives, teachers in school, mass media personnel, and by reading, hearing and/or seeing (directly or through mass media) political leaders emphasizing national successes compared to the ones from minorities and foreign peoples and countries. Once the negative attitudes toward other nationalities living in the country and foreign peoples and countries have developed, the individual will tend to be less open to any inconsistent information about these groups and countries and will be tended to ignore, reject, distort, or forget this kind of information. Individuals with a low sense of positive identity are more motivated than others to develop such negative emotions, beliefs and attitudes toward minorities and foreign peoples and countries. Perceptions of competition and conflict with these minorities and foreign countries and peoples, especially but not exclusively received from political leaders, mass media and military service trainers, may enhance favoring one's own country and people. This may result in

the development of *national preference*.

The stronger the preference becomes, the more negative the attitude may become toward others. National preference then leads to *national superiority*. National superiority may be expected to be individually acquired, the more he/she is educated in this attitude by parents or other relatives, has attended services of nationally oriented religious affiliations, is strongly emotional conditioned to national symbols such as the flag and to the head of the state (for example through enormous human reconstruction of the national flag at athletic events and huge portraits of national leaders on billboards), by reading newspapers that express national superiority, listens to and/or sings national songs frequently, and observe (directly or through mass media) statements of political leaders, including eventually salient and carefully "chosen trauma's" (Rothstein, 1994), while emphasizing national superiority.

Finally, the individual may develop the attitude of *nationalism*. Nationalism is developed when the contents of national socialization include is mention of a common origin, ancestry and consanguinity, a wish to keep the "nation" as pure as possible, a wish to establish or maintain a separate and independent state just for that particular "nation", including, if necessary, incorporating within the borders of that state all groups which are considered to belong to that "nation", changing borders incorporating all regions where groups which are considered to belong to that "nation" live, and forcing other nationalities or "nations" and ethnicities inside the country to leave, and to stop international cooperation. These messages will be attractive for the individual the more one worries on one's own (family's) economic, social, and cultural future, and has a very low sense of positive identity or suffers from an identity crisis.

In summary, we expect that the individual's development of national attitudes in general, and nationalism in particular, can be explained using the following individual's variables: previously developed national beliefs, previously performed national behaviors, previously experienced national emotions, previously developed attitudes toward foreign minorities living within the country and foreign peoples and countries abroad, presence or absence of a worrying on one's own (family's) economic, social and cultural future, and a (low) sense of positive identity. These individual national and other orientations are in turn influenced by the individual's national socialization, including the frequency and intensity of national rituals, and national(istic) education, information, and/or persuasion from the various socializers in general, and national(istic) charismatic political leaders (who have a centralized national education and communication system at their disposal), in particular. Background variables are the individual's social-demographic variables and systemic variables, such as the country's domestic political order, the quality of its democracy, its economic growth or deterioration, its social-cultural situation, including its level of criminality and the ethnic composition of its population, and its international position.

We hypothesize that the individual's development of nationalism can be explained for a considerable proportion by intense national emotions, that were previously experienced; national behaviors with a high intensity that were previously performed; extremely positively evaluated beliefs about the country's history; negatively evaluated beliefs about the country's actual international and domestic developments (including the belief in an worsening of its international position, including increasing insecurity and loosing influence and prestige, a growing domestic political disorder, an economic deterioration, a social-cultural going back, an increase of criminality, and the belief in increasing numbers of minority group members); extremely negative attitudes towards national or "ethnic" minorities living within the country and foreign peoples and countries; a strong worrying

on one's own (family's) economic, social, and cultural future; and a very low sense of positive identity. These individual's orientations are in turn influenced by one's national(istic) socialization, including the frequency and intensity of national rituals, and national(istic) education, information, and/or persuasion from the various socializers in general, and national(istic), charismatic political leaders in particular. Background variables are the individual's social-demographic variables (for example, age, gender and social class) and systemic variables (such as the country's domestic political order, the quality of its democracy, its economic growth or deterioration, its social-cultural situation, its level of criminality, and the ethnic composition of its population, and the country's international position).

