

Table 12:

Spanish negative national attitudes among Basque youth in 1995 (in %).

	α	++	+	cum	-	--	?	N
Spanish national alienation:	.71							747
26. Feeling uncomfortable among		04	13	17	36	34	13	764
27. Feeling not at home in Spain		09	20	29	30	30	11	760
Spanish national shame:	.68							741
28. Ashamed to be Spanish		05	12	17	30	34	20	745
29. Ashamed of Spain		05	19	24	30	29	17	762
Spanish national disgust:								761
30. Disgusted with the Spaniards		05	10	15	34	37	15	774
31. Disgusted with Spain		06	14	20	29	37	14	762
Spanish national hate:	.87							761
32. Hating the Spaniards		06	10	15	36	34	14	762
33. Hating Spain		08	13	20	31	34	15	764

A Mokken scale analysis including the 20 Spanish positive items and the 8 negative items revealed that they do not form one scale. All the covariances of the negative items with the positive items had negative values. The eight negative items did form a separate cumulative scale with a very high scale coefficient ($H = .82$; $n = 510$).

■ Regional national attitudes

Is another alternative trajectory out of the positive national attitudes' hierarchy the development of positive regional national attitudes?

We asked the Basque respondents to react to 37 items with respect to Basque Country, covering the attitude of Basque regional feeling (2 items) and the positive attitudes of Basque national liking (4 items), Basque pride (3 items), Basque preference (6 items), Basque superiority (9 items) and Basque nationalism (13 items).

The responses to the positive Basque national attitudes' items showed a trend in decline of support the more the national attitude's items felt in the higher stages of the hierarchy although there were some exceptions. About eight out of ten respondents had a Basque regional feeling. The high level of agreement with the second national feeling item, 'I feel that the Basque Country is my country', is very remarkable because the Basque Country is in fact not a separate country. About nine of ten had the attitude of national liking. The percent of respondents who like the Euskera language is considerably lower which may be explained by the low level of knowledge of it and the difficulty to learn this language. The national pride items received different levels of support, varying from eight out of ten respondents being proud to be Basque to less than six out of ten being proud of what the Basques have done and of what the Basque Country represents. Much lower proportions reached the level of Basque national preference or Basque national superiority. Three out of the thirteen Basque regional nationalism items - feelings of having a common origin, being part of one Basque family, and feeling of having Basque blood - received agreement from large proportions of the sample (60% - 70%). The items on an independent Basque state (items 30, 31, and 32) and the protection of Basques living in other regions of Spain and in France (items 34 and 35) received support from about one third of the respondents. A small proportion agreed with the items on wanting to keep the Basque nation pure, wanting non-Basques leaving the Basque Country

and rejection of cooperation with other Spanish regions and with other countries (items 28, 29, 33, 36, and 37). The individual subscales had acceptable Cronbach's alphas, varying from .82 to .91.

Table 13:

Basque regional national attitudes among Basque youth in 1995 (in %; n = 774).

	α	++ %	+ %	cum %	- %	-- %	? %	N
Basque national feeling:	.82							743
1. Feeling Basque		44	40	84	05	03	08	749
2. Feeling Basque Country is my country		41	32	72	10	04	14	746
Basque national liking:	.88							746
3. Liking to be Basque		47	41	89	03	01	09	752
4. Liking the Basques in general		43	46	90	02	01	07	752
5. Liking the Basque Country		46	45	92	02	01	05	752
6. Liking the Euskera language		42	34	76	08	07	09	754
Basque national pride:	.82							736
7. Proud to be Basque		46	37	84	04	01	11	750
8. Proud of the Basques		26	31	57	16	03	24	745
9. Proud of the Basque Country		26	31	57	16	04	24	745
Basque national preference:	.91							721
10. Preferring Basques to Spaniards		23	22	45	24	09	22	741
11. Preferring Basques to other peoples		17	24	41	26	09	23	744
12. Preferring B. citizenship to S.		30	25	54	16	09	21	743
13. Preferring Basque citizenship		24	23	47	20	09	24	741
14. Preferring Basque Country to Spain		34	29	62	15	07	16	744
15. Preferring Basque Country		24	23	48	23	09	21	745
Basque national superiority:	.91							706
16. Liking Basques more than Spaniards		28	24	51	21	08	19	746
17. Liking Basques the most		19	25	44	24	09	23	746
18. Feeling Basques are better than Spaniards		14	15	29	36	12	24	745
19. Feeling Basques are better		11	14	25	38	12	27	743
20. Feeling Basques are the best		17	24	41	26	10	22	738
21. Feeling BC is the best Spanish region		23	31	54	21	07	19	740
22. Feeling BC is the best part of Europe		16	18	34	31	09	26	739
23. Feeling BC is the best part of the world		14	15	28	35	11	26	742
24. Feeling Basque nationality is the best		20	17	37	27	10	26	736
Basque nationalism:	.90							681
25. Feeling Basque common origin		23	37	60	11	04	26	735
26. Feeling member of one Basque family		25	39	64	11	04	21	738
27. Feeling having Basque blood		31	39	69	11	05	15	742
28. Wanting Basques not mix with Spaniards		06	07	13	46	25	16	744
29. Wanting basques not mix		03	05	08	49	28	16	738
30. Wanting an independent Basque state		22	17	39	19	18	25	741
31. Wanting Iparralda unite with BC		22	20	42	16	12	30	744
32. Wanting Navarra unite with BC		21	21	42	17	12	29	739
33. Wishing non-Basques to leave BC		02	04	06	43	38	13	739
34. Wanting Basques in Spain protected		09	23	32	24	11	34	731
35. Wanting Basques in France protected		09	26	35	22	10	33	739
36. Rejecting cooperation with Spain		04	09	13	33	18	35	741
37. Rejecting international cooperation		02	06	08	36	19	38	739

Note: α = Cronbach's alpha, ++ = strongly agreeing, + = agreeing, cum = agreeing and strongly agreeing, - = disagreeing, -- = strongly disagreeing, ? = don't know and/or no opinion

We also asked the Basque respondents to react to 8 items, covering the negative attitudes of Basque alienation, shame, disgust, and hate (2 items per attitude). Support for negative regional national attitudes was low.

Table 14:

Negative Basque regional national attitudes among Basque youth in 1995 (in %).

	α	++ %	+ %	cum %	- %	-- %	? %	N
Basque national alienation:	.83							752
38. Feeling uncomfortable among Basques		02	05	07	24	63	06	753
39. Feeling not at home in the Basque Country		02	04	06	25	64	06	754
Basque national shame:	.68							751
40. Ashamed to be Basque		01	02	02	24	68	06	754
41. Ashamed of the Basque Country		01	06	08	24	58	10	752
Basque national disgust:	.94							750
42. Disgusted with the Basques		00	01	01	25	68	06	751
43. Disgusted with the Basque Country		01	01	02	25	68	05	753
Basque national hate:	.89							747
44. Hating the Basques		00	02	02	27	65	07	749
45. Hating the Basque Country		00	01	01	26	67	06	753

Respondents who have given no answer or the 'no opinion' response to 6 out of the 37 positive attitude items were excluded from the analysis which follows. The missing values of the others were replaced by the neutral alternative.

Mokken's scale analysis using MSP showed that the positive attitude items do form one scale ($n = 426$). One of the items had negative covariances with other items and had to be excluded from the analysis (item 33: 'Non-Basques who live in the Basque Country should leave the Basque Country'). A set of items only forms a scale if all pairs of items have positive correlations. The remaining 36 items formed a scale with a high scalability coefficient (Loevinger's weighted $H = .59$) and an acceptable reliability. Four items had individual item coefficients with medium values (item 35: 'Basques who live in France should have Basque Country's protection': $H = .40$; item 34: 'Basques who live in other regions of Spain should have Basque Country's protection': $H = .44$; item 36: 'Cooperation with other regions of Spain overburdens the Basque Country and should therefore be stopped': $H = .44$; and item 29: 'The Basques should not mix with other nationalities': $H = .46$). One other item had an individual H coefficient with a weak value of .37 and showed to be a weak indicator of the national attitudes scale (item 37: 'International cooperation overburdens the Basque Country and should therefore be stopped'). All other items had high scale coefficients and do thus contribute to a strong scale measuring Basque national attitudes.

The correlations between the individual attitude subscales were, however, high. Even the attitude of nationalism showed a high correlation with the neutral attitude of regional feeling. Responsible for this were the three nationalistic items on Basque blood, common origin, and being part of one Basque family. These three items together correlated very high with national feeling (.72), with national liking (.72), with national pride (.71), with national preference (.72) and with national superiority (.72) ($n = 604$).

A new Mokken scale analysis, now leaving out the three items on common origin, one family and blood, produced a strong scale with a Loevinger's weighted H of .58 (33 items, $n = 623$). Some of the new correlations between the subscales were still high to very high

but the attitude of Basque nationalism had no longer very high correlations with the attitudes lower in the hierarchy. The correlations between attitudes at the shortest distance were higher compared to the ones between attitudes at a larger distance in the hypothesized hierarchy with the exception of the preference correlations.

Table 15: *Correlations between Basque regional national attitudes (n = 623).*

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Regional national Feeling	1.00					
2. Regional national Liking	.79	1.00				
3. Regional national Pride	.67	.76	1.00			
4. Regional national Preference	.65	.64	.63	1.00		
5. Regional national Superiority	.59	.59	.61	.86	1.00	
6. Regional Nationalism	.48	.46	.50	.70	.73	1.00

All stages in the Basque regional national attitudes' hierarchy received higher levels of support than the same stages in the Spanish national attitudes' hierarchy. Both the Spanish national attitudes and the Basque regional attitudes form a hierarchy (with the exception of Spanish nationalism). There is also a trend of decline of support the more the attitudes felt in the higher stages of the hierarchy (with a very drastic decline of support between Spanish superiority and nationalism). Contrary to our expectations, more respondents had the attitudes of Spanish and Basque national liking than Spanish and Basque national feeling. The fact that less respondents feel they are Spanish than respondents who like Spain, the Spaniards, and the Castilian language is understandable from the point of view of their predominant Basque identification. The percent of those Basque youth who like to be Spanish is relatively low. The fact that less respondents have the attitude of Basque regional national feeling than Basque regional national liking may be explained by the relatively low support for the item 'I feel the Basque Country is my country' which is one of the two regional national feeling items. This relatively low support is understandable when we remember that there is in fact no independent Basque country.