## ■ EMPIRICAL NATIONALISM

We hypothesize that one neutral and five positive different national attitudes can be distinguished empirically: national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism. We also hypothesize a cumulative hierarchy of these national attitudes in individuals. Next, we hypothesize different alternative trajectories or 'escapes' for the individual out of the above presented hierarchy of positive national attitudes: negative national attitudes and/or positive regional national attitudes. The hierarchies of these positive attitudes are expected to be the same as the one for the positive national attitudes. A third alternative trajectory is formed by positive international attitudes. Finally, we hypothesize that people combine moderate positive regional national attitudes with moderate positive national attitudes, while they do not combine very or extremely positive regional national attitudes with positive national attitudes because of the downward comparisons included in attitudes of preference, superiority and regional nationalism, rather they combine their very or extremely positive regional attitude with a negative national attitude.

### ■ Data

To test our hypotheses we collected data by using the method of an anonymous self-administered survey among samples of Dutch youth in 1994 <sup>15</sup>, Slovak youth and adults in 1995/1996 <sup>16</sup>, and Basque youth in 1995 <sup>17</sup>.

We assumed that one's positive national attitude can be inferred from the (completely) agree or (completely) disagree responses to positive statements about one's own country and people (and one's negative attitude from responses to negative statements). We computed the Cronbach's alpha per national attitude subscale in order to test whether the several different items for each of the national attitudes formed a scale.

We tested whether the six different national attitudes could be distinguished empirically by computing the Pearson's *r* correlation coefficients between the six subscales. A separate treatment of these scales is justified if none of the correlations exceeds the border of .80.

In order to test the hypothesized cumulativity of the different national attitudes we checked first whether the responses show a trend in decline of support the more the national attitude felt in the higher stages of the hierarchy. Next we checked whether the correlations between the different attitudes at the shortest distance are higher compared to the ones between attitudes at a larger distance in the hypothesized hierarchy. The typical feature of such a 'simplex model' is that the entries in the correlation matrix decrease as one moves away from the main diagonal (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1989, 182), i.e., the correlations between attitudes at the shortest distance have to be higher compared to the ones between attitudes at a larger distance in the hypothesized hierarchy. Finally we carried out a Mokken's scale analysis using MSP (a program for Mokken Scale analysis for Polytomous items, version 3.0; Molenaar, et al., 1994). This analysis should reveal positive correlations between all pairs of items and an acceptable scalability coefficient and reliability. A set of items only forms a scale if all pairs of items have positive correlations. In the Mokken framework, the deviation of the observed data structure from the perfect scalogram structure is expressed using Loevinger's scalability coefficient. The required minimum is a Loevinger's weighted *H* of .30, while a  $.4 \leq H < .5$  indicates

medium scalability, and a  $H \geq 5$  indicates a strong scale. The reliability coefficient is expressed using the RHO. All individual subscales should contribute to the overall scale.

Mokken scale analysis was also applied to test whether the positive national attitudes can be distinguished empirically from the negative national attitudes. All covariances of the negative items with the positive items needed to have negative values.

#### ■ National attitudes hierarchy

Can we distinguish empirically the neutral national attitude of national feeling and the five positive national attitudes of national liking, pride, preference, superiority and nationalism? Do these national attitudes form a cumulative hierarchy?

#### □ Data from the Netherlands

We asked the Dutch respondents to react to 14 items, covering the attitude of national feeling (1 item) and the positive attitudes of national liking (4 items), national pride (2 items), national preference (2 items), national superiority (2 items) and nationalism (3 items).

The responses showed indeed a trend in decline of support the more the national attitude felt in the higher stages of the hierarchy, i.e., the more positive the attitudes towards one's own country and people were. Nine out of ten respondents had the attitude of national feeling, seven out of ten national liking (average score: 70%), almost six out of ten national pride (56%), almost five out of ten national preference (46%), four out of ten national superiority (20%), and one out of ten the attitude of nationalism (11%). Only one out of the five individual positive national attitude subscales had an acceptable Cronbach's alpha. The nationalism subscale had a low alpha of .68.

Table 1:

National attitudes among Dutch youth in 1994 (in %; n = 1.283).

	$\alpha$	++ %	+ %	cum %	- %	-- %	? %
National feeling:	-						
1. Feeling Dutch		67	24	91	04	01	04
National liking:	.82						
2. Liking the Netherlands		29	40	69	11	04	16
3. Liking to be Dutch		44	33	77	06	03	14
4. Liking the Dutch		21	44	65	12	03	20
5. Liking the Dutch language		32	35	67	14	05	14
National pride:	.63						
6. Proud of the Netherlands		17	36	53	17	07	25
7. Proud to be Dutch		27	32	59	16	06	19
National preference:	.69						
8. Preferring the Netherlands		22	36	58	20	07	15
9. Preferring the Dutch		12	22	34	33	19	15
National superiority:	.65						
10. Feeling NL is best country		09	14	23	36	21	21
11. Liking Dutchmen the most		07	11	18	37	28	17
Nationalism:	.68						
12. Wishing Flanders being part of the NL		06	07	13	35	32	20
13. Wishing all Dutchmen living in the NL		07	06	13	39	34	15
14. Rejecting international cooperation		03	05	08	37	34	22

Note:  $\alpha$  = Cronbach's alpha, ++ = strongly agreeing, + = agreeing, cum = agreeing and strongly agreeing - = disagreeing, -- = strongly disagreeing, ? = don't know or no opinion.

For the analysis of the cumulative hierarchy of the positive national attitudes we included only the data from students from the third and highest grade with Dutch nationality (N = 849).<sup>18</sup> The responses to the national attitudes' items were almost similar to the ones from the whole sample. The responses showed again a trend in decline of support the more the national attitude felt in the higher stages of the hierarchy. Two out of the five individual positive attitudes' subscales had acceptable Cronbach's alphas (national liking: .83, pride: .67, preference: .56, superiority: .70, and nationalism: .68). For the analysis of the positive national attitudes which follows, all respondents who had not answered one of the questions or who answered "no opinion" or "do not know", should have been excluded from the analysis. That would have resulted in a considerable decrease in the number of respondents. We decided to exclude the respondents who have not answered to 3 or more out of the 14 items (resulting in a N = 567). The missing values of the others were replaced by a score of 1 in case a majority agreed and a score of 0 if a majority disagreed. The correlations between the positive national subscales showed that they were related (varying from to .11 to .51), while none of the correlations exceeded the border of .80, which justified a separate treatment of these scales.<sup>19</sup> The correlations between attitudes at the shortest distance were higher compared to the ones between attitudes at a larger distance in the hypothesized hierarchy, with the exception of the 'national preference' correlations.



Table 3:

Correlations between national attitudes (n = 567).

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. National Feeling	1.00					
2. National Liking	.34**	1.00				
3. National Pride	.34**	.44**	1.00			
4. National Preference	.26**	.33**	.32**	1.00		
5. National Superiority	.17**	.23**	.32**	.50**	1.00	
6. Nationalism	.12*	.11*	.18**	.33**	.45**	1.00

Note:

1-tailed signif: \* -.01 \*\* -.001

Mokken's scale analysis using MSP revealed an acceptable scalability coefficient (Loevinger's weighted H = .46) and reliability (RHO = .77). All six individual subscales contributed to the overall scale.<sup>20</sup>

Table 4:

National attitudes' subscales' coefficients (n = 567).