■ Combinations of attitudes

Do individuals combine moderate positive regional national attitudes with moderate positive national attitudes? Do very or extremely positive regional national attitudes exclude such very or extremely positive national attitudes? Are very and extremely positive regional national attitudes combined with negative national attitudes?

The findings from our Basque Country study showed that large proportions of respondents with Basque liking and pride also have the attitudes of Spanish liking and pride indeed. The second part of the hypothesis had, however, to be rejected because large proportions of respondents with Basque preference, superiority or nationalism also had Spanish preference, superiority or nationalism.

Table 16: *Combinations of Basque regional national attitudes and Spanish national attitudes (in %)*

Spanish						
	Feeling	Liking	Pride	Preference	Superiority	Nationalism
Basque						
Feeling	37	52	32	29	17	04
Liking	40	54	35	30	18	04
Pride	39	51	35	29	18	05
Preference	20	35	19	28	18	05
Superiority	20	32	20	28	20	06
Nationalism	09	18	08	14	10	09

The same applied to the combination of Spanish national attitudes and Basque national attitudes.

Table 17: *Combinations of Spanish national attitudes and Basque regional national attitudes (in %)*

Basque national						
	Feeling	Liking	Pride	Preference	Superiority	Nationalism
Spanish						
Feeling	73	83	76	29	24	08
Liking	79	88	77	39	30	11
Pride	73	84	78	32	29	08
Preference	78	86	77	55	46	16
Superiority	76	87	79	61	57	18
Nationalism	79	93	83	63	62	66

The third part of the hypothesis is supported by the data. The numbers of respondents with negative Spanish attitudes tend to increase the more they have positive Basque attitudes. About half of the respondents with the attitude of Basque nationalism have negative attitudes towards Spain. This is a support for the hypothesis that positive Basque national attitudes are positively related to negative attitudes towards the country to which the Basque Country belongs.

Table 18: *Combinations of positive Basque regional national attitudes with negative Spanish national attitudes (in %).*

Spanish					
	Alienation	Shame	Disgust	Hate	
Basque					
Feeling	23	27	21	23	
Liking	22	25	19	21	
Pride	24	28	22	23	
Preference	32	39	30	33	
Superiority	36	44	35	37	
Nationalism	49	57	46	51	

The combination of these findings brought us to the expectation that Basque youth can be

classified into four groups with distinct combinations of Basque and Spanish attitudes. The first group consists of those respondents who have not a very positive attitude (preference, superiority, nationalism) towards Basque Country nor towards Spain. The second and third group has only a very positive attitude towards either Basque Country or Spain. The fourth group of respondents combines a very positive Spanish national attitude with a very positive Basque national attitude. After classifying all respondents in these four categories we found the following distribution: 12% had not a very positive Basque nor a very positive Spanish national attitude, 62% had exclusively a very positive Basque national attitude, 8% had only a very positive Spanish national attitude, while 19% had both a very positive Basque and Spanish national attitude.

Next we compared all four groups regarding presence or absence of agreement with negative Spanish national attitudes. The expectation was that more youth with only a very positive Basque attitude would combine this attitude with a negative Spanish national attitude compared to youth with both very positive Basque and Spanish national attitudes. The data confirmed this expectation.

Table 19: *Combinations of very positive Basque and Spanish attitudes, by negative Spanish national attitudes (in %; N = 493).*

	Negative Spanish national attitudes			
	Alienation	Shame	Disgust	Hate
Very positive national attitudes				
Basque	35	42	32	35
Spanish	02	-	-	-
Basque + Spanish	02	01	02	01
No Basque nor Spanish	-	02	-	-

This brought us to a refinement of the typology of Basque youth identities. The first group combines a very positive Basque identity with negative attitudes towards Spain (30%). A second group does not combine a very positive Basque identity with negative Spanish attitudes (31%). A third group has a combined very positive Basque and Spanish identity (19%). A fourth group has an exclusive very positive Spanish identity (8%), while the fifth group has no very positive Basque and Spanish identity (12%; n = 561).

The two groups with an exclusive very positive Basque identity differ with respect to the wish of an independent Basque state; almost all respondents from the first group want such an independent Basque state (92%), while 'only' 66% of the respondents from the second group have this wish (n = 471). The terrorist movement ETA is also supported most by the first group (18% gives its support both to its goals and activities). The two nationalist political parties also received most support from this group with very positive Basque national attitudes and negative Spanish national attitudes (64% would vote for the Eusko Alkartasuna or Herri Batasuna).

■ Conclusion

The outcomes of the empirical study among Dutch youth did not justify a rejection of the hypothesis that one neutral and five different positive national attitudes can be distinguished empirically and the cumulative national attitudes' hierarchy hypothesis. The

same applies to the findings from the survey among a sample of young and adult Slovaks. However, the hypothesis had to be rejected in the case of the attitudes towards Spain among Basque youth. But, there was no justification for a rejection of this hypothesis in the case of the positive regional national attitudes towards the Basque Country. The hypothesis that the positive regional national attitudes towards the Basque Country form a cumulative hierarchy could also not be rejected. The same applies to the hypothesis that negative national attitudes are present only in the absence of positive national attitudes. The hypothesis that very or extremely positive regional national attitudes (Basque preference, superiority and nationalism) are not combined with very or extremely positive national attitudes (Spanish preference, superiority and nationalism) had to be rejected. However, there was no justification for a rejection of the hypothesis that very and extremely positive regional attitudes (towards the Basque Country) are combined with negative national attitudes (towards Spain).

■ EXPLAINING NATIONALISM

Can nationalism be explained for a considerable proportion by national beliefs, national emotions, national behaviors, the attitude towards outgroups, a worry on one's own future, and a sense of positive identity? And what are the effects of national socialization on national attitude?

■ Explaining nationalism in Slovakia

The 'national beliefs' were measured by questions about characteristics of the country Slovakia and characteristics of Slovaks. First, the respondents were asked to indicate which of the displayed characteristics were applicable to Slovakia and/or Hungary, Czech Republic, Russia, and Germany.

Table 20:

Clichés of Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Russia, and Germany (in %; n = 635).

	SR	CR	H.	R.	FRG
+ Democraticizing	43	75	41	17	26
+ Increasing political freedom	23	57	29	13	42
+ Increasing comfort	8	46	13	3	73
+ Technologically highly developed	4	20	4	4	83
- Wants to rule other countries	3	8	41	60	63
- Is eager for war	1	1	10	29	8
- Worsening social security	65	19	30	75	7
- Less security on the street	11	42	9	5	33
- Increasing criminality	81	62	37	80	34
- Suffers from a threat of foreign security	59	22	20	30	6
- Suffers from loosing international prestige	55	45	24	15	19
- Increasing number of foreigners within the country	29	57	29	13	77
- Large minority groups, threatening majority's interest	45	8	8	16	8
- Growing gap between rich and poor	76	51	39	75	32
- Domestic politics gets in disorder	83	14	18	73	6
- Economic deterioration	54	10	26	77	5

The respondents were also asked to indicate which of the nineteen displayed characteristics were applicable to 'most' Slovaks and/or Hungarians, Czechs, Russians, Romanies, and Austrians.

Table 21:

Stereotypes of Slovaks, Czechs, Hungarians, Russians, Romanies, and Austrians among Slovaks in 1995/1996 (in %; n = 635).

	Most	Slovaks	Czechs	Hung's	Rus's	Roma's	Austrians
+ Tolerant		39	28	9	8	2	42
+ Sense of humor		64	67	23	21	16	23
+ Friendly		77	62	28	30	12	40
+ Reliable		35	19	9	12	1	37
+ Helpful		28	31	9	6	1	52
+ Intelligent		48	55	25	16	3	56
+ Honest		50	35	12	23	4	29
+ Sociable		61	58	26	28	23	41
+ Easy to interact with		66	42	23	19	2	55
+ Diligent		34	17	20	20	30	17
+ Ambitious		29	59	34	16	7	50
- Dominant		6	22	48	24	21	20
- Arrogant		6	16	33	16	52	21
- Aggressive		9	5	25	30	76	4
- Cruel		4	3	12	25	42	4
- Sly		8	41	29	18	59	16
- Egoistical		16	22	38	20	36	20
- Business-like		13	57	20	20	34	56
- Hard-headed		42	16	43	31	38	10

We included in the analysis all five positive auto-clichés and four out of the twelve negative auto-clichés. The positive clichés were: democratisation, increasing political freedom, increasing comfort, and technologically highly developed. The negative clichés were: worsening social security, less security on the street, increasing criminality, wants to rule other countries, and is eager for war. A respondent was considered to have a positive set of clichés about Slovakia if he/she had indicated at least three positive clichés and not more than one negative cliché. Seven out of the eleven positive auto-stereotypes and six out of the eight negative auto-stereotypes were included in the analysis. The positive stereotypes were: tolerant, sense of humor, friendly, reliable, helpful, intelligent, and honest. The negative stereotypes were: dominant, arrogant, aggressive, cruel, sly, and egoistical. A respondent was considered to have a positive set of stereotypes about Slovakia if he/she had indicated at least five positive stereotypes and not more than one negative stereotype. The variable 'national belief' is the sum of all positive and negative auto-clichés and -stereotypes. The total number of positive clichés and stereotypes, which were included in the analysis, was equal to the number of negative clichés and stereotypes (4 + 7 and 5 + 6, respectively).²¹

National emotions were measured by asking whether the respondent feel very emotional with respect to Slovakia when he/she listens to the national anthem, sees the national flag, and/or when Slovaks are victorious in sports events. Most emotions are felt in sports events (58%). In second and third position are emotions when listening to the national anthem (39%) and emotions when seeing the national flag (29%). In the analysis, a respondent was considered to have a strong positive national emotion if he/she had agreed with all three emotions.

National behaviors were measured by asking whether the respondent had attended ceremonies of commemoration of the national dead, ceremonies in commemoration of national historic events, and rituals around the national flag, and whether the respondent sings national songs. Only a few respondents responded with "(very) often" (respectively

2%, 4%, 2%, and 6%). In the analysis, a respondent was considered to have a high level of national behavior if he/she had answered positively to all four questions.