Subscales	Mean(i)	Values			H(i)	Z
		1	2	3		
National Feeling	2.70	6	160	401	0.37	13.07
National Liking	2.53	50	169	348	0.47	16.99
National Pride	2.34	103	171	293	0.46	17.41
National Preference	1.99	170	234	163	0.46	19.06
National Superiority	1.54	342	143	82	0.55	18.73
Nationalism	1.30	412	140	15	0.42	13.26

#### □ Data from Slovakia

We asked the Slovak respondents to react to 26 items, covering the attitude of national feeling (3 items) and the positive attitudes of national liking (4 items), national pride (3 items), national preference (4 items), national superiority (4 items) and nationalism (8 items).

The responses showed a trend in decline of support the more the positive national attitude felt in the higher stages of the hierarchy, i.e., the more positive the attitudes towards one's own country and people were. Eight out of ten respondents had a Slovak national feeling (average score: 82%), seven out of ten had national liking (70%), almost three out of ten had national pride (27%), three out of ten had national preference (30%), approximately one out of ten respondents had national superiority (11%), and between one and two respondents had the attitude of nationalism (16%). Divergences are the less agreeing with the 'proud of Slovakia' item compared to the two proud of Slovaks items, the low score for the 'liking Slovaks more than others' item compared to the other national preference items, and the high support for the 'Slovak blood' and the 'protection of Slovaks in Hungary' items compared to the other nationalism items. Five out of the six individual neutral and positive attitude subscales had acceptable Cronbach's alphas; the nationalism scale had, however, a low alpha of .62. The scale including all positive national attitude items had a high alpha of .89 (n = 255).

Table 5:

*Slovak national attitudes among Slovaks in 1995/1996 (in %; n = 635).*

	$\alpha$	++ %	+ %	cum %	- %	-- %	+/- %	? %
National feeling:	.76							
1. Being Slovak		63	27	89	02	02	06	01
2. Feeling Slovak		44	33	77	05	01	13	04
3. Feeling Slovakia is my country		33	46	78	03	01	15	03
National liking:	.81							
4. Liking to be Slovak		19	34	53	07	01	29	09
5. Liking the Slovaks		21	48	68	02	00	25	05
6. Liking Slovakia		34	45	79	02	01	17	02
7. Liking the Slovak language		39	43	82	02	02	11	03
National pride:	.73							
8. Proud to be Slovak		09	24	33	22	07	22	16
9. Proud of Slovaks		10	24	33	14	05	39	10
10. Proud of Slovakia		04	10	15	27	12	41	05
National preference:	.75							
11. Liking Slovaks more		04	08	11	38	21	21	09
12. Preferring Slovaks		09	32	41	14	04	19	23
13. Preferring Slovak citizenship		09	15	24	23	08	31	14
14. Preferring Slovakia		19	26	45	13	03	28	10
National superiority:	.79							
15. Feeling Slovaks are better		02	05	07	35	26	21	11
16. Feeling Slovaks are the best		02	06	08	35	16	31	11
17. Feeling Slovakia is the best		04	04	08	35	22	27	09
18. Feeling Slovak nationality is the best		09	12	22	24	13	26	16
Nationalism:	.62							
19. Feeling Slovak common origin		04	04	08	47	24	16	06
20. Feeling member of one Slovak family		04	08	11	39	21	21	08
21. Feeling having Slovak blood		22	29	51	12	04	15	18
22. Wanting all Slovaks in Slovakia		03	08	11	34	22	29	04
23. Wanting Slovaks not mix		04	06	10	35	32	15	08
24. Wanting non-Slovaks leave		02	03	05	36	45	11	03
25. Wanting Slovaks protected		13	18	30	22	06	28	14
26. Rejecting international cooperation		01	00	01	24	67	03	05

Note:  $\alpha$  = Cronbach's alpha, ++ = strongly agreeing, + = agreeing, cum = agreeing and strongly agreeing, - = disagreeing, -- = strongly disagreeing, +/- = partly agreeing and partly disagreeing, ? = don't know and/or no opinion.