The negative attitude towards outgroups was measured by asking the respondents to react to five statements about Hungary, Hungarians and Romanies. These statements and the '(completely) agreeing' responses were: 'I like Hungary': 15%, 'I like most of the Hungarians who live in Slovakia' (21%), 'I would have no problems with Hungarians as my neighbours' (31%), 'I like most of the Romanies' (10%), and 'I would have no problems with Romanies as my neighbours' (11%). The answers to the five statements did not form a reliable scale (the Cronbach's alpha was a low .60). In the analysis, a respondent was considered to have a negative attitude towards outgroups if he/she had (completely) agreed with all five items.

A worry on one's own future was measured by asking six questions about the expectations regarding the future of Slovak economy and employment situation, the respondent's economic future, the respondent's family's financial situation, and the respondent's personal safety and educational opportunities.²² Almost four out of ten respondents are often worried about their economic future (39%). One third expect that their personal safety will get worse in the future (33%). Three out of ten expect that the employment situation in Slovakia and their educational opportunities will get worse in the future (both 30%). About one quarter is worried about the future Slovak economy and one's family's future financial situation (respectively 26% and 21%). The responses showed that the items did not form a reliable scale (the Cronbach's alpha was a low .64). In our analysis, a respondent was considered to worry on the future if he/she (completely) agreed with all six statements.

Sense of positive self-identity was measured by asking the respondents' reactions to five statements: 'I have knowledge about the important things in life', 'People like me do not have any say about what parents do', 'I can help to bring about a change for the better', 'I have opinions on the main problems in life', and 'I can get further ahead in life by virtue of my own efforts'. The items formed a reliable scale (Cronbach's alpha: .72). In the analysis, a respondent was considered to have a low sense of positive identity if he/she had (completely) disagreed the items 1, 3, 4, and 5, and (completely) agreed with item 2.

The correlation matrix showed high correlations with national emotions. In second position were the national auto-stereotypes and the national belief. The n was, however, low due to the missing values.

Table 22: Correlations between national attitude and the independent variables (n = 154).

	1	2	3	4	4.1	4.2	5	6	7
1. Attitude	1.00								
2. Emotions	.72**	1.00							
3. Behaviour	.38**	.42**	1.00						
4. Beliefs	.46**	.41**	.29**	1.00					
4.1 Clichés	.19*	.26**	.16**	.61**	1.00				
4.2 Stereotypes	.46**	.37**	.27**	.92**	.25**	1.00			
5. Attitude outgroups	-.36**	-.21**	-.06	-.24**	-.17**	-.21**	1.00		
6. Worry on future	-.24	-.25**	-.18*	-.40**	-.45**	-.28	.15	1.00	
7. Sense of identity	.14	.18**	.11	-.04	.02	-.05	.04	-.12	1.00

Note: 1-tailed Significance: * -.01 ** -.001

In a stepwise multiple regression analysis, the variables national emotion, national auto-stereotypes, and attitude towards outgroups explained 60% of the variance in national attitude.

Table 23: *Stepwise multiple regression analysis.*

Variables	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
. Emotions	3.17	0.30	0.60	10.63	0.00
. Stereotypes	1.30	0.37	0.20	3.52	0.00
. Attitude outgroups	-.69	0.20	-.19	-3.42	0.00
Not in the equation:	Beta in	Partial	Min Toler	T	Sig T
. Behaviour	0.70	0.10	0.73	1.21	0.23
. Belief	-.09	-.05	0.15	-.65	0.52
. Clichés	-.05	-.08	0.82	-.94	0.35
. Worry on future	-.01	-.01	0.81	-.10	0.92
. Sense of identity	0.06	0.09	0.80	1.04	0.30

Another stepwise regression revealed the effects on national attitude of various socialization variables. These socialization variables were: frequency of reading political information in newspaper, watching political newsprograms on television, talking or discussing about Slovakia/Slovaks with other people, talking/discussing about minorities and foreign countries and peoples with others, and frequency of direct contact with minorities in Slovakia (talking with Hungarians and talking with Romanies living in Slovakia), positive attitude towards national(ist) political leaders, having often heard national(ist) statements, and having often heard national(ist) statements from political leaders. The positive attitude towards national(ist) political leaders was measured by asking the respondents to evaluate Vladimir Meciar (leader of HZDS), Jan Slota (leader of the Slovak Nationalist Party), and Bela Bugar and Miklos Duray (both are leader of one of the Hungarian parties). Meciar and Slota scored highest in the category '(very) bad' (both 52%), while Bugar scored highest in the category '(very) good' (20%). The indicators were: a positive or very positive evaluation of Meciar and Slota in combination with a negative or very negative evaluation of Bugar and Duray. The variable 'having often heard national(ist) statements' was measured by asking five questions. Four out of ten said having often heard: 'the Slovaks form one nation' (42%), and three out of ten: 'the Slovaks are all brothers and sisters'. About a quarter said to have often heard 'the Slovaks have the same ancestors' (23%) and 'the minorities in Slovakia must leave Slovakia' (26%). Lowest scored 'the same 'mother' gave birth to the Slovaks' (17%). The five questions formed a reliable scale (Cronbach's alpha: .72). A respondent was considered having often heard nationalistic statements if he/she had answered 'often' or 'very often' to all five questions. It was also asked from who or what the respondents have heard these statements. The answers were categorized in family (grandparents, father, mother, sister/brother), mass media (television, newspaper, radio), and political leaders. The three socialization variables with a direct effect on the national attitude were the positive attitude towards national(ist) political leaders (β .50), having often heard national(istic) statements from political leaders (β -.17), and having often heard national(istic) statements as such (β .13). These three variables explained 30% of the variance in national attitude. We also analyzed the effects of socialization variables on national emotion, national auto-stereotypes, and the attitude towards outgroups. Variance in national emotion was explained for 24% by having often heard national(istic) statements from political leaders

and having often heard national(istic) statements as such. Variance in national belief was explained for 10% by having often heard national(istic) statements from political leaders. Variance in attitude towards outgroups was explained for 40% by low frequency of direct contact with minorities, a positive attitude towards national(istic) political leaders, frequently watching political newsprograms on television, and having often heard national(ist) statements.

A stepwise multiple regression analysis, including all the previously named independent variables and the socialization variables showed that only one socialization variable contributed to the explanation of variance in national attitude: the attitude towards national(istic) leaders (national emotion: β .54, national auto-stereotypes: β .18, the attitude towards outgroups: β -.14, and the attitude towards national(istic) leaders: β .16). The percent of explained variance increased to 61%.

■ Explaining nationalism in the Basque Autonomous Community

In order to explain the variance in Basque regional national attitudes we tested, by using the method of multivariate regression, the explanatory power of the several different independent variables per national attitude (feeling, liking, pride, preference, superiority, nationalism). The independent variables were: regional national beliefs, behaviors, and emotions, Basque values, the attitude towards Spain, and Basque national socialization.

The beliefs which were investigated were Basque auto-clichés, Basque history belief, and Basques auto-stereotypes. The auto-clichés were measured by asking the respondents which of the 6 positive and 15 negative displayed characteristics were applicable to the Basque Country. The positive clichés and their acceptance were: increase of political liberties (applicable: 23%), democratizing (20%), increase of comfort (18%), increase of job opportunities (14%), increase of opportunities to make money (7%), and technologically highly developed (13%). The negative clichés were: increase of criminality (52%), minority groups threaten the majority's interest (40%), decrease of safety on the streets (38%), domestic politics gets in disorder (35%), economic deterioration (28%), eager for war (27%), loosing international prestige (28%), increasing number of foreigners (16%), growing difference between rich and poor (15%), suffering from a foreign threat of security (14%), diminishing international influence (13%), worsening of social security (9%), worsening of education opportunities (8%), wants to rule other countries (5%), and worsening of healthcare (4%). Two other variables were added: the number of marked positive characteristics (four out of ten did not indicate any of the positive clichés, while one quarter indicated only one) and the number of marked negative characteristics (half of the respondents named one to three negative clichés). A multivariate stepwise regression showed that seven clichés contributed to the explanation of the variance in the attitude of Basque nationalism. The belief that Basque Country suffers from a foreign security threat contributes considerably to the total explained variance in nationalism. Probably this threat is seen to come from Spain and France, that, in the view of some Basques, are the occupiers of Basque Country. The other relevant beliefs are: an increasing number of foreigners, growing difference between rich and poor, increase of political liberties, economic deterioration, and diminishing international influence. Together with the number of negative clichés, these Basque clichés explained 20% of the variance in Basque nationalism. The explained variance of the other national attitudes was lower, varying from 9% for national feeling to 17% for national superiority.

The Basque history belief was measured by asking the respondents to indicate what they thought about Basque Country's performances in the past on a seven-point scale ranging from extremely positive to extremely negative. A majority was positive about the Basque Country's history (62%: extremely positive: 5%, very positive: 18%, and positive: 39%). Three out of ten had a partially positive and partially negative history belief (30%). Less than one out of ten had a negative history belief (negative: 6%, very negative: 1%, extremely negative: 1%). All regression coefficients had positive values which means that having a positive history belief correlates with all positive regional national attitudes. The explained variance varied from 7% for national feeling to 12% for national preference. In the case of Basque nationalism, the history belief explained 10% of the variance.

The Basques auto-stereotypes were measured by asking the respondents which of the 12 positive and 12 negative characteristics that were presented were applicable to Basques. The positive stereotypes and their support were: industrious (73%), sociable (68%), sympathetic (65%), sense of humour (60%), intelligent (54%), reliable (49%), honest (49%), easy to interact with (45%), attentive (33%), tolerant (28%), efficient (26%), and diligent (14%). The negative stereotypes were: stubborn (29%), skilfull (23%), aggressive (20%), suspicious (15%), dominant (13%), arrogant (11%), egoistical (8%), susceptible (8%), cruel (5%), sly (4%), thinking hierarchical (4%), and ambiguous (4%). Again two other variables were added: the number of marked positive stereotypes (half of the respondents named three to six positive stereotypes) and the number of negative stereotypes (one third did not name any of the negative stereotypes, three out of ten named only one). The contribution of auto-stereotypes to the explanation of variance in regional national attitudes varied from 15% for pride to a low 6% in the case of Basque nationalism.