The correlations between the individual positive attitudes' subscales were moderately strong to strong, but none exceeded the border of .80, which justified a separate treatment of these scales (missing values, 'do not know' and 'no opinion' were excluded; n = 304). Ideally, the correlations between attitudes at the shortest distance have to be higher compared to the ones between attitudes at a larger distance in the hypothesized hierarchy; the correlations had to become lower reading the correlation matrix from above to below and from right to left. This was the case with two exceptions: the correlation between national preference and national feeling is higher than the one for national pride with national feeling, and the correlation of national preference is higher with nationalism than the one between national superiority and nationalism.

Table 6: Correlations between Slovak national attitudes' scales (n = 304).

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. National Feeling	1.00					
2. National Liking	.70**	1.00				
3. National Pride	.57**	0.70**	1.00			
4. National Preference	.61**	0.69**	0.76**	1.00		
5. National Superiority	.49**	0.56**	0.72**	0.80**	1.00	
6. Nationalism	.33**	0.34**	0.50**	0.63**	0.61**	1.00

Note: 1-tailed Significance: \*\* .001

Respondents who have given no answer or a 'do not know' or 'no opinion' response to 6 out of the 26 positive attitude items were excluded from the analysis which follows. The missing values of the others were replaced by the neutral alternative 'partly agree, partly disagree'. Mokken's scale analysis using MSP showed that the items do form one scale. The items formed a scale with a moderate scalability coefficient ( $H = .39$ ) and an acceptable reliability ( $RHO = .91$ ). Three items had an individual  $H$  coefficient with a very weak value ( $< .30$ ) and showed to be very weak indicators of the national attitudes' scale: the items 24, 25, and 26. Most items had individual item coefficients with medium values, varying from .30 to .49. Three other items had high scale coefficients ( $\geq .50$ ), showing to be very strong indicators: the items 4, 13, and 14.

Table 7: Scalability coefficients.

	Mean	H wgt	Z
. Being Slovak	1.53	0.36	32.70
. Liking the Slovak language	1.85	0.32	33.30
. Feeling Slovak	1.86	0.43	44.95
. Liking Slovakia	1.91	0.38	40.72
. Feeling Slovakia is my country	1.92	0.41	44.27
. Liking Slovaks	2.14	0.43	45.28
. Liking to be Slovak	2.37	0.52	55.91
. Feeling Slovak blood	2.47	0.44	48.07
. Preferring to live in Slovakia	2.55	0.52	57.40
. Preferring Slovaks for personal contacts	2.71	0.31	34.07
. Proud of Slovaks	2.81	0.38	41.96
. Wishing Slovaks in Hungary protected	2.91	0.30	32.84
. Proud being Slovak	2.94	0.48	54.24
. Preferring Slovak citizenship	3.06	0.50	54.87
. Slovak nationality is best to have	3.19	0.47	52.22
. Proud of Slovakia	3.32	0.39	42.06
. Slovaks are best for personal contacts	3.57	0.39	42.49
. Feeling member of one Slovak family	3.66	0.36	39.31
. Liking Slovaks more than others	3.66	0.36	39.77
. Slovakia is best to live in	3.67	0.44	48.45
. Slovaks are better	3.79	0.38	41.49
. Feeling common Slovak origin	3.83	0.32	34.94
. Wanting all Slovaks in Slovakia	3.84	0.31	33.32
. Wanting Slovaks not mix	3.86	0.28	30.58
. Wanting the non-Slovaks leave Slovakia	4.18	0.28	28.88
. Rejecting international cooperation	4.56	0.17	16.15

Note: Scale coefficient  $H = 0.39$ . Scale  $Z = 151.97$

□ Data from the Basque Autonomous Community in Spain

We asked the Basque respondents to react to 25 items with respect to Spain, covering the attitude of Spanish national feeling (2 items), the positive attitudes of national liking (4 items), national pride (3 items), national preference (3 items), national superiority (5 items) and nationalism (8 items).