Regional national behavior was measured by asking the respondents whether they had always, often or never orally defended the Basque Country or its people against criticism from non-Basques. Almost every respondent has orally defended Basque Country (always: 53%, often: 24%, sometimes: 20%). Having performed this behavior has indeed a positive effect on positive Basques national attitudes. The explained variance varied from 14% (national liking) to a low 6% in the case of Basque nationalism.

Regional national emotion was measured by asking whether the respondents get emotional in such a way that he gets tears in the eyes when seeing the Basque flag being hoisted at a sports ceremony. More than half of the respondents answered positively (always: 9%, often: 13%, sometimes: 32%). All regression coefficients had positive values (Basque national liking: .37, national pride: .32, national preference: .41, national superiority: .38, nationalism: .36). The explained variance in the positive Basque attitudes varied from 10% for national pride to 17% for national preference. Emotion explained 13% of Basque nationalism.

Much higher per cents of explained variance were reached when we included positive and negative attitudes towards Spain in the regression. The neutral and two out of the five positive Spanish attitudes (feeling, liking and nationalism) explained 55% of the variance in Basque nationalism. Three out of the four negative Spanish attitudes (alienation, shame, and hate) explained 52% of the variance in Basque nationalism. The attitudes towards foreign countries (all EU member states) were measured by asking a sympathy score ranging from 0 to 100 for each of the countries, and a ranking of all the countries in preference for the country to live in. The attitudes towards foreign countries explained approximately one third of the variance in Basque national preference (36%), national superiority (32%) and nationalism (37%). But all variance came from the sympathy score and ranking of Spain. The attitudes towards foreign peoples (the peoples of the fifteen EU

member states, and other minorities in Spain, i.e., Catalans, Andalusians and Galicians) were also measured by asking a sympathy score and a ranking in preference for having them as neighbors. This attitude explained more than one third of the variance in Basque nationalism (38%). Again, almost all of the variance is, however, explained by the sympathy scores and preference ranking for Spaniards.

In order to test the effects of specific values relating to Basque Country on Basque regional national attitudes we asked the respondents to indicate the five most important things in life and the five most important things that parents should teach their children at home out of a list of nineteen values. The list of 19 important things in life included values relating to individuals' personal life, e.g., 'having much free time', general social and political values, e.g. 'freedom', and one value regarding Basque society, i.e., 'maintenance of Basque culture'. The Basque value arrived in ninth position (25%). The list of 16 important things that parents should teach their children at home included knowledge of Basque politics, Basque independence, and the willingness to fight for 'your' country. Basque independence arrived in eighth position (26%), the willingness to fight for one's own country in tenth position (17%), and knowledge of Basque politics in thirteenth position (14%). The four Basque values explained 32% of the variance in Basque nationalism. The percents for the other attitudes were lower (Basque feeling: 17%, liking: 21%, pride: 22%, preference: 28%, superiority: 29%).

We also hypothesized that Basque attitudes are directly influenced by socialization variables: the Euskera linguistic model of the school, the mass media, charismatic leaders of nationalistic parties ²³, and having often heard nationalistic statements. About three out of ten respondents attended schools where education is given in Euskera (28%). The explained effect of the linguistic model of the school (Euskera or Castillian language) on Basque national attitudes varied from 10% for national pride to 17% in the case of Basque nationalism. Reading a Basque nationalistic newspaper (*Egin*, *Deia* or *Egunkaria*) had indeed a positive effect on positive Basque national attitudes. The same applied to watching the Basque television channels ETB-1 and ETB-2. Reading Spanish newspapers and watching Spanish channels had negative regression coefficients. Reading about Basque politics in newspaper and watching the television news about Basque politics also had a positive effect on positive Basque attitudes. In the multivariate regression, the mass media variables equated in the analysis, as did often reading and watching news about Basque politics. The percents of explanation by mass media variables were considerable (feeling: 19%, liking: 22%, pride: 18%, preference: 29%, and superiority: 25%); the highest percent was reached for explaining Basque nationalism (33%). Charismatic leaders of the three nationalistic parties explained high per cents of variance in all Basque national attitudes (liking: 24%, pride: 24%, preference: 34%, superiority: 32%) and a very high 41% of the variance in Basque nationalism. The nationalistic statement, which was heard from others and that had strongest effect on Basque nationalism was: 'Iparralde should unite' (Iparralda is the collective name for the three Basque provinces in France).²⁴ The socializers equated in the regression - having heard nationalistic statements from father, having often heard or read the statement that 'Iparralde should unite with the Basque Country', having heard nationalistic statements from best friend(s), brothers/sisters, politicians on radio, and having often heard and seen the statement that 'Basques should not mix with other nationalities' - explained 26% of the variance in Basque nationalism.

We also hypothesized that Basque national attitudes are indirectly influenced by Basque socialization through its influence on Basque beliefs and emotions. We expected that the Basque beliefs (clichés about Basque Country and Basque history, and stereotypes about

Basques) are influenced by the linguistic model of the school, exposure to particular mass media, charismatic political leaders, and talking about the Basque Country and Basques with relatives, the priest, schoolteachers, and peers.²⁵ The regression showed that all these socializers had small effect on Basque beliefs. Emotions were expected to be influenced by having experienced Basque national rituals. In order to test this, the respondents were asked whether they had participated in the Day of the Basque fatherland.²⁶ This *Aberri Eguna* is celebrated every year with Easter and is a celebration of Basque culture and cultural heritage. One fifth of the respondents answered that they have participated in this Basque national ritual. The respondents were also asked whether they know songs about the Basque Country and whether they sing and listen to these songs.²⁷ Almost every respondent knew Basque songs (many: 32%, some: 42%, few: 20%, no songs: 6%). A majority sometimes sing these songs (very often: 8%, often: 22%, sometimes: 57%, and never: 14%). All regression coefficients had positive values. They explained a low 15% of the variance in emotion.

Table 24: National and nationalistic socializers of Basque youth in 1995 (in %).

Socializers	Talked 'often' Basque Country with	Basques with	Received information about the Basque Country from	Heard nationalistic statements from
Grandparents	7	7	43	16
Father	21	19	71	22
Mother	20	19	68	18
Brother(s)/Sister(s)	12	11	29	13
Priest(s)	1	1	3	2
Teacher(s)	4	4	63	13
TV news	-	-	70	49
Movie(s)	-	-	22	7
Textbook(s)	-	-	52	10
Other book(s)	-	-	38	14
Newspaper(s)	-	-	41	35
Best friend(s)	25	22	40	33
Politician(s) on TV	-	-	26	67
Politician(s) on radio	-	-	14	39
Politician(s) in newspaper	-	-	17	41
Poster(s)/pamphlet(s)	-	-	10	32
Magazine(s)	-	-	20	14
N =	-	-	709	609

The relative effects of all the explanatory variables on Basque nationalism have been tested by a backward regression analysis. All variables we found in the separate regression analyses were entered and step by step the variables that added least to the total explained variance were removed. The Spanish positive and negative national attitudes best explained variance in Basque national attitudes (variance in regional national superiority is explained for 58%, preference: 62%, pride: 39%, liking: 42%, and feeling: 35%). This also applied to the explanation of variance in Basque nationalism: Spanish national liking (β -.33), Spanish national shame (β .27), and Spanish nationalism (β .21). The value of maintenance of Basque culture (β .15), reading newspaper (reporting on political leaders' speeches, statements and activities; β .15), having heard nationalistic statements from best

friend(s) ($\beta .10$), and the country-cliché of increasing political liberties ($\beta .09$) also stayed in the backward regression. The total explained variance in the attitude of Basque nationalism is a high 64%.

■ Conclusion

The hypothesis about the main determinants of the individual's development of nationalism has to be rejected in part. The stepwise regression analysis of data from the Slovak respondents showed that national emotion, national auto-stereotypes, the attitude towards outgroups, and the attitude towards nationalistic political leaders were the main determinants. They explained a high 61% of the variance in national attitudes. The backward regression analysis of the data from Basque youth showed that the attitudes towards Spain best explain variance in Basque nationalism. The cliché of increasing political liberties, the value of maintenance of Basque culture, and two socialization variables (reading a Basque newspaper, and having heard nationalistic statements from best friend or friends) also stayed in the regression. Other Basque beliefs, behaviors, and emotions were removed from the regression. The total explained variance in the attitude of Basque regional nationalism was a high 64%.

■ SUMMARY

Nationalism is high on the political science agenda. This is so probably thanks to the perception of a revival of nationalism at present.

A clear, consistent, broadly accepted terminology is one of the essential starting points of any branch of science. In political science literature, the term of nationalism is often 'misused, used loosely, or used inconsistently', concluded Barrington (1997, 712). This could have been the conclusion of our first chapter. We found that in the relevant literature 'nationalism' is often not very well distinguished from other national orientations, for example, national loyalty, and that 'nationalism' receives many different conceptualizations. 'Nationalism' also has different meanings, relating to different levels of analysis: an individual's orientation, an ideology, a movement, and the process of 'nation' building. In each category, 'nationalism' receives different conceptualizations. These conceptualizations often include terms of other national orientations (for example, nationalism defined as a sense of loyalty to the nation). Other conceptualizations of nationalism include a great variety of different elements. Moreover, there are several different types and intensities of nationalism distinguished. The underlying concept of 'nation' also receives different interpretations. The very few empirical studies suffer from conceptual confusion as well, using several different indicators or indices. The differences in definitions result in differences in evaluations of nationalism. Naturally, we are not the first to criticize the conceptual confusion and to realize the need for distinguishing nationalism from other national orientations. A number of scholars have undertaken just such a clarification especially with respect to the concepts of patriotism and nationalism. Results of these efforts are, however, not completely convincing. A more clear conceptualization and operationalization of "nationalism" is needed in order to prevent a continuation of the 'inflation' of the value of the concept, and to improve the studying of its actual occurrence and possible growth or decline in a more valid and reliable way.

Efforts to explain nationalism have resulted in a long list of different variables. Nationalism has been related to systemic variables, individual's variables, and socialization variables. Systemic variables and social-demographic variables are, however, not more than background variables. Socialization variables seem to have a crucial influence on the acquisition of national attitudes. Additional variables are, however, needed to link systemic, individual's and national socialization variables with national attitude (the dependent variable). We have not found any cross-national empirical multivariate study into nationalism.

We developed a new set of concepts about national attitudes along with their conceptualizations and operationalizations and proposed an universal psychological structure of national attitudes and a theory of nationalism development. We hypothesized that the attitudes of national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism can be distinguished empirically. The second hypothesis was that these positive attitudes form a cumulative hierarchy. The next hypothesis was that several different alternative trajectories for the individual out of this hierarchy of positive national attitudes can be distinguished: negative national attitudes, positive regional national attitudes (regional national feeling, liking, pride, preference, superiority, and regional nationalism), and/or positive international attitudes, relating to a particular region of the world (for example, Europe and the EU) or to the world as a whole (international feeling and internationalism). The fourth hypothesis was, that moderate positive attitudes are combined moderate positive attitudes towards an other

entity (e.g., moderate positive regional attitudes with moderate positive national attitudes), that very and extremely positive attitudes are not combined with other very or extremely positive attitudes because of the downward comparisons included therein (e.g., regional nationalism with nationalism) and that very and extremely positive attitudes are combined with negative attitudes (e.g., regional nationalism with negative attitudes towards the country of which the region is a part). We also hypothesized that the main determinants of the individual's development of nationalism are: intense national emotions, that were previously experienced; national behaviors with a high intensity that were previously performed; extremely positively evaluated beliefs about the country's history; negatively evaluated beliefs about the country's actual international and domestic developments; negative attitudes toward foreign national or 'ethnic' minorities living within the country and foreign peoples and countries; a worrying on one's own (family's) economic, social, and cultural future; and a very low sense of positive identity. These individual national and other orientations are in turn expected to be influenced by the individual's national(istic) socialization, including the frequency and intensity of national rituals, and national(istic) education, information, and/or persuasion from the various socializers in general, and national(istic), charismatic political leaders in particular. Background variables are social-demographic variables and systemic variables.

We collected data in the Netherlands (1994), Slovakia (1995/1996), and the Basque Autonomous Community in Spain (1996) to test these hypotheses. The instruments in the three studies differed. In each following study, we tried to improve the scalability of the attitudes' subscales, by introducing new items, and the explanatory power of the nationalism explanatory model, by introducing new independent variables. In doing so, we made several mistakes: one superiority item was applied as a preference item in the Dutch study and the question about the respondent's nationality was applied as a national feeling item in the Slovak study. Most of the operationalizations of the several different national attitudes worked well. The three nationalism items on blood, common origin, and being membership of one national family correlated too high with other national attitudes. They do not seem to measure nationalism exclusively.

The data from the Dutch and Slovak respondents did not justify a rejection of the first hypotheses that we can distinguish empirically one neutral and five positive national attitudes, and that these attitudes form a cumulative national attitudes' hierarchy. These hypotheses had, however, to be rejected in the case of the attitudes towards Spain. We speculate that the Spanish items stay far away from the social and political reality of a large group of Basque youth.

We also found empirical evidence for the hypothesis that one of the alternative trajectories out of the positive national attitudes hierarchy is the development of negative attitudes towards one's own country. The analysis showed that the positive and negative national attitudes towards Spain among Basque youth do not form one scale. The negative items did form a separate cumulative scale with a very high scale coefficient.

There also was empirical evidence for the hypothesis that another alternative trajectory is the development of positive regional national attitudes. One neutral and five positive regional national attitudes could be distinguished empirically among Basque youth. These attitudes formed a cumulative scale.

The next hypothesis was, that moderate positive attitudes are combined with other moderate positive attitudes, that very and extremely positive attitudes are not combined with other very or extremely positive attitudes because of the downward comparisons included therein, and that very and extremely positive attitudes are combined with

negative attitudes towards another entity. The first part of the hypothesis was not contradicted by the data from Basque youth. The second part of the hypothesis had, however, to be rejected because large proportions of respondents with the attitudes of Basque preference, superiority and nationalism also had Spanish preference, superiority and nationalism. The same applied to the combination of Spanish attitudes and Basque attitudes. The third part of the hypothesis was not contradicted by the data. Almost one out of three respondents combined a very or extremely positive Basque attitude with a negative attitude towards Spain.

The hypothesis about the main determinants of the individual's development of nationalism had to be rejected in part. A stepwise regression analysis of data from Slovak youth showed that national emotion, national stereotypes, the attitude towards outgroups, and the attitude towards nationalistic political leaders were the main determinants. They explained a high 61% of the variance in national attitudes. A backward regression analysis of the data from Basque youth showed that the attitudes towards Spain best explain variance in Basque nationalism. One Basque-belief, the value of maintenance of Basque culture, and two socialization variables also stayed in the regression. The total explained variance in the attitude of Basque regional nationalism was a high 64%. It seems to be worth to continue our research.

■ APPENDIX: INDICATORS OF NATIONAL ATTITUDES AND EXPLANATORY VARIABLES

■ National attitudes in the Netherlands.

National feeling: multi-item question: (completely) agreeing with:

- . "I feel I am Dutch".
- . "I feel that the Netherlands is my country".

National liking: multi-item scale: (completely) agreeing with:

- . "I enjoy being Dutch".
- . "In general, I like the Dutch".
- . "I like the Netherlands".
- . "I like the Dutch language".

National pride: multi-item scale: (completely) agreeing with:

- . "I am proud to be Dutch".
- . "I am proud of what the Dutch people have done".
- . "The Netherlands can be proud of what it represents".

National preference: multi-item scale: (completely) agreeing with:

- . "In general, I prefer to have Dutch people for my personal contacts more so than people from other countries".
- . "I prefer being a Dutch citizen more than any other citizenship in the world"
- . "I prefer to live in the Netherlands more so than in any other country".

National superiority: multi-item scale: (completely) agreeing with:

- . "In general, I like Dutch people more so than people from other countries".
- . "In general, Dutch people are better than other nationalities".
- . "In general, Dutch people are the best people to have for my personal contacts".
- . "The Netherlands is the best country in which to live".
- . "The Dutch nationality is the best nationality to have".

Nationalism: multi-item scale: (completely) agreeing with:

- . "I feel I share a common origin with other Dutch people".
- . "I feel I am member of one Dutch family".
- . "I feel I have Dutch blood".
- . "The Dutch should not mix with other nationalities".
- . "All the Dutch should live in the Netherlands".
- . "Flanders, that part of Belgium where people speak Dutch, should unite with the Netherlands".
- . "The non-Dutch living in the Netherlands should leave the Netherlands".
- . "International cooperation with other countries overburdens the Netherlands and, therefore, should be stopped".

National alienation: multi-item scale: (completely) agreeing with:

- . "In general, I do not feel comfortable being among Dutch people".
- . "I do not feel at home in the Netherlands".

National shame: multi-item scale: (completely) agreeing with:

- . "I am ashamed to be Dutch".
- . "I am ashamed of what the Dutch people have done".
- . "The Netherlands should be ashamed of what it represents".

National disgust: multi-item scale: (completely) agreeing with:

- . "In general, I am disgusted with the Dutch".
- . "I am disgusted with the Netherlands".

National hate: multi-item scale: (completely) agreeing with:

- . "In general, I hate the Dutch".
- . "I hate the Netherlands".

■ National attitudes in Slovakia.

National feeling: multi-item question: (completely) agreeing with:

- . "I feel I am a Slovak".
- . "I feel that Slovakia is my country".

National liking: multi-item scale: (completely) agreeing with:

- . "I enjoy being a Slovak".
- . "In general, I like the Slovaks".
- . "I like Slovakia".
- . "I like the Slovak language".

National pride: multi-item scale: (completely) agreeing with:

- . "I am proud to be Slovak".
- . "I am proud of what the Slovaks have done".
- . "Slovakia can be proud of what it represents".

National preference: multi-item scale: (completely) agreeing with:

- . "In general, I prefer to have Slovaks for my personal contacts more so than people from other countries".
- . "I prefer being a Slovak citizen more than any other citizenship in the world".
- . "I prefer to live in Slovakia more so than in any other country".

National superiority: multi-item scale: (completely) agreeing with:

- . "In general, I like the Slovaks more so than people from other countries".
- . "In general, Slovaks are better than other nationalities".
- . "In general, Slovaks are the best people to have for my personal contacts".
- . "Slovakia is the best country in which to live".
- . "Slovak nationality is the best nationality to have".

Nationalism: multi-item scale: (completely) agreeing with:

- . "I feel I share a common origin with other Slovaks".
- . "I feel I am member of one Slovak family".
- . "I feel I have Slovak blood".
- . "Slovaks should not mix with other nationalities".
- . "All Slovaks should live in Slovakia".
- . "That part of Hungary where most people speak Slovak should unite with Slovakia".
- . "Slovaks living in Hungary should have Slovakia's protection".
- . "The non-Slovaks living in Slovakia should leave Slovakia".
- . "International cooperation with other countries overburdens Slovakia and, therefore, should be stopped".

National alienation: multi-item scale: (completely) agreeing with:

- . "In general, I do not feel comfortable being among Slovaks".
- . "I do not feel at home in Slovakia".

National shame: multi-item scale: (completely) agreeing with:

- . "I am ashamed to be Slovak".
- . "I am ashamed of what the Slovak people have done".
- . "Slovakia should be ashamed of what it represents".

National disgust: multi-item scale: (completely) agreeing with:

- . "In general, I am disgusted with the Slovaks".
- . "I am disgusted with Slovakia".

National hate: multi-item scale: agreeing with:

- . "In general, I hate the Slovaks".
- . "I hate Slovakia".

■ National attitudes in Spain.

National feeling:

- . "I feel I am a Spaniard".
- . "I feel that Spain is my country".

National liking:

- . "I enjoy being a Spaniard".
- . "In general, I like the Spaniards".
- . "I like Spain".
- . "I like the Castilian language".

National pride:

- . "I am proud to be Spaniard".
- . "I am proud of what the Spaniards have done".
- . "Spain can be proud of what it represents".

National preference:

- . "In general, I prefer to have Spaniards for my personal contacts more so than people from other countries".
- . "I prefer being a Spanish citizen more than any other citizenship in the world".
- . "I prefer to live in Spain more so than in any other country".

National superiority:

- . "In general, I like the Spaniards more so than people from other countries".
- . "In general, Spaniards are better than other nationalities".
- . "In general, Spaniards are the best people to have for my personal contacts".
- . "Spain is the best country in which to live".
- . "The Spanish nationality is the best nationality to have".