In general, the positive Spanish national attitudes among Basque youth received low levels of support. All individual neutral and positive subscales had acceptable Cronbach's alphas, varying from .81 to .93.

Table 8:

*Spanish national attitudes among Basque youth in 1995 (in %; n = 774).*

	$\alpha$	++ %	+ %	cum %	- %	-- %	? %	N
Spanish national feeling:	.93							754
1. Feeling Spanish		10	30	40	21	25	14	760
2. Feeling Spain is my country		10	31	41	20	25	14	759
Spanish national liking:	.83							745
3. Liking to be Spanish		09	29	38	19	25	18	761
4. Liking the Spaniards in general		10	46	57	15	11	17	759
5. Liking Spain		10	39	49	17	17	17	757
6. Liking the Castilian language		13	56	70	11	08	11	762
Spanish national pride:	.81							745
7. Proud to be Spanish		09	25	34	20	24	23	759
8. Proud of the Spaniards		05	20	25	26	23	27	754
9. Proud of Spain		05	25	30	24	17	30	759
Spanish national preference:	.83							750
10. Preferring Spaniards		05	28	33	30	16	22	759
11. Preferring Spanish citizenship		05	16	21	33	22	24	758
12. Preferring Spain		05	23	28	32	22	18	757
Spanish national superiority:	.85							740
13. Liking Spaniards most		03	20	23	37	20	20	757
14. Feeling Spaniards are better		02	10	11	40	27	21	752
15. Feeling Spaniards are the best		02	18	21	36	22	21	754
16. Feeling Spain is the best		02	13	16	41	25	19	756
17. Feeling Spanish nationality is the best		02	06	07	42	27	24	756
Spanish nationalism:	.84							743
18. Feeling Spanish common origin		02	22	23	28	16	33	743
19. Feeling member of one Spanish family		03	18	21	29	26	24	750
20. Feeling having Spanish blood		04	24	28	24	27	21	754
21- Wanting Spaniards not mix with others		01	06	08	42	31	19	753
22. Wishing Portugal united with Spain		01	09	09	31	20	40	758
23- Wanting non-Spaniards leaving Spain		01	02	03	36	45	17	755
24. Wanting Spaniards in France protected		03	22	25	24	13	38	755
25- Rejecting international cooperation		01	05	06	34	20	40	754

Note:  $\alpha$  = Cronbach's alpha, ++ = strongly agreeing, + = agreeing, cum = agreeing and strongly agreeing, - = disagreeing, -- = strongly disagreeing, ? = don't know and/or no opinion.

For the following analysis respondents who have given no answer or the "no opinion" response to 5 or more out of the 25 positive attitude items were excluded from the analysis (n = 457). The missing values of the others were replaced by the neutral

alternative. Mokken's scale analysis using MSP showed that three out of the twentyfive positive attitudes items had negative covariances with other items and had thus to be excluded from the analysis (item 21: 'Spaniards should not mix with other nationalities'; item 23: 'Non-Spaniards living in Spain should leave Spain', and item 25: 'International cooperation with other countries overburdens Spain, therefore it should be stopped'). The remaining 22 items form a strong scale ( $H = .60$ ). Two items were weak indicators of the Spanish national attitudes' scale (item 22: 'Portugal should unite with Spain':  $H = .16$ ; and item 24: 'Spaniards living in France should have Spain's protection':  $H = .30$ ). Removing these two items led to a high scale coefficient of  $H = .66$ .

The Pearson's correlation coefficients between the individual Spanish national attitudes' subscales were very high. (The scores on the several national attitudes have been calculated by the means of all item-scores per attitude). Even the attitude of nationalism showed a high correlation with the neutral attitude of national feeling. Responsible for this unexpected finding were the three nationalistic items on Spanish common origin, being part of one Spanish family, and Spanish blood (items 18, 19, and 20). These three items seem to indicate something else than nationalism in Basque Country. When we took these items together in one hypothetical construct and correlated that construct with all other national attitudes we found (too) high correlations of .82 with national feeling, .78 with national liking, .83 with national pride, .67 with national preference and .65 with national superiority.