Nationalism:

- . "I feel I share a common origin with other Spaniards".
- . "I feel I am member of one Spanish family".
- . "I feel I have Spanish blood".
- . "The Spaniards should not mix with other nationalities".
- . "Portugal should unite with Spain".
- . "The non-Spaniards living in Spain should leave Spain".
- . "The Spaniards, living in France, should have Spain's protection".
- . "International cooperation with other countries overburdens Spain and therefore should be stopped".

National alienation:

- . "In general, I do not feel comfortable being among Spaniards".
- . "I do not feel at home in Spain".

National shame:

- . "I am ashamed to be Spanish".
- . "I am ashamed of what the Spanish people have done".
- . "Spain should be ashamed of what it represents".

National disgust:

- . "In general, I am disgusted with the Spaniards" and
- . "I am disgusted with Spain".

National hate:

- . "In general, I hate the Spaniards" and
- . "I hate Spain".

■ Regional national attitudes in the Basque Country.

Regional national feeling:

- . "I feel I am a Basque".
- . "I feel that Pais Vasco is my country".

Regional national liking:

- . "I enjoy being a Basque".
- . "In general, I like the Basques".
- . "I like Pais Vasco".
- . "I like the Euskera language".

Regional national pride:

- . "I am proud to be Basque".
- . "I am proud of what the Basques have done".
- . "The Basque Country can be proud of what it represents".

Regional national preference:

- . "In general, I prefer to have Basques for my personal contacts more so than other Spaniards".
- . "In general, I prefer to have Basques for my personal contacts more so than people from other countries".
- . "I prefer being a Basque citizen more than Spanish citizenship".
- . "I prefer being a Basque citizen more than any other citizenship in the world".
- . "I prefer to live in the Basque Country more so than in any other part of Spain".
- . "I prefer to live in the Basque Country more so than in any other country".

Regional national superiority:

- . "In general, I like the Basques more so than other Spaniards".
- . "In general, I like the Basques more so than people from other countries".
- . "In general, Basques are better than other Spaniards".
- . "In general, Basques are better than other nationalities".
- . "In general, Basques are the best people to have for my personal contacts".
- . "The Basque Country is the best region of Spain in which to live".
- . "The Basque Country is the best part of Europe in which to live".
- . "The Basque Country is the best part of the world in which to live".
- . "The Basque "nationality" is the best nationality to have"

Regional nationalism:

- . "I feel I share a common origin with other Basques".
- . "I feel I am member of one Basque family".
- . "I feel I have Basque blood".
- . "The Basques should not mix with other Spaniards".
- . "The Basques should not mix with other nationalities".
- . "I want that a separate and independent state of Euskadi is established".
- . "Navarra should unite with the Basque Country in one separate and independent state, Euskadi".
- . "Iparralda should unite with the Basque Country in one separate and independent state, Euskadi".
- . "The non-Basques living in Pais Vasco should leave Pais Vasco".
- . "The Basques, living in other regions of Spain, should have Basque Country's protection"
- . "The Basques, living in France, should have Basque Country's protection"
- . "Cooperation with other regions in Spain overburdens the Basque Country and, therefore, should be stopped".
- . "Cooperation with other countries overburdens the Basque Country and, therefore, should be stopped".

Regional national alienation:

- . "In general, I do not feel comfortable being among Basques".
- . "I do not feel at home in the Basque Country".

Regional national shame:

- . "I am ashamed to be Basque".
- . "The Basque Country should be ashamed of what it represents".

Regional national disgust:

- . "In general, I am disgusted with the Basques".
- . "I am disgusted with the Basque Country".

Regional national hate:

- . "In general, I hate the Basques".
- . "I hate the Basque Country".

■ Explanatory variables

□ Individual's explanatory variables

- . National emotions. Multi-item question: never -> always getting tears in eyes, while
 - . listening the national anthem,
 - . watching head of state on film or tv,
 - . seeing the national flag being hoisted after a fellow-national's victory in a sports competition.
- . National behaviors. Multi-item question:
 - . having orally defended one's own people and country against criticisms from abroad,
 - . having served in the army on a compulsory basis,
 - . having served in the army on a voluntary basis,
 - . having fought in a war defending one's own country.
- . National beliefs: Images of one's own country and foreign countries.
 - . Open question "What are the first five things that come into mind when hearing the word [the name of respondent's country]?" Ditto: the neighboring countries.
 - . Closed-ended multi-item question: "Which of the following characteristics is/are applicable to [respondent's own country and the neighboring countries]?" Positive characteristics: democratizing, increase of political freedoms, increase of comfort, growth of job opportunities, increase of opportunities to make money, is technologically highly developed. Negative characteristics: suffers from a foreign threat of security, suffers from losing international prestige, suffers from diminishment of international influence, domestic politics gets in disorder, economic deterioration, growth of criminality, large minority groups threatening the majority's interests, growing numbers of foreigners, worsening of healthcare, worsening of education opportunities, decrease of safety on the streets, growing gap between rich and poor, worsening of social security, is eager for war, wants to rule other countries.
 - . National history belief. Single-item question: what is your view on what your own country, ... [respondent's country], and ... [the neighboring countries] have performed in the past: extremely positive, very positive, positive, partly positive and partly negative, negative, very negative, extremely negative?
- . National beliefs: Stereotypes of one's own people, minorities within the country and foreign peoples.
 - . Open questions: "What are the first five things that come into mind when hearing the word ... [respondent's people]?" and "What are the first five things that come into mind when hearing the word ... [minority living within respondent's country]?" and ditto foreign peoples.
 - . Closed-ended multi-item question: "Which of the following characteristics is/are applicable to most of the [respondent's people, members of minority and neighboring peoples]?" Positive characteristics: sociable, sense of humour, tolerant, easy to interact with, friendly, diligent, reliable, intelligent, helpful, efficient, industrious, honest. Negative characteristics: dominant, arrogant, business-like, hard-headed, aggressive, cruel, sly, thinking hierarchical, prejudiced, ambitious, dominant, quick-tempered, egoistical.
- . Attitudes towards ethnic minorities within the respondent's country. Additive index, based on the following questions:
 - . sympathy score for minority groups and foreign peoples;
 - . ranking minority groups according to preference for getting them as neighbors.
- . Attitudes towards foreign countries. Additive index, based on the following three questions:
 - . sympathy score for foreign countries
 - . ranking foreign countries in preference for country to live in.
 - . ranking foreign peoples according to preference for getting them as neighbors.
- . Worry on the economic outlook for one's own country. Multi-item scale:
 - . agreeing with "economy gets worse";
 - . expecting that within the next year the general economic situation in [respondent's country] will be a little or a lot worse (and not a lot or a little better); and
 - . expecting within the next year the employment situation will get a little or a lot worse.
- . Worry on the political outlook for one's own country. Multi-item scale: indicating fifteen or more (major) "problems" out of a list of twenty-one issues, including unemployment and/or labour market problems, wages, income distribution, prices, taxes, health care, social security, housing, environment, energy, crime, education, traffic circulation, foreign affairs, defense, norms and values, abortion, euthanasia, women's rights, minorities, government, parliament, and democracy; agreeing with "politics gets worse"; and expecting that within the next year the political situation in [respondent's country] will get a little or a lot worse.
- . Worry on one's own (family's) future. Multi-item scale:

- . expecting that the financial situation of respondent's family or household get a little or a lot worse within the next year (and not a lot better or a little better);
- . expecting that respondent's own job situation will get a little or a lot worse;
- . expecting that respondent's career opportunities will decrease;
- . expecting that respondents's own future income opportunities will be less positive;
- . being often or sometimes worried about his or her [respondent's] economic future;
- . expecting that one's future healthcare security will get a little or a lot worse;
- . expecting that one's future personal safety will get a little or a lot worse; and
- . expecting that one's education opportunities will get a little or a lot worse.
- . Belief of causes of economic deterioration. Single-item question: who or what do you consider to be responsible for our country's economic deterioration: particular foreign countries, particular minority groups living within the country, former political leaders, actual head of state, actual government, etc.
- . Belief of causes of political deterioration. Single-item question: who or what do you consider to be responsible for our country's economic deterioration: particular foreign countries, particular minority groups living within the country, former political leaders, actual head of state, actual government, etc.
- . Sense of positive identity. Multi-item self-assessment scale: including
 - . self-confidence items: saying having knowledge about important things in life, having opinions on the main problems in life, finding him/herself often persuading his/her friends and/or relatives to share his/her views on several different topics in life, and agreeing with "you can get further ahead in life by virtue of your own efforts"; and
 - . self-efficacy items: not agreeing with "people like me do not have any say about what parents (ditto other relatives, teachers, and friends) do", and agreeing with "do you think, that if things are not going well in your direct environment, people like yourself can help to bring about a change for the better or not".
- . Values priorities. Multi-item question:
 - . selecting the five most important things in life out of the following choices: freedom, equality, peace, order, national security, prosperity, nice family, good health, a lot of free time, a happy marriage, enjoyable work, high income, many friends and acquaintances, a strong faith, democracy, personal safety, maintenance of [respondent's people's] culture, international solidarity;
 - . selecting the five most important qualities which children should be encouraged to learn at home out of a list of the following choices: good manners, unselfishness, independence, determination, obedience, imagination, willing to work hard, interest in politics, knowledge about politics in [respondent's country], knowledge of foreign politics, being a democrat, tolerant, honest, peaceful, willingness to fight for the country.