A new analysis leaving the MSPProgram search for possible scales, including all items but the three on common origin, one family and blood, produced two scales. All 17 items relating to national feeling, liking, pride, preference and superiority formed a strong scale ( $H = .66$ ). The remaining three nationalistic items appeared to form a second scale with a weak scale coefficient ( $H = .38$ ). Two out of the five nationalistic items could not be included because of low individual scale coefficients (item 22: 'Portugal should unite with Spain:  $H = .26$ ; and item 24: 'Spaniards living in France should have Spain's protection':  $H = .14$ ). We have to conclude that the hypothesis that all six national attitudes form one scale does not apply to Basque youth in Spain. The new correlations between the several different national attitudes' subscales (20 items), including the new Spanish nationalism scale (3 items, alpha: .71,  $n = 743$ ) showed that the attitude of Spanish nationalism is very weakly related to the other Spanish national attitudes. The first three attitudes of the hierarchy (national feeling, liking, and pride) showed, however, very high correlations with each other. As a result, separate treatment of these attitudes is not justified.

Table 9: *Correlations between Spanish national attitudes' scales ( $n = 544$ ).*

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. National Feeling	1.00					
2. National Liking	.88	1.00				
3. National Pride	.88	.85	1.00			
4. National Preference	.60	.61	.64	1.00		
5. National Superiority	.53	.52	.57	.81	1.00	
6. Nationalism	.09*	.02*	.12	.23	.30	1.00

Note: \* Significance level lower than 90%

## ■ Negative national attitudes

Is one of the alternative trajectories out of the positive national attitudes' hierarchy the development of negative attitudes towards one's own country and people?

We asked the Dutch respondents to react to 2 items, covering the attitude of national alienation. Only a few respondents supported the two items (5%).

Table 10:

*Negative national attitude among Dutch youth in 1994 (in %).*

	$\alpha$	++	+	cum	-	--	?
National alienation:	.77						
. Not feeling at home in the Netherlands		02	04	07	30	56	08
. Not feeling comfortable among the Dutch		01	02	04	35	54	08

We asked the Slovak respondents to react to 8 items, covering the negative attitudes of national alienation, shame, disgust, and hate (2 items per attitude). Only a few respondents had negative national attitudes. The negative items regarding the country of Slovakia received more agreeing than the items regarding Slovaks. Remarkably high scored the national disgust item "I am disgusted with Slovakia" (27%). The negative national attitudes do not seem to form a cumulative hierarchy.

Table 11:

*Negative national attitude among Slovaks in 1995/1996 (in %; n = 635).*

	++	+	cum	-	--	+/-	?
National alienation:							
. Feeling uncomfortable among Slovaks	01	04	05	44	35	14	02
. Feeling not at home in Slovakia	03	06	09	41	34	15	01
National shame:							
. Ashamed to be Slovak	01	02	03	34	47	13	04
. Ashamed of Slovakia	03	09	12	30	15	38	05
National disgust:							
. Disgusted with Slovaks	01	06	08	42	22	23	06
. Disgusted with Slovakia	09	19	27	18	6	41	08
National hate:							
. Hating Slovaks	00	00	00	32	58	07	04
. Hating Slovakia	01	01	02	32	56	07	04

We asked the Basque respondents to react to 8 items with respect to Spain, covering the the negative attitudes of national alienation, shame, disgust, and hate (2 items per attitude). The levels of support for the negative Spanish national attitudes items varied from 15% ('I am disgusted with the Spaniards') to 29% ('I do not feel at home in Spain'). The negative items related to the country received higher levels of agreement than the negative items relating to the people.