□ Socialization variables:

- . Experiences with national rituals. Multi-item question: additive index:
 - . having participated in ceremonies of remembrance for the national dead;
 - . having participated in other ceremonies in commemoration of national historic events;
 - . having participated in rituals around the national flag;
 - . having song national songs.
- . Socializers of national beliefs. Multi-item question:
 - . "Where and from who or what have you learned and do you mainly learn what you know about [respondent's country]"?
 - . "Where, and from who or what have you *mainly* learned and do you mainly learn what you know about [respondent's country]: (card:) grandparent; father; mother; sister; brother; priests; teachers; television news; television films; books; newspaper, best friend; partner; employer, symbols; army officer; political leaders on tv, on radio, in newspaper.
- . Reading political information in (nationalistic) newspaper. Multi-item question:
 - . self-assessment: frequency of reading in newspaper about politics in [respondent's country] foreign policy of [respondent's country], and about politics in other countries.
 - . open question: which newspaper is read often or almost always.
- . Socializers of nationalism. Multi-item question:
 - . Having heard never -> very often:
 - . "We, [the Dutch] have the same ancestors";
 - . "We, [the Dutch] are of the same family";
 - . "We, [the Dutch] are all brothers and sisters";
 - . "The same "mother" gave birth to us, [the Dutch]";
 - . "We, [the Dutch], are part on one nation";
 - . "We, [the Dutch] should not mix with other nationalities";
 - . "[Flanders, that part of Belgium where people speak Dutch,] should unite with [the Netherlands]";
 - . "The non-[Dutch] living in [the Netherlands] should leave [the Netherlands]";
 - . "International cooperation with other countries overburdens [the Netherlands] and, therefore, should be stopped".
 - . "Where, and from who or what have you heard these statements?" Card: grandparent; father; mother; sister; brother; priests; teachers; television news; television films; books; newspaper, best friend; partner; employer, symbols; army officer; political leaders on tv, on radio, in newspaper.
- . Talking, discussing one's own country, one's own people, minorities, foreign countries and foreign peoples. Multi-item index:
 - . Talking/discussing one's own country never, sometimes, or frequently with grandparents, father, mother, brother, sister, priest, teacher, best friends, colleagues, employer;
 - . Talking/discussing one's own people never, etc.
 - . Talking/discussing minorities never, etc.;
 - . Talking/discussing foreign countries never, etc.
 - . Talking/discussing foreign peoples never, etc.
- . Watching political television items. Multi-item self-assesment index: watching news programs on television and current events programs on television never, sometimes or frequently.

■ NOTES

1. The examples of conceptualizations of these national orientations, presented here, may puzzle the reader. We present them here in making our point that the available literature suffers from a remarkable lack of conceptual information. For example, 'national awareness', is conceptualized both as awareness of one's nationality and also as a sense of nationality (Davies, 1973). 'National consciousness' is conceptualized as the attachment of secondary symbols [that is, symbols about symbols] of nationality to primary items of information moving through channels of social communication or through the mind of an individual (not just 'people', but 'our people' or 'the American people'; Deutsch, 1966, 172-173); as an awareness of membership in the nation, coupled with a view that this membership is an inherently valuable quality (Hroch, 1985); as the sense of group placement, of allies, or of people like me, in contrast to strangers and enemies (Lane, 1973); and even as a sense of, and a pride in, what distinguishes one's own from other peoples (Plamenatz, 1976). Other authors describe national pride, however, as a separate orientation. Kamenka (1976, 15) characterized national consciousness as 'nationalism in a weak sense'. 'National identification' is conceptualized as an identification with national symbols (Bloom, 1993), but also as a primordial attachment or loyalty, arising from shared cultural givens (Geertz, 1963). National loyalty is also a separate national orientation according to some authors. These authors conceptualize 'national loyalty' as the willingness to fulfil certain duties towards one's own country, state, and people. For example, to fight for one's own country or to stay in one's own country even if one can make a better living in other countries (Seliktar, 1980). Loyalty is related both to the nation and the state (Connor, 1993), and is also included in conceptualizations of patriotism. 'National solidarity' conceptualizations do not differ from 'national loyalty' conceptualizations. At the heart of nationalism are feelings of attachment; the feelings that persons have toward their own and other nations and the sense of loyalty to them (Druckman, 1994, 44). Both 'national attachment' and 'national allegiance' are conceptualized as a more or less conscious conviction that the individual's welfare, and that of the groups are linked in an on-going pattern of national life (Davies, 1973). In some publications, national attachment also means patriotism (for example, Bar-Tal, 1993). 'National pride' is conceptualized as the attitude of being proud of one's own country and people (Rose, 1985), or as a sense that one's countrymen are, on balance, at least benign (Davies, 1973). Being proud of one's own country is, however, also included in some definitions of 'national consciousness', 'patriotism', and 'chauvinism' (for example, Rose, 1985). 'National devotion' is a national orientation which includes devotion to the community to which one belongs (Plamenatz, 1976). '(National) patriotism' is described as the conviction that one's own welfare and that of the significant groups to which the individual belongs are dependent upon the preservation or expansion (or both) of the power and culture of his/her society (Doob, 1964, 6), but also as love of country (Plamenatz, 1976; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989), as loyalty to one's own people or nation (Plamenatz, 1976; Farnen & German, 1992; Adam, 1990), as pride in one's nation (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Farnen & German, 1992), and as feelings of attachment to one's own country (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Distinctions are often made between negative and positive patriotism. Negative patriotism or 'pseudopatriotism' is an ethnocentric patriotism which includes 'blind attachment to certain national cultural values, uncritical conformity with the prevailing group ways, and rejection of other nations as outgroups', while genuine patriotism is love of country and attachment to national values in combination with an appreciation of the values and ways of other nations without outgroup rejection (Adorno et al., 1950, 107-108). In most publications, patriotism is evaluated only positively. 'A healthy patriotic spirit may be as important to the well being of a nation as high self-esteem is to the well being of an individual. ... In fact, patriotism may be an often overlooked means of reducing international belligerence, much as an individual's healthy self-esteem can promote better interpersonal relationships' (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989, 273). Bar-Tal (1993, 48) stated that the essence of patriotism can be positively defined as the attachment of group members toward their group and the country in which they reside. Attachment implies a binding affection between a person and his/her group and the land, reflects motivational forces, is associated with positive evaluation and emotion, and express beliefs connoting love, loyalty, pride, or care. It is claimed that this definition is not substantially different from 'lay-people's' ideas which Bar-Tal's study among Israeli adolescents (Bar-Tal & Raviv, 1985) and Kelly & Ronan's (1987) study of Arizona's high school students revealed. Billig (1993) questioned, however, some elements of Bar-Tal's analysis, such as its inevitable occurrence and that of being a necessary condition for a sense of community. Remmers & Radler (1957) have also mentioned the concept of 'super-patriotism'. 'National involvement' is

defined as a combination of a close identification between one's own interests and national interests, a belief that the policies of one's own country are always right, and the reification and glorification of one's own country (Morse & Allport, 1952). The identification of individual interests and national interests is, however, also included in some conceptualizations of national attachment and patriotism (for example, Doob, 1964; and Davies, 1973). 'Chauvinism' (Nicholas Chauvin was a French recruit and comedian showing admiration for Napoleon's victories) is conceptualized in terms of giving one's own country ('fatherland') the highest value, as being proud of it, as disliking and distrusting foreigners, as the willingness to fight and to die for one's own people, and as having the willingness to conquer other peoples. Often, chauvinism is presented as a form of extreme zealous and fanatical nationalism. Brzezinski (1989) uses the neologism of 'nationalistic chauvinism' without any definition, despite its redundancy.

2. Seton-Watson, 1977; Haas, 1986; Brzezinski, 1989; Tilly, 1990; Smith, 1991; Schöpflin, 1991; Eriksen, 1991; Motyl, 1992; Bimbaum, 1993; Hobsbawm 1993; Kamenka, 1993; Guibernau, 1996.

3. Speech for the opening of the academic year of the Central Europe University, published in the Dutch newspaper *De Volkskrant*, December 4, 1993. Translated from Dutch to English by the author of this chapter.

4. For example, Seton-Watson, 1977; Smith, 1991; Brass, 1991; Guibernau, 1996.

5. For example, Kohn, 1965; Kamenka, 1976; Anderson, 1983; Mellor, 1989; Hobsbawm, 1990; Huntington, 1993.

6. For example, Brzezinski's five stages (1989) and Gellner's four 'time zones' (1992).

7. For example, Doob, 1964; Kohn, 1965; Plamenatz, 1976; Loh, 1975; Seliktar, 1980; Gellner, 1983; Jacobs, 1990; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Bar-Tal, 1993; and Zajac, 1993.

8. Cultural nationalism 'involves an emotional identification with the language, history, religion, and folkways of one's ethnic-linguistic group' and reflects 'a collective consciousness of kind'. Political nationalism 'involves political values and beliefs regarding means for achieving national goals' (Loh, 1975, 220).

9. 'It tears the man out of all the identification groups that are characteristic for pluralist democracy and recognizes just one and only one: a nation or nationality. Each exclusiveness is aggressive, and so also the nationalistic one' (Kusy, 1992, 124).

10. Kamenka (1993, 152) says that nationalism 'has a positive and a negative side: it has been democratic or authoritarian, backward-looking or forward-looking, socialist or conservative, secular or religious, generous or chauvenist'.

11. 'Love for home, the special sound of language and music, the superior taste of food, landscape of childhood, unique roots and histories are usually elevated to an ethnocentric rejection of the stranger' (Adam, 1990, 577).

12. 'The nation state and democracy are the twins born of the French Revolution. From a cultural point of view, both have been growing in the shadow of nationalism' (Habermas, 1994, 22).

13. An example of one such confusion is Fukuyama's reasoning about the relationship between nationalism and democracy / liberalism. He argues that 'Nationalism can coexist quite well with liberalism as long as the former becomes tolerant. ... Nationalism can become tolerant if national identity or national culture is something that is fundamentally open to other people' (Fukuyama, 1992, 26).

14. Even in the publications of highly regarded research institutes such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the assumed growth in nationalism does not use empirical data for its validity (Griffiths, 1993).

1.5. The Dutch respondents filled out a questionnaire containing 61 single- and multi-item questions covering national attitudes and a variety of other political orientations. We included 1 neutral, 13 positive, and 2 negative national attitudes' items. Data collection took place during regular school hours of 50 minutes, mainly during Dutch or English language classes. History/Constitution and Society classes were excluded in order to limit the number of socially desirable answers. The quota sample included 1444 13-17 year old Dutch secondary school students (93% of N; 7% were absent from classes). The respondents were contacted through their schools. All schooltypes and denominations were included. The respondents were students in the common first year of secondary education (21%), and students from pre-vocational education schools (21%), middle general secondary education schools (32%), higher general secondary education schools (11%), and pre-university education schools (16%). The percent of students of protestant schools is 27%, while 35% attended catholic schools, 19% schools of another denomination, and 19% schools with no denomination. Students from three grades were asked to complete the questionnaire: grade 1: 34%, grade 3: 29%, and grade 4 (pre-vocational education and middle general education schools) or 5 (higher general education and pre-university education schools): 37%. The gender representation was: males: 51% and females 49%. Quota-controls were based on data from the Central Statistics Bureau. Students from confessional schools were slightly overrepresented compared to students from public schools. The same applied to students from middle general education schools compared to students from pre-vocational, higher general, and pre-university education schools.

1.6. The questionnaire included 22 single- and multi-item questions covering national attitudes and a variety of other political orientations. The originally English questionnaire was translated in the following way. First two Slovak students with English proficiency translated individually the text in Slovak language. Next, a political scientist from Comenius University in Bratislava, Darina Malová, translated the questionnaire in Slovak, using the two student translations. Finally another group of Slovak students compared the English and Slovak version. All reported absence of differences between the two versions. The sample was not a good representation of the Slovak population. Half of the respondents were young people, 14-20 years of age, while the age of the other half of respondents varied between 21 and 82 years. More women than men were contacted (respectively 58% and 42%). Originally we planned to carry out the research among a good sample of Slovak youth attending secondary school classes. However, at the time of the data collection, our study became a political issue and the Slovak Ministry of Education requested (insisted) the schools not to participate in the research. The data were collected by students from the Political Science Department of the Comenius University between December 1995 and May 1996. They interviewed 635 respondents in their homes, following the questionnaire and filling out the respondents' answers.

1.7. Basque Country is a region located in the north of Spain and the south of France. Euskal Herria is the collective name for all Basque provinces in Spain (Guipúzcoa, Álava, Vizcaya) and in France (Lapurdi, Baja Navarra, and Zuberoa). The Basque language, Euskera, is spoken by about one fifth of the Euskal Herria's population. In this contribution, we focus on Basque Country in Spain. In history, the Basque language was forbidden by Spanish rulers. In 1895, the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco - PNV) was established. During the repressive Franco regime the Basque terrorist movement ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna, Basque Land and Freedom) was established. Since the death of the dictator Franco (November 20, 1975) and the following transition to democracy, the 'Basque nationalist question' dominates politics and everyday life of the Basque Country. Young nationalists, assembled in the youth organization Jarrai, frequently set fire to cars from Madrid while screaming 'Euskal Herria Askatu' (Freedom for the Basque Country) and 'Gora ETA!' ('Hail ETA!'). Other young people are, however, attracted by movements such as Gesto por la Paz (Gesture for Peace). Three political parties may be called more or less nationalistic. The Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV, established in 1895) is the most moderate party. Herri Batasuna (HB, established in 1979) is seen as the political arm of the ETA. The Eusko Alkartasuna (EA) strives to independence for Euskadi but rejects violent ways and thus ETA to reach this goal. In last general elections in 1996, the three national(istic) parties received almost half of the votes (45%). The quota-sample included 774 secondary school students, 14-18 years of age. The respondents were contacted through their schools (25 schools). Schools were selected on the basis of schooltype (BUP, i.e., three years of secondary education, and COU, i.e., one year of pre-university education), geographical location (the three provinces Álava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya; fourteen municipalities), private or public type of school, and the linguistic model of the school (Euskera or Castilian/'Spanish' language). The respondents filled out a questionnaire containing 97 single- and multi-item questions covering national attitudes and a variety of other political orientations.

We included 25 Spanish national attitudes' items and 37 Basque regional national attitudes' items. Sander Hoogendoorn translated the originally English questionnaire in the Spanish language. A political scientist from the Universidad de la Rioja in Logroño, Juan Andres Muñoz Arnau also translated the questionnaire in Spanish. Differences between the two translations were discussed and decided upon. Juan Andres Muñoz Arnau also assisted in contacting the schools and helped to solve all kinds of logistical and organizational problems. The ambiance at the time of our research may have influenced the outcomes. Demonstrations and violent actions by young people were common practice. The Basque businessman José María Aldaia and the Spanish warder José Antonio Ortega were held in hostage by the ETA. Some Basque groups demanded their release, while Basque nationalists organized contra-demonstrations. After finishing our data-collection (January and February 1996), more acts of violence took place before, during and after the general elections (March 3, 1996).

18. This subsample consisted of students in pre-vocational education schools (17%), middle general secondary education schools (40%), higher general secondary education schools (17%), and pre-university education schools (26%). The per cent of students of protestant schools was 32%, while 41% attended catholic schools, 17% schools of another denomination, and 9% attended public schools. The per cent of students of grade 3 was 42%, grade 4: 31%, and grade 5: 28%. The gender representation was: males: 51% and females 49%. The age representation was: ≤ 14 year: 10%, 15 year: 27%, 16 year: 31%, 17 year: 18%, ≥ 18 year: 12%, and unknown: 2%.

19. Thereto the answers to all items were dichotomized; the answers to the individual items were recoded whereby the scores 1 and 2 ("completely agreeing" and "agreeing") were recoded in 1 (agreeing) and the scores 3 and 4 ("disagreeing" and "completely disagreeing") in a score of 0 (disagreeing). Next, the score for each of the subscales, including 2, 3 or 4 items was computed. This subscale score was based on the number of items with which the respondent agreed and could vary from 0 to 4 (national liking: 4 items, scores 0-4; national pride, preference and superiority: 2 items: scores 0-2; nationalism: 3 items: scores 0-3). In order to get a comparable score for each of the subscales, including different numbers of items, the subscale scores were recoded in 1 (absence of attitude, e.g., no national liking), 2 (modest attitude, e.g., some national liking), and 3 (strong attitude, e.g., much national liking). National liking: the subscale scores 0 and 1 were recoded in a score of 1, the subscale scores 2 and 3 in 2, and the subscale score of 4 in a score of 3. National pride, preference and superiority: the subscale score of 0 was recoded in a score of 1, subscale score 1 in a score of 2, and subscale score 2 in a score of 3. Nationalism: the subscale score of 0 was recoded in a score of 1, the subscale scores 1 and 2 in a score of 2, and subscale score 3 in a score of 3). For the national feeling subscale score the different original answer options were used (answer option 1, "completely agreeing", was recoded in a score of 3, answer options 2 and 3 in a score of 2, and answer option 4 in a score of 1).

20. We also measured the political left-right self-scaling, attitude toward foreigners living in the Netherlands, and preference for the extreme right-wing party, represented in the Dutch parliament to validate the findings. It was expected that the more the respondents place themselves to the political right and the more negative their attitude toward foreigners is, the higher their national attitude score is. The respondents with a preference for the extreme right-wing political party were also expected to have a very high national attitude score. For these bivariate analysis total national attitude scores were computed. These total national attitude scores could vary between 6 and 18 (6 subscales times the score of 1, 2 or 3). Respondents were considered having a weak positive national attitude when they scored 6-9, a modest positive attitude when they scored 10-14, and a strong positive national attitude when they scored 15-18. Among the respondents who placed their own political ideas on a ten-point left-right scale provided for that purpose (61%) the political centre (point 4-7) was most popular (31%), while the political left (point 1-3) scored 18% and political right (point 8-10) received 12% (n = 901). The more the respondents placed themselves to the political right, the higher their national attitude scale score was (r .35). The negative attitude toward foreigners did also correlate with national attitude (r .56); the more the students had a negative attitude toward foreigners, the higher their national attitude scale score was. This attitude measured by asking the respondents to say whether they (completely) agreed or (completely) disagreed with statements such as "foreigners in the Netherlands are threatening Dutch culture", "asylum-seekers come to our country in order to profit from social security", "foreigners living in the Netherlands take the jobs of the Dutch", "foreigners living in the Netherlands should take over Dutch habits and customs", and "asylum seekers should stay in

their country of origin; there are already more than enough foreigners in our country". The five items formed a reliable scale (Cronbach's α : .91). The scale scores indicated that more than one third of the respondents (37%) had a (very) negative attitude toward foreigners (agreeing with 3-5 items). Boys (compared to girls) had a more negative attitude toward foreigners (Somer's $d = .25$). Students from higher secondary education schools, compared to students from lower types of secondary school education, had a less negative attitude toward foreigners (Somer's $d = .23$). Among the respondents with a party-preference (66%), the extreme right-wing party represented in the Dutch parliament received 5% of the preferences. This extreme right-wing party did score low among the respondents with the lowest score on the national attitude scale (2%), and scored high among the respondents with the highest national attitude scale score (23%; $n = 413$). Another interesting bivariate finding was that national attitude correlated with gender ($r = .27$); boys scoring higher compared to girls. The correlation with subjective social class was statistically not significant.

21. It is a weak point of this study that the evaluation of the clichés and stereotypes was decided upon by the researchers (though on the basis of previous research) and not by the respondents themselves.

22. We also asked a question to measure worry on the political situation. The statement that "the political situation in Slovakia will get worse in the future" received an agreement from six out of ten respondents (59%, while 13% disagreed).

23. Question: 'Sometimes you can hear people saying that politicians have charisma, which means that they have a good character and the vigour to convince. Could you indicate how much charisma each of the following politicians have'? Answer options: a scale from 1 (almost no charisma) to 10 (much charisma).

24. Question: 'How often have you heard or read each of the following statements'? Statements: 'We, the Basques, should not mix with the rest of the Spaniards', 'We, the Basques, should not mix with other nationalities', 'Navarra should unite with the Basque Country in a separate and independent state, Euskadi', 'Lapurdi, Baja Navarra and Zuberoa, the parts of France where are people who speak Euskera, should unite with the Basque Country in a separate and independent state, Euskadi', 'Cooperation with other regions of Spain overburdens the Basque Country, and should therefore be stopped', and 'International cooperation with other countries overburdens the Basque Country, and should therefore be stopped'. Answer options: very often, often, sometimes, never. Question: 'Where and from who or what have you heard or seen these statements'? Respondents were allowed to mark as many socializers as they want. The list included seventeen socializers (see table).

25. Questions: 'How often do you talk about the Basque Country with each of the following persons'? and 'How often do you talk about the Basques with each of the following persons'? Persons: grandparents, father, mother, brothers/sisters, teachers, best friend, and priest. Answer options: often, regularly, sometimes, never.

26. Question: 'Have you participated in a commemoration on Aberri Eguna'? Answer options: yes, no.

27. Question: 'How many songs about the Basque Country do you know'? Answer options: many, some, few, no songs. Question: 'How often do you sing or listen to songs about the Basque Country'? Answer options: very often, often, sometimes, never.

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